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This thesis is an investigation of the theoretical and empirical consequences of
idiolectical variation for the coherence of natural language dialogue. In essence,
it is an elaboration of the intuition that we do not all mean the same thing by a
given expression.
To the extent that semantic theories have been applied to modelling dialogue,
it is argued that it has involved appeal, implicit and explicit, to a shared semantic
code as the basic guarantee of mutual-intelligibility. The case is made that idiolec¬
tical variation should be understood as a semantic phenomenon, indeed may be
fundamental to the normative character of semantic content, and as such it under¬
mines models of communication that depend on the existence of such a code. A
parallel problem is identified in empirical models of dialogue where there has been
a tendency to concentrate on social and pragmatic factors in interactional coher¬
ence whilst remaining silent on the processes that contribute to the achievement of
semantic coordination. It is argued that, again, there is often an assumption that
the recognition of some code-like level of literal meaning proceeds automatically
but no explanation of how this level arises. Two notable exceptions to this are
the Collaborative Model of Dialogue and the Input-Output Coordination Model;
however, they offer conflicting accounts of the mechanisms involved in semantic
coordination: the former appeals to the pairwise establishment of mutual belief
whereas the latter offers a group-based account of semantic conventions. Three
experiments are reported which investigate in more detail the emergence of se¬
mantic coordination within experimental communities and provide a test of these
competing explanations. The results indicate that neither of the existing accounts
is fully adequate and an alternative, repair driven, model is proposed. This model
allows for an arbitrary degree of idiolectical variation to obtain between individ¬
uals while still accounting for the convergence in interpretation necessary for the
coordination of actions through dialogue. To provide a semantic model for this
explanation a formal framework is proposed, using Channel Theory, in which both
conventional cognitive and semantic analyses can be reconciled.
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Dialogue is the primary site of language-use in ontogeny and phylogeny. In evo¬
lutionary time, language is thought to have emerged with the Hominids, approx¬
imately 2 million years ago (Foley, 1987). By contrast, the earliest evidence of
any written language is dated to approximately 10 thousand years ago (Schmidt-
Besserat, 1991) and Cherry (1966) estimates that only 5% of languages have a
written form. In development, children achieve communicative competence in
their native language prior to engaging with the problems of becoming literate.
The skills required to communicate successfully in a natural language seem to be
prior to those required for negotiating the other forms of language to which we
are exposed. Despite its centrality in the development of language, dialogue per
se has received little attention from psycholinguists or semanticists (Clark, 1985).
There is a tendency to assimilate dialogue to monologue under the heading 'dis¬
course', obscuring the problems specific to the maintenance of the inter-individual
1
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coherence of linguistic interaction. Intuitively, an important problem specific to
dialogue is that individuals must attempt to coordinate meaning. Where inter¬
locutors vary in their interpretation of words and expressions they must find some
way of dealing with the threat this poses to the success of their interaction. The
organising concern of this thesis is with the empirical and theoretical problems id-
iolectical variation poses for the mutual-intelligibility of dialogue. Empirically, the
question is how mutual-intelligibility is achieved and maintained in dialogue de¬
spite idiolectical variation. Theoretically, the question is how theories of meaning,
particularly those in the formal semantic tradition, can accommodate idiolectical
variation.
Like much of cognitive science, what follows is an exercise in ecumenicalism,
attempting to recruit findings from experimental psychology, formal semantics
and philosophy of language to the exploration of this theme. Some obvious dan¬
gers attend an interdenominational approach, not only because it may offer a
weaker analysis than a more focused investigation would allow, but also because
it may violate some of the commitments that delineate each discipline it draws
on. Sectarian antipathies notwithstanding, interdisciplinary research also promises
substantial advantages, not least because it holds out the possibility of bringing a
range of tools and methodologies to bear on a common problem. Whatever claim
this work has on developing a coherent thesis, it is defended on the grounds that
it starts from a specific problem and explores its implications in several areas in
cognitive science. A more practical corrollary of the interdisciplinary approach
adopted here is that no exhaustive, coherent literature review is possible. Rather
than appealing for absolution, the strategy followed below is to try and deal with
the relevant elements of each literature as they arise rather than corralling them
all into one chapter.
One important tradition whose toes do not fall under the steps made by the
following pages is that referred to by Markova. (1990) as "clialogism" (see also
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Leudar, 1991). In this literature, the notion of dialogue is elaborated beyond
processes of face-to-face interaction to an epistemological stance on the nature of
cultural and historical development as, for example, in the Hegellian notion of di¬
alectic. Where psychological issues are raised, the emphasis is on psychology and
cognition as socially constituted, rather than individualistic, phenomena. The pre¬
occupations of cognitive science do not readily accommodate this tradition, not
least because it draws extensively on phenomenology and 'modern' continental
philosophy where, by contrast, the majority of work in cognitive science follows
in the Anglo-American analytic tradition. It would be wrong to overplay these
differences; however, they are sufficient to prevent any attempt by the ensuing
discussion to span the gap between them. There are points of contact though,
particularly with respect to the problems of perspectival relativity and the nor¬
mative nature of meaning and, where relevant, these issues are raised.
In terms of the overall plan of this thesis, the remainder of this chapter con¬
centrates on outlining the, often tacit, commitment of semantic theories to code
based models of mutual-intelligibility. Chapter 2 explores in some detail the prob¬
lems idiolectical variation poses for code-based accounts and its relation to several
themes in the philosophy of language. Chapter 3 turns to the examination of a
number of empirical models of dialogue and the extent to which they can address
the difficulties raised for code theories. It is argued that only two proposals offer
analyses which impact on questions of semantic coordination. Chapter 4 reports
three experiments designed to separate the competing claims of these two models.
The results of these experiments suggest neither account is entirely adequate and
an alternative explanation for the mechanisms by which coordination is achieved is
offered. Chapter 5 returns to the formal concerns, developing a proposal for a se¬
mantic framework which can address idiolectical variation and can provide a basic
model for the phenomena observed in the experimental work. Finally, Chapter 6
attempts to draw together the arguments of the preceding chapters and discusses
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their implications for the study of meaning.
1.1.1 Terminology
A practical difficulty that besets discussion of theories of meaning and comprehen¬
sion is the confusion engendered by terminological clashes between different areas.
Although it is impossible to detect and pre-empt all the potential conflicts it is
useful to state at the outset how some terms are intended throughout the text.
For the purposes of characterising meaning in natural language a tripartite
distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics has traditionally been im¬
posed. Roughly, syntax characterises the structural or grammatical component
of language, pragmatics characterises the factors relating to particular occasions
of use and semantics characterises the aspects of meaning, sometimes referred to
as literal meaning, that are understood as somehow given by a particular lan¬
guage independently of its deployment in particular situations, ft is difficult to
give an independent justification for the distinction between the contribution to
meaning made by the semantic resources of a language and the contribution made
by pragmatic factors. Usually, the distinction is drawn purely on theory-internal
grounds. For example, Gazdar (1979) defines pragmatics as meaning minus truth
conditions. There is no interest here in becoming embroiled in the defence of a
particular application of this terminology. The ensuing discussion is understood,
by the author at least, to be primarily concerned with semantic issues but often
strays in the direction of pragmatics.
The term "concept" is used as an explicitly mentalistic term, appying to cog¬
nitive or psychological state(s) rather than the abstract, 'platonic', philosophical
notion (Fodor, 1981, also notes this potential confusion). Some authors ecprate
concepts with the notion of intension (see e.g., the discussion in Putnam, 1975).
Here, intension is restricted to its technical sense of a function that determines
the extension of a term, and concept is used in its psychological sense.
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The term "dialogue" is used to refer to multi-party discourse in a natural lan¬
guage and is not restricted to situations in which there are only two interlocutors.
"Discourse" itself is treated as a superordinate category of extended linguistic
performances by one or more individuals; i.e. it subsumes both monologue and
dialogue.
1.2 Theorising Meaning
Meaning is a nebulous notion, understood as anything from the emotional impact
of a painting to the reference of a particular word. Despite the variety of contexts
in which the term is used, informal discourse about meaning in language displays
a consistent bias toward treating meanings as objects that are passed between
individuals. Reddy (1979) estimates that, in English, 70% of expressions relating
to meaning are structured by the "conduit metaphor" (see also Lakoff & Johnson,
1980). The conduit metaphor embodies the idea that communication is a process
of transfer of thoughts and feelings using language as a container. For example,
the following expressions are typical of talk about meaning (the numbering from
Reddy's original article is retained):
I Try to get your thoughts across better.
5 You have to put each concept into words very carefully.
II The sentence was filled with emotion.
13 Your words are hollow you don't mean them.
These examples illustrate what Reddy terms the "major framework" of the
metaphor. In each case there is some concept or thought which is placed into a
word or utterance for transmission and then retrieved through extraction by the
listener. In the major framework, an utterance serves as a pipe or conduit directly
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linking interlocutors. However, the metaphor also displays a generalisation which
suspends the requirement that thoughts are always contained in something. In
this case ideas and feelings are 'released' into some general, public, space between
individuals where they may exist in an independent or disembodied form until
they are picked up again. For example,
27 Put those thoughts clown, on paper before you lose them.
30 That concept has been floating around for decades.
32 You'll find better ideas than those in the library.
Of course, 'common sense' talk about meaning is untroubled by questions of
whether it offers a coherent analysis in the theoretician's eye. Such questions are
academic, in the pejorative sense. Informal notions do, however, often provide
the pre-theoretical basis on which more systematic speculations are based. As a
pre-theoretical account of meaning, the conduit metaphor employs a reification
of thoughts or concepts which are passed between individuals using language.
However, it combines two potentially distinct views on what these objects are. The
minor framework of the metaphor highlights the view that meanings are public
objects: we see tables and we see meanings. The major framework highlights the
intuition that meanings are psychological entities, that we put our thoughts into
words. Consider Reddy's examples;
8 Your concepts come across beautifully
26 You only have a short time, so try to stuff your essay with all your best ideas
31 I can't seem to get these ideas into words
Concepts and thoughts are treated as both public and private objects, thus
obscuring a distinction that forms a major fault line in semantic theory, where
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there has been a tendency to treat semantic entities as either psychological states
or public objects but not both.
1.2.1 Semantical Realism
Semantical realists view the analysis ofmeanings in a way resonant with the minor
framework of the conduit metaphor. The clearest statement of this approach is
found in the work of Frege (1892) who distinguished three components of meaning,
Sinn, Vorstellung and Bedeutung, usually translated as sense, idea and reference.
For Frege, senses are abstract objects, like Platonic forms, that individuals grasp
(sic) with varying degrees of success. Like concepts and thoughts in the minor
framework, senses are autonomous objects that exist independently of the human
mind. Ideas, by contrast, are subjective psychological states, private to, and de¬
pendent on, the individuals who entertain them. As Schweizer (1991) emphasises,
Frege understood the grasping of a sense not as a purely psychological state but
as something analogous to the realist view of perception where to see an object is
to stand in a relation to something external. On this view, a 'grasped' sense is not
reducible to its associated psychological states in the same way that an object of
perception is not reducible to perceptual sates. My perception of a tree is not nu¬
merically or qualitatively the same as your perception but, under the appropriate
circumstances, we maintain that it is of the same tree. To preserve the possiblity
that the truth or falsity of an expression is a matter of fact, independent of indi¬
vidual beliefs, Frege invoked senses as the semantical objects being perceived or
grasped.
Frege's views have formed the cornerstone of subsequent work in formal seman¬
tics and many authors explicitly maintain the commitment to semantical realism
(e.g., Lewis, 1972b; Dowty, Wall, & Peters, 1981). Montague, whose work was
seminal in this area, advocated a view of formal semantics as a branch of math-
matics, not psychology (Partee, 1979). For authors in this tradition, theories of
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meaning for natural language must account, at a minimum, for the way in which
some expressions are true and some are false. In so far as meaning mediates, in a
systematic way, between the form of expressions and the form of the world, formal
semantics aims to characterise this relation.
Arguably, the most successful approach in this area has involved the specifica¬
tion of a model theory constructed in a way that provides an abstract structure
reflecting the properties of the world relevant to the truth of particular expressions
(e.g., Dowty et ah, 1981; Kamp & Reyle, 1993; Lewis, 1972b). To provide a math-
matical foundation, the models are constructed using set theory. The standard
approach is to determine a set of individuals, Um-, which represents the universe
of the model and use subsets of the universe to analyse the simple and compound
terms in the language being modelled. Typically, names are assigned to individuals
in i £ Um-i n-place predicates are assigned subsets of n-place tuples of individuals
and so on. Where possible worlds techniques are employed, for example, Lewis
(1972b), Dowty et a.l. (1981), different assignments of individuals in Um are made
for predicates and names in different worlds. The functions that make these as¬
signments are intensions which take as their arguments indices determining, for
example, a set of possible worlds, a set of contextual coordinates to a speaker,
time of utterance and audience, and an index to an assignment of individuals to
variables. The range of an intension is its extension in the model. The intension of
a sentence is a function from indices to propositions, analysed as sets of possible
worlds. The intension of a common noun is a function from indices to sets of
individuals in the model. For more complex linguistic categories, the associated
intensions are more elaborate. To characterise verb phrases, appeal is made to a
function from name intensions to sentence intensions. For adverbs, the function is
from verb phrase intensions to verb phrase intensions. The defence of, and interest
in, model-theoretic or referential semantics lies in the details of how the intensions
create alternative structures for each expression in way that deals with issues such
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as quantifier scope ambiguity and pronoun resolution.
1.2.2 Semantical Cognitivism
The metaphysical commitments of semantical realism have proved unattractive
for many authors. The appeal to abstract, real entities that connect language
directly with the world contributes little to understanding how people actually use
and comprehend natural language. Semantical cognitivists maintain that it is the
cognitive or mental states of individuals that mediate between language and the
world and that a theory of meaning must be characterised in terms of these states.
Gardenfors (1993) insists that "meanings are in the head" (p.288). The cognitivist
claim, that knowing the meaning of a word consists in associating some thought or
concept with it, has a long history. Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Putnam (1988)
trace it as far back as Aristotle's De interpretations. People associate some form of
mental representation, in Aristotle's terms "affectations of the soul [.. . ] that are
in themselves likenesses of actual things", with words that determine the meaning
or sense of those words for them. Semantical cognitivism thus gives expression
to the conduit metaphor's treatment of thoughts and concepts as psychological
entities that individuals 'put into words'.
Early attempts to provide a systematic, cognitive, theory of semantics typically
attempted to determine a set of primitive features or properties that exhaust the
meaning of a word (Katz, 1972; Katz & Fodor, 1963). Thus "boy" is analysed by
appeal to the properties, Male, Human and Non-adult, "girl" by appeal to, Female,
Human, Non-adult. The expression "Pat is a boy", is analysed as expressing the
conjunction of propositions: Male(Pat) & Non-adult(Pat) & Human(Pat). Clark
and Clark (1977) discuss the details of this and related proposals in some detail.
Ultimately, the attempt to isolate primitive properties in this way was aban¬
doned for a number of widely discussed reasons (see, e.g., Putnam, 1970, 1975;
Johnson-Laird, 1983). An important problem is that the cognitive structures that
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individuals associate with the meaning of words act like vague theories that help
to pick out typical instances rather than definitions consisting of various primitive
properties. The definitional view suggests, for instance, that something either is
a bird or it isn't: i.e. it either has the properties expressed by the propositions
which analyse the meaning of "bird" or it doesn't. However, it has been repeat¬
edly demonstrated that people regard some birds as better examples of birdhood
than others. Penguins are generally considered less typical examples of birds
than Robins (Rosch, 1973). There are also much cited examples of words, such
as "game", that do not seem to possess any definitional properties (Wittgenstein,
1958). The task of accounting for these, and similar, observations seems to require
appeal to a richer representation than that admitted by definitional approaches.
A range of proposals have been made that try to provide a more adequate ac¬
count of the cognitive structures that underpin natural language semantics. Work
in the area of cognitive semantics has concentrated on developing more elaborate
structures for concepts and the nature of their connections, perceptual and expe¬
riential, with the world (e.g., Neisser, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 1986). In
addition to the truth-functional aspects of meaning emphasised by semantical re¬
alists, cognitive semantics is also concerned with finer-grained semantic contrasts,
such as "half-full" versus "half-empty", that do not directly impact on the truth of
an expression. This has involved appeal to quite highly structured cognitive states
such as image schemas and radial categories. Other proposals, e.g., Johnson-Laird
(1983), Miller and Jolmson-Laird (1976), have concentrated on a procedural anal¬
ysis of meaning in which some simple, propositional, meaning of a expression is
recovered in the first stage of language-processing and then elaborated into a spe¬
cific interpretation through the construction of a mental model. There have also
been attempts to recruit the apparatus of model theoretic semantics to the task
of characterising the psychological states associated with production and com¬
prehension. For example, Stalnaker (1987) suggests an interpretation of possible
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worlds in terms of epistemologically possible worlds. However, there are a number
of substantive problems with interpreting formal semantic structures in this way
(see, e.g., Putnam, 1975; Partee, 1979; Gardenfors, 1991).
The details of the alternative models proposed in both the realist and cogni-
tivist approaches are not directly of interest here. For the purposes of this thesis,
the importance of semantic theory resides in the contribution it can make to un¬
derstanding how mutual-intelligibility is achieved in natural language dialogue.
1.3 Theorising Communication
Semantical realism endorses the notion of thoughts as public objects and pro¬
ceeds to characterise them in terms of abstract senses and propositions associated
with the various expressions in a particular language. Semantical cognitivism en¬
dorses the notion of thoughts as private, psychological objects and proceeds to
characterise them in terms of cognitive concepts and propositions entertained by
individuals who speak a particular language. While both approaches develop quite
elaborate proposals concerning the structure of thoughts or concepts, neither is
concerned with developing a detailed explanation of how these structures relate
to the communicative aspects of language. However, the intuition that the notion
of meaning is intimately related to communication is evident in both approaches.
As noted above, Frege argued from the fact that individuals could, through
communication, 'grasp' the same meaning to the conclusion that senses cannot be
reduced to private psychological states (cf. Taylor, 1992). Semantical realists often
explicitly acknowledge the importance of mutual-intelligibility as an explanandum
for theories of meaniixg (e.g., Lewis, 1969; Davidson, 1977; Karnp & Reyle, 1993).1
1 For example, "central among the problems [for a theory of meaning] is the task of explaining
language and communication ..." (Davidson, 1977, p.215) "Languages are for communication.
To know a language is to know how to communicate with it ..." (Karnp and Ryle, 1993, p.7).
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However, the preoccupation of semantical realism with the specification of abstract
structures for a language leaves only a vestigial account of how communication is
actually achieved. Probably the most that can be said is that, in the ideal case,
individuals who speak the same language make inferences in accordance with the
structures specified by the model for that language.2
A concern for the possibility of successful communication also informs cogni-
tivist approaches. A typical statement is found in Locke (1690), who explicitly
referred to language as the "great conduit":
"To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it is
necessary, as has been said, that they excite in the hearer exactly the
same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this men
fill one another's heads with noise and sounds but convey not thereby
their thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is the
end of discourse and language" (Locke, 1690; III.ix.6)
For Locke, successful communication, where it occurs, is due to a matching
of ideas, and success is guaranteed only where different individuals respect the
same pairing of ideas and words. However, like the accounts of semantical realists,
little more than this is said about how the 'matching of ideas' is actually achieved.
Oddly, this is still the case in contemporary cognitivist accounts where there is
rarely more than a cursory nod in the direction ofmutual-intelligibility. More will
be said about this below.
On the view that semantics characterises those aspects of meaning given by
a language or, perhaps, given in virtue of membership of a particular linguistic
community, the relative silence on issues relating to communication may seem
perfectly defensible. Communication, it might be argued, is precisely a matter
2Dowty et al. (1981) suggest that accounting for speakers' intuitions about entailments is an
important goal for model theory.
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for pragmatics, not semantics. An important theme of this thesis is to argue
that this way of partitioning the explanation of meaning is unsustainable. A
preliminary step in developing this claim is to establish that the application of
semantic theories to the task of modelling communication imports the assumption
that there is some basic, cocle-like level of meaning which underwrites the mutual-
intelligibility of natural language dialogue.
1.3.1 The Naive Code Model
In ordinary discourse, the notions of meaning and communication are deeply in¬
tertwined. The reification of thoughts and concepts in the conduit metaphor is
bound up with an implicit theory of what mutual-intelligibility consists in. As
Redely (1979) emphasises, the conduit metaphor assimilates concepts or thoughts
to words in a way that naturally gives rise to a view of languages as codes that
pair symbols, or groups of symbols, with meanings. This fosters a view of suc¬
cessful communication, in the sense of mutual-intelligibility, where the parties to a
dialogue respect the same pairing. While both strands of semantic theory depart
substantially from ordinary discourse in their analyses of the nature of seman¬
tic structures, both appear to subscribe to this 'naive code' model of mutual-
intelligibility. In support of this claim it is useful to survey the ways in which
semantic theory has been applied in modelling communication.
As noted above, the conventional interpretation of formal semantics as charac¬
terising abstract, mathematical objects is not conducive to consideration of how
agents might actually communicate. However, some recent approaches, such as
Discourse Representation Theory, or DRT, (Kamp & Reyle, 1993), have attended
more closely to the relationship between individual competence and formal struc¬
ture in determining interpretation. DRT places certain restrictions on the models
it allows and further restrictions are employed in the generation of possible dis¬
course representation structures (DRSs). Nonetheless, where different speakers are
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considered, although they may well vary in the assignment of, say, elements in the
model to anaphora in a particular DRS, if they speak the same language they are
assumed to employ the same model for a particular vocabulary. Of course, DRT
is principally concerned with the inter-sentential coherence, not inter-individual
coherence, of discourse. Some models with a more direct interest in multi-agent
communication employ model theory to provide a basic semantic structure for the
agents in their models (e.g., Airenti, Bara Bruno, &; Colombetti, 1993; Cohen &
Levesque, 1990; Galliers, 1989). Implicitly, agents are assumed to to determine
identical interpretation functions for mapping expressions onto their extensions,
and the semantic ontology, given by Um, is effectively transparent to the agents in
these models. As a result, the application of formal semantics to situations where
more than one agent or individual is considered imports a shared semantic code
respected by all the agents.
Work in Artifical Intelligence which examines issues such as multi-agent plan¬
ning and coordination also assumes the existence of some shared semantic code in
accounting for the basic interpretation of expressions by each agent (e.g., Grosz &
Sidner, 1990; Houghton & Isard, 1987; Pollack, 1990; Perrault, 1990). Again, these
models are not directly concerned with questions of semantic coordination: rather,
they presuppose some basic level of coordination in order to concentrate on the
investigation of issues such as how speech acts are recovered or how joint plans are
constructed. The use of a unique semantic representation is also a common feature
of research on natural language processing (Barr & Davidson, 1981), and forms
the basis of many theories of discourse analysis (Levinson, 1983; Prince, 1988). In
these cases, the investigators make no explicit claims about the inter-individual
coherence of discourse but the implication is that every individual who speaks a
particular language can be adequately characterised by the same apparatus.
The role of a shared code in determining mutual-intelligibility is particularly
clear in information theoretic models of communication (Shannon & Weaver, 1964;
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Cherry, 1966). Orignally, information theory was developed as means of charac¬
terising the quantitative aspects of communication, i.e. the average quantity of
information carried in a channel between a source and a receiver. The quantita¬
tive nature of the information transmitted in a particular case can be determined
only by reference to the processes of encoding and decoding that take place at
the source and receiver (cf. Dretske, 1981; Bar-Hillel &: Carnap, 1953). In the
terminology of information theory, the message is a set of alternative states at the
source which are encoded into a signal via a pairing of various physical character¬
istics of the signal with different states. The message itself cannot travel but is
converted into a signal that is decoded by the receiver(s) to obtain the message.
In order for communication to be successful, the process of decoding by the re¬
ceiver must respect the same pairing of signal characteristics with states. Applied
to natural language, this becomes the claim that the mental states or concepts
intended by the speaker are encoded into words and then decoded by the hearer
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Reddy, 1979). Successful transmission of a message
therefore depends on the existence of identical copies of the code in both speaker
and hearer.
Taylor (1992) discusses a number of code models that have been influential
in Linguistic theory, perhaps the best-known of which is the Saussurean notion
of langue. For Saussure, successful communication occurs and it is this fact that
stands in need of explanation. lie therefore proposes that languages consist of a set
of signs that pair acoustic images with concepts. As before, mutual-intelligibility
is possible because individuals who speak the same language respect the same
pairing of sounds and concepts, internalised through their exposure to a partic¬
ular speech community. In many respects Saussure's approach parallels that of
formal semantics, the principle interest being in investigating the structure of the
code, not the factors which determine how individuals, correctly or incorrectly, in¬
ternalise it. It is worth noting that Saussure's requirement for a pairing of acoustic
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images and concepts is especially strong, since concepts are defined by reference
to their role in the whole system constituted by the langue. Taylor points out that
this has the consequence that individuals cannot differ 011 just one word, since, if
they do, they differ on the entire language.
In most of the cases considered above the code is understood as a property
of a language, a property individuals must respect in order to count as speakers
of the language. The cognitivist, by contrast, is directly concerned with the pre¬
cise nature of the cognitive structures involved and the processes by which they
become internalised. One (in)famous strategy in dealing with this question has
been to adopt a nativist position with respect to concepts. The most radical for¬
mulation of this view is associated with Fodor (1975) who appeals to an innate
language of thought, or mentalese, into which expressions in natural language are
translated. The phylogenetic naturalism in Fodor's account is adduced in order to
guarantee that the same primitive concepts are shared by the entire species, again
providing a shared code that underwrites successful communication. .Jackendoff
(1992) also argues for an innate 'alphabet' of concepts or primitives shared by all
individuals that underpin meaning, although, in conrast to Fodor, he adopts a
more Saussurean line on how the meaning of these concepts is determined by the
system of distinctions in which they are embedded. Interestingly, Hurford (1989)
has developed a game theoretic model which illustrates how the Saussurean code
might become fixed by processes of natural selection.
For cognitivists in the empiricist tradition, this kind of analysis is unattractive
and other explanations of how a code can become internalised are sought. Locke
devoted considerable attention to the imperfections in each individual's under¬
standing which could lead to to "doubtfulness and uncertainty of signification".
He cited a number of factors, such as the problems with the retention of complex
ideas, understanding of vague ideas that have "110 certain connexion in nature"
and, somewhat presciently for the discussion of chapter 2, problems with deter-
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mining the 'correctness' of ideas whose definition is not widely known or which
do not capture the essence of the thing signified. In response to these worries,
Locke focussecl on the development of prescriptive principles according to which
the ideal code-model of communication would more usually be met.
In contemporary cognitive semantics, the issue of mutual-intelligibility rarely
receives explicit mention. However, even here code-theoretic assumptions surface
in the appeals to factors which can underwrite the sharing of some basic conceptual
structures. Significant attention is paid to experiential and perceptual factors that
are common for all individuals. For example, Lakolf (1987) repeatedly points to
basic-level concepts and the pre-conceptual structuring of experience as a means
of defending against a perceived relativistic threat to communication:
"The existence of directly meaningful concepts -basic-level con¬
cepts and image schemas- provides certain fixed points in the ob¬
jective evaluation of situations. The image schematic structuring of
bodily experience is, we hypothesize, the same for all human beings.
Moreover, the principles determining basic-level structure are also uni¬
versally valid, though the particular concepts arrived at may differ
somewhat. Thus, certain things will remain constant in assessing sit¬
uations." (Lakoff 1987, p.302)
Lakoff also discusses "grammaticised" concepts that are conventionalised in a
particular community:
"Concepts that are used in this way are fixed in the mind, or 'en¬
trenched', as opposed to being novel, that is, newly made up. Conven¬
tional concepts, shared by members of a culture, are also fixed in the
mind of each speaker." (1987, p.321)
For similar reasons, Keil (1981) appeals to universal constraints on learning
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as a way of providing individuals with concepts similar enough to allow them to
communicate.
The motivation for appealing to these various mechanisms seems to be to
provide some basic shared code that offers a minimum level ofmutual-intelligibility
and in virtue of which more elaborate communicative transactions can be achieved.
Thus Johnson-Laird (1983) assumes that people can recover enough meaning from
an utterance to apprehend its literal or propositional meaning and then proceed
from that to a more detailed model corresponding to a particular interpretation.
It is worth noting that a degree of hedging is evident concerning the exact degree
of similarity necessary between different individuals' concepts: they are required
to be "similar enough" or only "somewhat different". However, nothing is said
concerning how this is established or the circumstances under which concepts fail
to be similar enough to support communication.
1.4 Summary
The foregoing survey was designed to establish that, inasmuch as semantic theory
is bought to bear on questions of communication, there is a pervasive assumption
that mutual-intelligibility depends, at root, on the existence of a shared semantic
code. Effectively, people who speak the same language are treated as semantically
transparent to each other. Some qualifications are in order. This is not to claim
that this is a necessary feature of semantic theory: rather, it is a largely 'accidental'
consequence of the focus on other issues. Neither is it to suggest that different
theories are committed to the same sense of "shared". In semantical realism and
approaches such as Saussure's the code emerges as an assumption about the nature
of a language considered as a whole, independent of the individuals who speak the
language. In cognitivist and information theoretic approaches the code emerges
as something internal to individuals who speak the language. Furthermore, even
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within cognitivist semantics, there is a range of assumptions about exactly what is
shared. In Fodor's case it is a fully regimented formal language including primitive
symbols, syntax and proof theory while in Lakoff's it is no more than a set of basic
concepts that may be elaborated in different ways in different conceptual systems.
Despite these differences, it has been claimed that all these approaches are
committed, in one way or another, to a naive code model of mutual-intelligibility.
In the following chapters it will be argued, on conceptual and empirical grounds,
that this assumption is ultimately unsustainable and must be revised in order to
provide an adequate account of successful communication in dialogue.
Chapter 2
Content and Commensurability
This chapter elaborates the claim that idiolectical variation undermines the naive
code model of communication. In pursuit of this, section 2.1 provides a general
survey of the range of inter-individual differences with respect to normal1 interpre¬
tation and understanding. This leads to discussion of two problematic aspects of
semantic theories: firstly, the idealisation of individuals in a linguistic community
as semantically transparent to one another -the problem of commensurability;
secondly, the attempt to naturalise semantic content in terms of cognitive states
-the problem of content.
2.1 Idiolectical Variation
The suggestion that no two people will understand exactly the same thing by a
given utterance is tantamount to a cliche. For Fodor and Lepore (1992) it is a
"... patent truth that no two speakers of the same language ever speak exactly
the same dialect of that language" (p. 10). In general, we do not expect mem¬
bers of the same linguistic community to share exactly the same vocabularies nor
1Normal here is simply intended to exclude pathological cases such as dyslexia and anomia.
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recognise exactly the same meanings for the words they do share. This is, per¬
haps, unsurprising given the inevitable differences in each individual's exposure
to, and use of, language during their lives. Furthermore, there is a general concen¬
sus that the principal source of idiolectical variation in understanding is variation
in the cognitive structures (e.g., representations/images/concepts) that we each
associate with particular words or utterances (amongst others: Chomsky, 1986;
Frege, 1892; Lakoff, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Quine, 1960; Schutz, 1973).
The gross consensus is, of course, consistent with a range of proposals concern¬
ing the appropriate analysis of idiolectical variation. The underlying architecture
of conceptual structures, their relative stability and their course of development
are all contentious issues (see, e.g., Lakoff, 1987; Neisser, 1987). There are also
interesting questions concerning their relevance to models of syntax. The con¬
cern here is to establish that idiolectical variation should be understood, at least
in part, as a semantic phenomenon. Prima facie, several aspects of idiolectical
variation appear to raise semantic issues.
2.1.1 Misconceptions
Probably the most common and least controversial examples derive from situa¬
tions where an individual displays some 'deviant' understanding of a term. Burge
(1979) discusses the prevalence of idiosyncratic differences between an individual's
understanding of a term and its use in a community. Intuitively, there are many
cases where people suppose, for example, that a contract is only binding if it is
written and signed, or that "brisket" is a cut of beef without knowing exactly
which part of an animal it is cut from. Such misconceptions infect much of our
normal discourse but they do not ordinarily impede communication. In addition
to these 'secular' examples, the everyday use of terms recruited from specialist
areas also provides a range of familiar cases. For example, a number of terms
from theoretical psychology have passed into common usage but often without
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the theory that grounded their original introduction. A familiar case is the com¬
mon confusion of schizophrenia with multiple personality disorder. Terms such
as "neurotic" are often applied with enthusiasm by individuals who have only a
vague understanding of the clinical definition of the condition.
Although individual misconceptions of relatively well defined terms provide
the least contentious examples of semantic variation there are two respects in
which this focus can be misleading. Firstly, they foster the idea that to know
the meaning of a word is, in some sense, to internalise its definition. Departures
from an established definition or norm yield the possibility of comparisons of, for
example, expert and novice understanding. Clearly, such comparisons are only
possible where there is some standard conception available to act as a reference
point. However, emphasis on these cases can foster the idea that the correct
concept to associate with a word is its intension as determined by, for example,
scientific theory. Nonetheless, although ordinary usage presupposes that words
such as natural kind terms pick out a set of things that share some essential
essence, it is widely accepted that the concepts individuals actually associate with
natural kind terms rarely, if ever, determine that essence (for example: Lakoff,
1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Neisser, 1987; Putnam, 1970, 1975). Rather, as noted
in section 1.2.2, the concepts associated with terms like "lemon" and "tiger" act as
vague theories or sets of defeasible conditions that pick out typical instances of the
entity in cjuestion. Whatever their actual structure, these stereotypical concepts
do not determine the extension of natural kind terms in the way that scientific
definitions aim to. Nonetheless, normal practice often grants that an individual
knows the meaning of a term even where he or she does not understand, or even
necessarily know of the existence of, the relevant science.
The second side effect of the focus on individual deviation from a norm is
to obscure cases of divergent interpretation where there is no clear standard of
what counts as a correct conceptualisation. For example, there is no accepted
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definition of a "friend" and there are probably as many concepts of what consti¬
tutes a friend as there are friendships. Domains such as interpersonal relations
do not have definitive analyses which render comparisons of 'friendship expertise'
tractable. Consequently, they tend to be underrepresented in studies of conceptual
and semantic structures. If anything, idiosyncratic variations are probably even
more common in these less well defined domains.
2.1.2 Cognitive Depth
Putting aside questions concerning accuracy or correctness, another semantic as¬
pect of idiolectical variation is that it may have cognitively 'deep' effects. That is,
individual differences in the use of language about a domain cannot be dismissed
as superficial differences in, say, the labels applied to the underlying entities. This
point is readily illustrated by work on the effects of conceptual structure on rea¬
soning. Gentner and Gentner (1983) compared the influence of two predominant
metaphors that people spontaneously appeal to when prediciting the behaviour
of a circuit: as a moving crowd or as water flow. They found that these alterna¬
tive conceptualisations have a differential influence on problem solving, displaying
complementary strengths and weaknesses. For problems predicting the behaviour
of circuits that vary in their configuration of resistors, subjects who use the moving
crowd metaphor are more successful. By contrast, in problems which manipulate
the configuration of batteries, subjects who use the water-flow model generate
more successful predictions. Importantly, this indicates that adopting a particular
metaphor is not simply a matter of exegetical or communicative convenience, it
may reflect the structure of the underlying conceptualisation as evidenced by the
way it constrains reasoning and prediction. Gentner and Gentner (1983) provide
suggestive evidence that this is equally true of problem solving in scientific con¬
texts where metaphors may guide researchers toward certain concepts and away
from others. Analogy and metaphor are extremely pervasive aspects of natural
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language (e.g., Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and may have correspond¬
ingly pervasive effects on conceptualisation.2
2.1.3 Range of Variation
In addition to 'depth' it is important to consider the 'breadth' of conceptual vari¬
ation that needs to be addressed. Cross-cultural research on mental models illus¬
trates just how profound the range of variation can be. Iiutchins (1983) compared
the mental models of Micronesian and western navigators. Micronesian naviga¬
tors successfully negotiate voyages of up to 450 miles, out of sight of land, with
great accuracy. This is achieved without recourse to charts, compasses or any
mechanical navigation aids. In fact, the conceptual models of experienced nav¬
igators appear to be so radically different from their western counterparts that
these devices are not obviously of use to them. Rather than utilising the famil¬
iar absolute 'bird's eye' view of a voyage in two dimensional space, Micronesian
navigators adopt an egocentric viewpoint against which the bearings of various ref¬
erence points change. During a journey, reference islands move along the horizon,
the goal moves towards them and the starting point recedes. The horizon itself
is conceived as a line parallel to the canoe instead of a circle. Early anthropolo¬
gists discovered that, without extensive tutoring, techniques such as using several
sets of bearings to pinpoint an absolute location in two dimensional space were
almost completely incomprehensible to experienced Micronesian navigators. Al¬
though the western and Micronesian methods of navigation evolved in response to
the same problem they appear to achieve their results through radically divergent
conceptualisations and processes of computation.
2This is not to suggest, like the strong reading of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, that language
determines thought. The point is rather that what people say about a domain may reflect
more than a stylistic preference or trope: it may reflect structural differences in their underlying
conceptualisation.
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2.2 Idiolectical Variation and Ontology
While it is uncontroversial to suggest that idiolectical variation is widespread, the
extent to which it bears on semantic models is far less clear. While the examples
discussed above indicate that idiolectical variation raises general semantic issues,
a principal concern of this thesis is to press a specific claim about the semantics
of idiolects, specifically, that idiolectical variation needs to be analysed, at least
in part, as variation at the level of the semantic ontology.
2.2.1 The Realist Inheritance
As discussed in Chapter 1, semantical realists assume a set of ontologica.l primi¬
tives, the 'universe', over which interpretation functions are defined. These prim¬
itives are designed to capture the properties of the world relevant to the truth of
different expressions. Determination of exactly which primitives there are and how
they are individuated is taken to be principally a question for the natural sciences,
or perhaps careful conceptual analysis. The gamble is that the characterisation of
semantic properties, such as reference and entailment, can proceed independently
of any programme to naturalise the underlying ontology3 (e.g., Dowty et ah, 1981).
While this seems to be a viable strategy under a platonist or realist interpretation,
as noted above, attempts to adapt the machinery of semantic realism to models of
dialogue also import the commitment to a single ontology. It is this commitment
which comes under pressure from conceptual variation between different individu¬
als. While realist semantics appeals to a direct mapping between language and the
3In fact, the ontology of semantic theories also usually includes, at a minimum, set theory
and the logical connectives. The characterisation of these primitives is not normally considered
a matter for the natural sciences, not least because they also draw on the same, or similar,
machinery. The current discussion concentrates on the non-logical primitives, leaving aside
the equally tendentious issue of exactly how the logical and mathematical apparatus should be
understood.
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world, cognitivist semantics interposes cognitive structures between language and
the world and the interpretation function or reference relation must be realised
by individuals in the relevant linguistic community. The realist commitment to a
unique ontology becomes a psychological claim that there is some universal con¬
ceptual ontology. Prima facie, the examples discussed above suggest that this
assumption cannot be maintained.
Pressure on the assumption of a universal semantic ontology poses, in turn,
a direct threat to the applicability of semantic theory to accounting for mutual-
intelligibility and communication. Divergent conceptualisations undermine the
shared code account of communication because they imply divergent ontological
commitments. If individuals 'carve up' the world in different ways they will deter¬
mine different interpretation functions defined for different ontologies. However,
naive code models (see section 1.3.1) assume that the same concepts are associated
with the same words:
"Communication is achieved by encoding a message, which cannot
travel, into a signal, which can, and by decoding this signal at the
receiving end. Noise along the channel (electrical disturbances in our
example) can destroy or distort the signal. Otherwise as long as the
devices are in order and the codes are identical at both ends, suc¬
cessful communication is guaranteed." (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p.4,
emphasis added)
In a naive code model, a language is actually defined as a particular pairing
of signals with messages. If the requirement for identical codes which express
those messages is not met, then successful communication is, at best, a happy
contingency. In the case of human communication, the codes adopted by speaker
and hearer must match in order for successful communication to occur. We obtain
the bizarre consequence that, strictly speaking, interlocuters who do not have
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identical codes, i.e. who do not determine identical interpretation functions, fail
to speak the same language. Unmodified, the appeal to a common code ceases to
play any explanatory role in the success or failure of communication.
There are some obvious objections to this analysis. We might be legitimately
suspicious whether the difficulties for naive code models really constitute difficuli-
ties for code models in general. The most obvious response in this spirit is to
contest whether conceptual variation of the kind discussed above really is relevant
to the semantics of communication.
2.2.2 Idiolectical Variation as Noise
Methodologically, it might be justifiable to restrict the scope of semantic explana¬
tion by stipulating that normal communication consists in precisely those interac¬
tions for which a code model is appropriate. While, strictly speaking, there may be
no unique interpretation function, it might be legitimate to idealise to one in order
to maintain theoretical tractability. Like the performance-competence distinction
familiar in generative linguistics, semanticists might discount some variation by
appeal to performance factors. Certainly, it seems valid to claim that a semantic
theory should not be required to deal directly with, for example, memory limi¬
tations or pathological cases such as slips of the tongue. However, it seems that
this approach is not really plausible for variation of the kind recorded by Gentner
and Gentner (1983) and Hutchins (1983). The basic difficulty is that we observe
conceptual variation even where perfomance factors, in all relevant respects, are
constant.
The parallel with syntactic theory does, however, suggest a more robust line
of response. Different subgroups of speakers who share, to some degree, particu¬
lar conceptualisations might be regarded as speaking the same 'semantic dialect'.
The prevalence of idiosyncratic variation suggests that this idealisation may ulti¬
mately be unsustainable, however, even the established syntactic notions of dialect
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and language are often considered to be convenient fictions unsupported by any
systematic linguistic distinction (Chomsky, 1986). The fact that, in the long run,
such idealisations are difficult to defend empirically does not necessarily undermine
their programmatic value. An obvious advantage of this line of response is that
it offers a straightforward analysis of cases like those reported by Hutchins and
Centner and Gentner (ibid). The differences between subgroups or cultures can
be accommodated as dialectical variation. More importantly, the parallel with
syntax raises the possibility of appealing to a set of innate semantic universals
which constitute a common semantic structure underpinning dialectical (and, to
some extent, idiolectical) variation -in Chomskian terms, an I-language (cf. Jack-
endoff, 1992). If, following the Chomskian lead, we take the goal of psychological
semantics to be elucidation of innate semantic universals then the threat posed
by idiolectical variation is blunted. Some variation could be factored into the pa¬
rameters which fix different dialects and some could be factored into variation in
the integrity of each individual's 'semantic organ'. The resulting semantic theory
could ignore the noise created by individual variability and concentrate on map¬
ping the underlying semantic universals. In addition to defusing the challenge
from conceptual asymmetries this approach also suggests a possible reconciliation
with semantical realism since it offers a determinate ontology conditioned, through
natural selection, by the structure of the world.
2.3 Commensurability
Although the parallel with the Chomskian approach to syntactic theory brings
questions of innateness to the fore, nothing hinges directly on the, potentially
controversial, appeal to genetic endowment. The central issue for current pur¬
poses is whether it is possible, in principle, to devise a set of universal semantic
primitives. Idiolectical and dialectical differences must yield to an analysis which
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renders them commensurable. If we can identify a semantic 'lowest common de¬
nominator', idiolectical differences can be reduced to the same basic concepts and
thereby rendered mutually translatable. Given the right kind of inferential appa¬
ratus for encoding and decoding utterances, we obtain an account of the mutual-
intelligibility of natural language.4 The pivotal assumption for this general line
of response is that idiolects and, mutatis mutandis, dialects do, in fact, respect
some common semantic measure which guarantees their commensurability. The
assumption of commensurability has, often tacitly, informed research programmes
in many areas. It is instructive to consider its influence in three areas: machine
translation, developmental psychology and philosophy of science.
2.3.1 Cross-Linguistic Commensurability
The grossest requirement for a set of universal semantic primitives is that they
should capture all the potential distinctions available in all natural languages.
Cross-linguistic comparisons between, say, French and English, often reveal dis¬
tinctions in one language which are not found in another. For example, there is no
French word that directly translates the English "chair", neither "chaise" nor "fau-
teuil" capturing the same set of properties. Conversely, the French word "porte"
does not discriminate between the English words "door" and "gate" (Kay, Gawron,
& Norvig, 1994). Another example from French (discussed by Ivuhn, 1983) is
"pompe" which translates to the English "pomp" in ceremonial contexts and to
"pump" in hydraulic contexts. It is apparent that concepts such as CHAIR,5 that
might normally be invoked by a semantic analysis will need to be abandoned in
favour of more finely individuated primitives. Nonetheless, given an appropriately
4Sperber and Wilson (1986), e.g., pp.26-27, pursue just such a heterogeneous approach ar¬
guing for both an innate code and inferential processes.
5Notations! convention: where the concept is intended it will be rendered in upper-case e.g.,
CHAIR, the corressponding lexical items will be rendered in lower-case with double quotes to
distinguish mention from use, e.g., "chair".
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revised ontology, these examples might be amenable to an analysis which renders
them commensurable.
The prospects for this strategy of re-analysis look worse when we consider
more complex examples. Even restricting attention to French-English mismatches,
less tractable cases are apparent. The French word "esprit" can, depending on
the context, be translated as "spirit", "aptitude", "mind", "judgement" or "wit"
(Kuhn, 1983). Furthermore, French and English share a common root; if we
switch attention to translation mismatches between languages such as .Japanese
and English the difficulties multiply (see, e.g., Lakoff, 1987; Quine, 1969). Kay
et al. (1994) provide detailed discussion of the contrast between the Japanese verb
"nomu" and its normal English translation, "drink". In fact, "nomu" has a slightly
wider range of application and can be used for medicines or small objects. This
suggests a translation as "swallow". Assuming we require two different universal
concepts, DRINK and SWALLOW, a problem arises because SWALLOW is also
the right concept to associate with the English word "swallow". But this leaves
no way of accounting for the fact that "nomu" should sometimes translate as
"drink". While it is literally correct to clecribe drinking as swallowing, in some
contexts it sounds very marked. Translation of a Japanese phrase as "she is
swallowing water" implies a context like drowning rather than drinking. Although
the specific difficulty may be resolved by devising an extra, translation rule, such
a move seems ad hoc not least because the contextual factors which determine a
"drowning" interpretation are quite diffuse.
Translation mismatches have had important repercussions for attempts to au¬
tomate the process of translation. An important strand of research in machine
translation has focussed on the attempt to specify a language-neutral semantic
'interlingua' which, like a universal conceptual ontology, captures all the basic
semantic distinctions in the languages, or language fragments, it translates (Kay
et ah, 1994; Barr & Davidson, 1981). Once the interlingua has been determined,
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translation consists in decomposing the source sentence into its primitives and
then producing a meaning-preserving reconstruction in the target language. How¬
ever as examples like "nomu" illustrate, the accuracy of a translation seems to
depend not only on a particular source sentence considered alone but also on its
relation to the broader context, including the narrative context and the concep¬
tual resources and distinctions available in the language as a whole. Terms in one
natural language often seem to involve concepts almost 'orthogonal' to those asso¬
ciated with another. Although any specific example may be resolved by adding an
extra translation rule, the overall frequency of such mismatches raises the possibil¬
ity that something approaching world knowledge is necessary for their resolution.
Kay et al. (1994) conclude that the interlingual approach's lack of success is due
to reliance on a literal, what has here been termed code, model of what constitutes
translation. Instead of regarding translation as strictly meaning-preserving they
argue for an approach which models translation as a process of active negotiation
(cf. Bell, 1991).
2.3.2 Commensurability and Development
The literature on child development has seen a parallel dispute surrounding the
validity of what amounts to a 'code theoretic' picture of development. As Gopnik
(1983) notes, although the details of each proposal vary, there is a strong, roughly
Piagetian, tradition in theories of conceptual development which maintains that
a child's concepts of things like "animal" and "weight" can be analysed in terms
of a fixed set of semantic/conceptual primitives. The course of development is
envisaged as a process in which universal conceptual primitives are combined into
successively more sophisticated structures as learning proceeds.6 In turn, the
child uses these structures in order to interpret the language it is exposed to,
6See Jackendoff, 1992, pp.57-59, for a particularly explicit statement of this view.
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thus providing a model of how the child's intellectual and communicative abilities
develop.
As in the case of cross-linguistic comparisons, this assumption appears to be
empirically inadequate. Carey (1988) reports a detailed study of the interrela¬
tionships between the preschool child's concepts of "animal", "death" and "life".
These concepts diverge from those in adult language in a number of ways. The
concept of animal centres on a 'vitalist biology' which takes internally generated
activity to be the key property of living things. There is no recognition, for ex¬
ample, that each species must solve universal problems such as obtaining food
or reproducing and no understanding of internal bodily systems such as eating,
breathing and circulation. Death is conceived of as a reversible form of separation
where the dead effectively live on but in an altered state. For the preschooler, death
is part of an undifferentiated concept that includes UNREAL, INANIMATE and
NONEXISTENT. Carey claims that the meaning of the preschool child's biologi¬
cal concepts is partially determined by their interrelations within a whole nework
of related concepts which inform their reasoning about the world en masse. Sup¬
port for these claims comes from the influence these concepts have on structuring
the child's inferences (cf. Gentner & Gentner, 1983); for example, a child who
asks why it is possible to see objects like statues and tables if they are dead. Con¬
versely, children frequently maintain that active, useful things are alive. They will
classify, amongst other things, the sun, bicycles, the moon, fire and the buttons
on their trousers as alive.
Karmiloff-Smith (1988) utilises an experimental paradigm to investigate how
children's concepts of "weight" evolve during development. Six to seven year olds
will balance blocks on a beam according their geometric centre. If the weight
distribution of the blocks is shifted away from the centre, by attaching a weight to
one side of the block, this severely interrupts their performance. Both younger and
older childer, by contrast, are able to balance both 'off-centre' and normal blocks.
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The detailed differences between the age groups show some marked parallels with
the Kuhnian (see below) picture of scientific theorising. The younger children take
each block seperately and use simple proprioceptive feedback in order to get the
block to balance. They show no evidence of making any generalisations about
balancing points for sets of blocks. Even if they have successfully balanced one
block and an identical one is available they do not appear to have any expectation
that it will behave similarly. In contrast to this, the six to seven year olds adopt a
'geometric centre' theory for predicting how each block will balance. In fact, they
apply this theory so rigidly that when they fail to balance an off-centre block they
respond as if the problem was with their method, for example, trying to place
the block at the same point but much more slowly. For the older children, the
failure to balance the block is treated as data about the block, not a failure of their
method. As Karmiloff-Smith (1988) argues, like scientists at successive stages of
a research programme, children appear to adjust the boundary between data and
theory in a manner that frequently involves sacrificing data in order to preserve
theory.
These examples call into question what amounts to an assumption of com¬
mensurability in developmental theorising. Models which appeal to conceptual
primitives acting as basic building blocks do not fit comfortably with the studies
outlined above. Rather, many developmental psychologists argue that children
should be regarded as actively theorising about their environment in a manner
that undermines the validity of the appeal to universal conceptual primitives (e.g,
Gopnik, 1983; Carey, 1988; Karmiloff-Smith, 1988). As Karmiloff-Smith (1988)
puts it:
"They [children] constantly develop theories and create domains,
carving and re-carving nature at new joints" (p.192).
Echoing the problems created by translation mismatches, elucidation of the
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nature of a child's concepts appears to depend in opaque ways on the context, or
theory, in which they occur.
2.3.3 Commensurability and Scientific Theory
The emphasis on children-as-theorists was explicitly inspired by the work of Kuhn
(1970) and Feyerabend (1962) on diachronic change in scientific theories. This
work highlights the problems created by the way 'semantic interdependencies'
distribute throughout a theory. For example, Kuhn (1970. 1983) documents the
relationship between successive theories in disciplines like chemistry. Eighteenth
century chemical theory made extensive use of the notion of 'phlogiston1 to account
for various experimental data. As Kuhn (1983) points out, nothing in contempo¬
rary chemical theory can directly translate this term. Although in some cases it
is possible to identify a referent in terms of modern theory, for example as oxygen
or an oxygen-rich atmosphere, in other uses such as "phlogiston is emitted during
combustion", there is nothing recognised by contemporary chemical theory which
could act as a referent. In fact nothing, currently acknowledged, combines all the
appropriate properties. Consequently, any translation of an eighteenth century
text needs to adduce a range of different substitutions, and in some cases blanks.
Without an extra gloss provided by the translator it is not even clear that a single
notion or entity is actually intended (Kitcher, 1988). Contemporary theory also
lacks the auxiliary concepts corresponding to "principle" and "element". Phlo¬
giston was interdehned with these terms which determined a web of relationships
that do not map directly onto to anything in subsequent theories (Kuhn, 1983).
Wiser and Carey (1983) draw parallel conclusions from their study of the con¬
cepts of HEAT and TEMPERATURE. Prior to Black, these two concepts were
fused in a single notion, one that has no counterpart in current theory. Wiser and
Carey carefully rule out the possibility that this was due to a false belief that there
really were two different concepts involved but they were perfectly correlated. The
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older concept of HEAT combined both causal strength ancl qualitative intensity,
properties separated by the later theory. Nor were heat and temperature mea¬
sured separately by experimenters: instead they related a single variable, "degree
of heat", to a range of phenomena. From a contemporary perspective there is no
such thing as "degree of heat". Although any use of the concept in a particular
context might be held to correspond to either heat or temperature there is no
translation into contemporary theory which successfully preserves the sense of the
original concept.
Kuhn (1970, 1983) claims that changes in theory frequently amount to changes
of 'world view' or 'paradigm1 and that when such a transition occurs, the lan¬
guage of a scientific community, before and after the change, may not be mutually
inter-translatable. For example, Kuhn argues that Newtonian mechanics can¬
not be derived as a special case of Einsteinian unless the concepts corresponding
to "space", "mass" and "time" are actually reinterpreted. Conventional, homo-
phonic, translation fails to respect the basic sense of each term. For instance,
Newtonian mass is always conserved whereas Einsteinian mass is inter-convertible
with energy. Only where relative velocities are low can they be measured in the
same way (Kuhn, 1970, p. 102). The attempt to reduce Newtonian Mechanics to
Einsteinian also runs into difficulties because of the interdependence of each term
within the theory. In Newtonian mechanics, the terms "force" and "mass" have
to be acquired together with Newton's Second Law. They can't be learned in¬
dependently because the meaning of these concepts is defined in terms of their
mutual interdependence. In Einstein's theories, Newton's Second Law does not
apply, leaving no counterpart to Newtonian "force" and "mass" which might ad¬
mit a direct translation. Although the same terms occur in both theories their
various interdependencies are transformed between the two in a "displacement of
the conceptual network"(Kuhn, 1970, p.102).
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2.4 Incommensurability
The parallel with syntactic theory raised in the previous section suggested an
argument for discounting idiolectical differences as irrelevant to the interests of
semantic theory. This move gains plausibility from a certain intuitive picture of
conceptual differences as differences in beliefs about what are, in some sense, the
same underlying entities. As Putnam (1981) puts it: "as the difference between
the primitive concepts employed, by a theory, which are constant, and the con¬
ceptualisations in which they are employed which may vary" (p.116). Individual
variation, synchronic and diachronic, is construed as a matter of differences in the
way primitive concepts are combined, not as differences in the basic vocabulary.
Prima facie, each of the examples raised above undermine this picture. Sub¬
stantial cross-cultural variation of the kind recorded by Hutchins (1983) (see also
Lakoff, 1987) indicates that the goal of developing a universal ontology, if possible
at all, will demand a radical revision of what are normally considered to be the
primitives in semantic analysis. In order to accommodate translation mismatches,
patterns of conceptual development and conflicting scientific theories it seems rea¬
sonable to suppose that we would require a vocabulary couched at a very low level,
possibly in terms of perceptual or sensory primitives, in order to ensure adequate
coverage. While these examples may shift the burden of plausibility against such
a programme, thus far, they do not definitively rule it out.
However, there is a much more serious problem presaged by each of the exam¬
ples in section '2.3. They call into question whether it is actually possible, even
in principle, to isolate a set of semantic primitives common to all languages (or
developmental stages, or theories) independently of the various conceptual and
theoretical contexts in which they figure. Without such a division, there is no
reason to suppose that idiolects and dialects are, in fact, commensurable.
Probably the best-known proposal concerning the incommensurability of dif¬
ferent frameworks is associated with Kuhn (1970) who, argued that the changes
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in 'world view' that result from radical revisions of scientific theory render many
of the terms of each community incommensurable. Drawing on his historical anal¬
ysis of patterns of theory change, Kuhn argues that the web of interrelationships
between terms such as "force" and "mass" guarantee that substantial theoretical
shifts, even where the same words (or perhaps strings) are retained, also entail
ontological shifts. The examples above suggest that to the extent this holds for
scientific theory it also holds for developmental change, cross-linguistic disparities
and for conceptual differences in general. In each case, the diffuse influences of
the wider conceptual or linguistic background undermine the attempt to isolate
the theory-neutral content of a concept from its context.
Kuhn's argument is induced from the patterns of actual, historical, scientific
practice. Quine's paper, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", (Quine, 1953) provides
a more systematic analysis of what is essentially the same difficulty.' Quine's
attack begins with the first dogma, the analytic-synthetic distinction. Taking a
number of proposals in turn, Quine shows that definitions of analvticity in virtue
of, e.g., semantic rules, definition, or meaning, are inherently circular. Ultimately,
they involve appealing to intentional notions which themselves presuppose some
adequate definition of analyticity. An apparently attractive proposal for breaking
this circle is offered by the second dogma: roughly, the suggestion that meanings
can somehow be reduced to their primitive empirical content. The verificationist
program represents the most notable example of this, aiming to systematically
reduce the meaning of any 'high-level' statement to statements about the set of
primitive sense data which could confirm or infirm it. If achieved, this reduction
could provide a reconstruction of the notion of synonymy in terms of statements
' One obvious discontinuity between Kuhn's and Quine's positions is the latters focuses on the
meaning of statements rather than terms, a consequence of his view that reference is secondary
to truth. However, as Quine notes, the considerations he raises apply equally to terms and can
be derived by verifying whether the substiution of terms in a statement maintains synonymy.
See Quine, 1953, pp.37-38 and footnote 15.
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having the same empirical content or verification conditions and a reconstruction
of the notion of analyticity as statements which are always confirmed, no matter
what. However, as Quine emphasised, the difficulty lies in the intimate intercon¬
nections between theory and data. In practice, scientific statements are neither
exclusively empirical nor exclusively theoretical: "statements about the external
world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a cor¬
porate body."(1953, p.41). There are no 'empirical' statements which cannot be
salvaged in the face of recalcitrant data by appeal to auxiliary hypotheses, e.g.,
methodological factors or even hallucination. Conversely, there are no theoretical
claims, including logical laws, which are immune from revision. The response to
any particular piece of evidence depends, amongst other things, on global factors
such as theoretical conservativism, simplicity ancl heuristic value.
Although widely accepted, the Quinean analysis is not uncontroversial. Fodor
and Lepore (1992) in particular have suggested that, in fact, it cannot be co¬
herently formulated as a semantic thesis. The crux of their argument, and the
point from which all their objections stem, is that Quine holds both that a) the
meaning of a statement can be held constant in the face of confounding data by
revising the meaning of other statements and that b) because theories meet the
"tribunal of sense experience [... ] as a corporate body" changes in the interpre¬
tation of any single theoretical statement entail revisions in the meaning of all
the theoretical statements. As a result, they urge, Quine is caught in a dilemma:
semantic holism with respect to an entire theory is inconsistent with the sugges¬
tion that one statement may keep its meaning while others within the same theory
change. It is not at all clear however that Quine is actually committed to either
position. Firstly, he nowhere claims that the meaning of an ostensibly falsified pre¬
diction is held constant while others are revised. Rather, a threatened statement
may retain its truth value by revision of the truth value of one or more auxiliary
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statements.8 Without establishing the additional step that truth value exhausts
meaning, there is no contradiction. Revision of the truth value of auxiliary state¬
ments may well alter the meaning of a statement, for example, by changing its
reference, but nonetheless leave its truth value intact. In point of fact, Quine has
repeatedly emphasised that all the truth values of a theory can be held constant
under systematic variations in their ontology (Quine, 1960, 1992).
Taking up the second horn of the dilemma, it also seems clear that Quine is not
actually committed to the suggestion that revising the truth or, indeed, meaning
of one statement in a theory necessarily implies revision of all other statements
of a theory. In fact, this is an option which Quine explicitly rejects (Quine, 1953,
1992). For the current point, all that is required to get the difficulties going
is that it be unpredictable which auxiliary statements are revised in the face of
problematic data. As long as theory revision depends on nebulous considerations
such as simplicity and conservativism then the attempt to determine a set of fixed
points around which theories evolve is forlorn. There is nothing to guarantee that
it won't be the truth value of ontological claims that is sacrificed. Returning
to the other examples, the diffuse effect of embedding context on the content of
particular terms (or sentences) is apparent in the case of translation mismatches
and conceptual development in children. Just as theory revision may involve
disparate, unpreclicatable elements of the entire theoretical nexus, so the accuracy
of a translation may depend on diffuse elements of the linguistic context. Similarly,
a child confronted by "recalcitrant experience" may choose to revise any of the
auxiliary hypotheses available to it, including those relating to its ontological
commitment s.
The problems identified by Quine also feed into the prospects for naturalising
For example: "A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the
interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements" (1953,
p.42) "Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments
elsewhere in the system" (1953, p.43).
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a candidate set of semantic universals. Establishing a plausible revision of the
conventional semantic ontology is necessary but not sufficient for a cocle-theoretic
account of communication. As discussed in section 1.2.2, there must also be some
mechanism which ensures that different individuals come to represent or realise
the same basic conceptual alphabet.
2.4.1 Naturalising the Code
Models that appeal to learning-based accounts face the immediate difficulty that
the requirement for a universal conceptual vocabulary that accommodates the
distinctions encoded by all natural languages has the consequence that the requi¬
site conceptual primitives are not discriminated directly by the resources of any
particular natural language. As a result, the conceptual primitives required are
necessarily more basic than those that a child is exposed to when learning any
given natural language. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that nothing
guarantees that a child will actually receive appropriate exposure during devel¬
opment (cf. Chomsky, 1986). Additionally, Quine (1960, 1969) has argued that
even if we restrict attention to the ontology of a single natural language, the overt
behavioural data from which a child might try to derive its conceptual primi¬
tives radically unclerdetermines the choice of a specific ontology or set of concepts.
There are an indeterminate number of equally viable ontologies consistent with
observed linguistic behaviour (see also Davidson, 1984; Putnam, 1975).
The most popular solution to the difficulties with learning-based models has
been to propose that a species-specific conceptual vocabulary might be fixed to
some degree by evolution (amongst others, Fodor, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 1986;
•Jaekendoff, 1992). This proposal has been widely criticised (e.g., Putnam, 1975,
1988), not least because there is no model of natural selection which could real¬
istically drive such a vocabulary to fixation. Many concepts currently in use had
no significance for the survival of our ancestors. For example, Putnam (1970)
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discusses Katz's theory of semantic markers which attempts to analyse the mean¬
ing of a word in terms of innate conceptual universals such as UNMARRIED,
ANIMATE, SEAL. As Putnam notes, it is difficult to see what theory of human
evolution is going to provide an account of the fixation of SEAL, let alone CLOTH¬
ING or FURNITURE. In general, the conceptual resources of natural languages
invoke a wide range of entities that simply did not exist in evolutionary time.
Furthermore, it is not obvious how we can construct an argument that evolution
would act to fix a species-specific code without appealing to group selection as
the principal selective force. However, group selection provides by far the weak¬
est form of selection pressure, one which is i-eadily overturned by other pressures
(Healey, 1991). In the absence of a detailed model that addresses these worries,
this aspect of the nativist explanation is difficult to sustain.
The natural way to resist these difficulties is to propose that evolution fixes a
set of more primitive concepts which could then be built up, during development,
into successively more complex structures. This avoids the unhappy conclusion
that concepts such as CARBURETTOR and COMPACT DISC are innate. How¬
ever, the Quinean argument indicates that this is, in principle, impossible. Indeed,
Fodor (1981, 1983) accepts that empiricist and verificationist attempts at reduc¬
tion to "sensation concepts" failed precisely because no such reduction is possible.
For Fodor, a natural language is effectively as expressive as it needs to be and
"you can't hardly reduce it at all" (1981, p.213). As for languages, so for idiolects.
2.5 Ontological Pluralism
The first part of this chapter has concentrated on the problems idiolectical dif¬
ferences create for code-theoretic models of communication. Idiolectical variation
is both pervasive and marked, an observation that undermines naive code mod¬
els. The attempt to salvage code-based theories by appeal to a set of primitive
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semantic universals runs up against arguments to the effect that the ontology em¬
bodied by a particular idiolect (or theory, or language) cannot be isolated from the
theoretical commitments which serve to individuate it. The attempt to 'step out¬
side1 idiolectical variation to determine an absolute, universal, semantic ontology
of concepts or sense data cannot succeed without compromising or reinterpreting
the terms and statements of the originals. Even those authors who are sceptical
both about the coherence of claims about incommensurablity and its diagnosis as
a semantic condition offer no alternative proposals which might obviate the prob¬
lem. Quine (1992) concludes that the reification of objects, abstract and 'real1, is
a retrospective theoretical move motivated by the desire to integrate our system
of beliefs with the world. The ontologies associated with theories and, mutatis
mutandis, idiolects emerge as "ideal nodes at the foci of intersecting observation
sentences" (p.24). As systems of belief vary, so, frequently, will our ontological
commitments. Models that propose to account for communication must accom¬
modate some degree of ontological pluralism between interlocutors.
Perhaps the principal motivation for suggesting that, at some level, there is
a shared conceptual code is the intuition that there must Ire one in order for
communication to be possible at all. The proposals for innate mentalese, con¬
ceptual universals in development and a language-neutral interlingua. all trade on
the code-theoretic assumption that what makes translation between conceptual
schemes possible is a common set of conceptual elements. This intuition also in¬
forms criticisms of the arguments for incommensurability. For example, Kuhn's
analysis of theory change has been challenged on the grounds that it is self-refuting.
In the course of his argument Kuhn apparently offers inter-translations of theories
that are ex hypothesis not mutually translatable (see Kuhn, 1983; Putnam, 1975).
The same worry is apparent in critiques of the literature on incommensurability
between adult and child language (Carey, 1988). Adults and preschool children
are perfectly capable of communicating and this may seem mysterious if they
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do not employ commensurable languages. Furthermore, developmental psychol¬
ogists, including those who endorse the notion of incommensurability, frequently
do translate children's conceptualisations into adult language. Of course, the ac¬
curacy of these example inter-translations between adult and child language and
different scientific paradigms is largely an empirical issue. To insist that these are
clear cases of inter-translation, and that successful inter-translation presupposes
a common semantic ontology, courts an obvious circularity.
More importantly, the claim that two idiolects are incommensurable does not
entail that there can be no informational commerce between them. In fact, Kuhn
(1983), elaborating the metaphor, points out that incommensurable magnitudes
can be compared to an arbitrary degree of accuracy. Chapter 5 of this thesis is
precisely an attempt to provide a semantic framework for dialogue which does not
depend on assumptions of commensurability. Rather than rejecting the notion of
incommensurability as incoherent on the grounds that successful inter-translations
occur, we might equally conclude that it is the concept of accurate translations as
'ontologically invariant', or, perhaps, reference-preserving, which must be aban¬
doned. The issue is not whether it is useful or productive to have a strong notion of
translation but rather whether the actual practices to which it has been applied,
for example, translation between languages, idolects and theories, ever actually
meet the strict criterion of preserving reference. Kuhn (1983) and Carey (1988)
both question whether the strong notion of translation is ever appropriate. What
we ordinarily refer to as translations are, on this account, really interpretations,
or perhaps instances of language acquisition (see also Lakoff, 1987). Carey ar¬
gues that in the case of child development the psychologist is effectively learning
the child's language and attempting to teach it to us, not passively reporting
its meaning. In the applied case of machine translation, semantic mismatches be¬
tween natural languages have proved so problematic that the attempt to identify a
universal inter lingua has been all but abandoned. Kay et al. (1994) argue that the
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notion of a pure interlingua fundamentally misconceives the nature of translation.
Rather than regard translation as a function between languages that preserves
meaning in any absolute sense they advocate a view of translation as a negotiated
compromise.
Having elaborated an essentially negative thesis about the consequences of
icliolectical variation, the next section develops the claim that, in fact, idiolectical
differences may be instrumental in giving semantic and, more generally, intentional
states their distinctive character.
2.6 Idiolectical Variation and Content
Recent debate in the philosophy of mind has generated some surprising conclu¬
sions about which objects or states can be sensibly identified as the 'bearers' of
meaning. The most obvious suggestion for a psychological theory is to analyse
the meaning of a word in terms of the associated psychological state(s) of the
speaker or hearer, and perhaps allow this to vary from individual to individual.
However, a number of arguments have been advanced to show that such a move
fails to satisfy some basic, 'pre-theoretic', intuitions about meaning. In particular,
it seems that ordinary usage presupposes that the meaning or semantic content
of words is a distributed property of individuals, their linguistic community and
the physical environment. This implies (at least) two challenges to a cognitive
account of meaning. The weaker challenge is that the meaning of a word cannot
be determined solely by reference to the cognitive states of a particular individual
or community; instead it is minimally a composite situation in which some state of
affairs in the head stands in an appropriate relation to some state of affairs in the
environment. On this account we might still maintain a theory of narrow content,
i.e., those characteristics shared by two individuals who "mean the same thing"
or "think the same thought" after the "broad" influences of the socio-physical
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environment have been discounted (e.g., Foclor, 1980). The stronger challenge is
that whatever the mental structures associated with language turn out to be, they
bear no constitutive relevance to the meanings of words (see Pettit & McDowell,
1986). The problems raised by these arguments are obviously of great significance
for any programme which aims to develop a 'psychological semantics'.
2.6.1 Content and the Environment
The best known arguments for the distribution of semantic content originate with
Hilary Putnam (e.g., Putnam, 1975, 1988). Putnam's principal concern is with the
'world-involving' aspects of the meaning of natural kind terms, i.e., nouns associ¬
ated with entities that have explanatory importance within some, possibly infor¬
mal, theory. As discussed in section 2.1.1, the standards of normal usage require
only a relatively underspecified knowledge of a natural kind term for competent
usage. As a result we might accommodate this within a cognitivist semantics by
determining a representation that captures a set of incomplete (i.e., not necessary
and sufficient) conditions that each person who competently uses the word has
internalised. However, Putnam shows that not only do the cognitive states asso¬
ciated with knowing a word unclerdetermine its 'actual' extension as determined
by the relevant science, the same intension, conceived as a cognitive state, may
determine indefinitely many different extensions. Putnam (1975, 1988) illustrates
this possibility with the aid of a thought experiment.
Two situations are considered, one on earth and one on a possible twin earth.
Both situations are assumed to be identical in all respects, including linguistic
conventions, except that water on earth has the chemical structure H20 whereas
on twin earth it has the chemical structure XYZ. The argument turns on the
intuition that the word "water" on earth has a different extension from the word
"water" on twin earth. Specifically, someone using the word "water" on earth is
referring to H20 whereas the counterfactual twin using the word "water" on twin
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earth is referring to XYZ. Crucially, this intuition holds even though, by hy¬
pothesis, there is no difference between the cognitive states, narrowly understood,
the twins associate with the term "water". The only variation between the two
situations is the ultimate composition of the liquid they both call "water". Nei¬
ther twin needs to be able to discriminate H2O from XYZ through taste, touch
or any other superficial characteristics. Indeed, it does not even matter whether
anyone in the relevant communities, including scientists, can discriminate H2O
from XYZ, only that they might in principle do so (see section 2.6.3).
The general conclusion Putnam draws is that what a natural kind term means
cannot be determined solely by reference to the internal cognitive state(s) of
speaker-hearers. The reference of any natural kind term is determined partly
by the ultimate nature of the stuff referred to itself. As a consequence we cannot
adopt a cognitive interpretation of semantic theory which satisfies both the claim
that meanings are mental states and that meanings determine extensions.
2.6.2 Content and The Community
While Putnam emphasises the role of the physical environment, Burge (1979,
1986) develops arguments which focus on the contribution of the social environ¬
ment in determining the content of mental states. Burge (1979) sets up a thought
experiment involving two possible situations. In both situations we consider an
individual who uses the word "arthritis" perfectly competently under the same
circumstances to the same effect. For example, to agree that "arthritis is painful",
that "it affects the old" that "stiffening of the joints is one of its symptoms" and
so on. In both cases it is assumed that the individual's physical, functional and
phenomenological history is identical. He is exposed to the same perceptual ex¬
periences, has the same physiological history and exhibits the same behaviour. I11
short, the situations are identical in all non-intentionally described respects. In the
first situation the individual makes a visit to the doctor during which lie suggests
Content and Commensurability 47
that his arthritis has spread to his thigh. The doctor explains that this cannot be
the case since arthritis is specifically an inflammation of the joints. The patient
has expressed a false belief. Burge then contrasts this with a second counterfactual
situation where, as before, the patient visits their doctor and declares the same
worry. However, in this situation the term "arthritis" can be legitimately applied
to the patient's condition. The relevant bodies of expert and lay opinion all hold
that the term "arthritis" applies to any rheumatic ailment. Under these circum¬
stances the patient has expressed a belief with a different content; a true belief.
In both cases this is the first time the patient has ever expressed his belief and,
ex hypothesis, his disposition to express it has resulted from precisely the same
(non-intentionally defined) patterns of experience. The only difference between
the two situations is the conventional application of "arthritis" in the patient's
linguistic community, a difference of which the patient is ignorant.
The contrast between the situations brings out the intuition that the content of
the patients' "arthritis-beliefs" changes from the first situation (essentially ours) to
the second. In the second case none of his beliefs, e.g., that his father had it, that it
afflicts the old, are about arthritis as we understand it. They are beliefs about an
extensionally and definitionally different condition. This is demonstrated by the
change in the truth of the belief that "my arthritis has lodged in my thigh" between
the two situations. However, nothing about the patients' internal states, narrowly
understood, varies between the two situations. The difference in the content of the
patients' beliefs arises purely as a result of the change in the conventional interpre¬
tation by the relevant community. While the patients' misconception brings out
the difference between the two situations it is their other, related, beliefs that give
the thought experiment its force. Importantly, ordinary practice indicates that we
commonly attribute to individuals beliefs whose contents they may incompletely
understand. The kind of deviation from common usage of "arthritis" envisaged
in the thought experiment does not preclude us from attributing beliefs whose
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content is specified by reference to the meaning of "arthritis". Under such circum¬
stances we normally regard an individual as still holding beliefs about arthritis (or
contracts, or neurosis), just that some of them are false.
Surge's thought experiment turns on the observation that mental states are
commonly individuated by reference to the content ascribed to them in the subor¬
dinate 'that-clause' of propositional attitude descriptions. For example, the differ¬
ence between the psychological states associated with the attributions, "believing
that arthritis is painful" and "believing that rheumatism is painful", depends
on the distinction between the meaning of arthritis and rheumatism respectively.
Surge draws out the intuition that this difference of meaning is exhausted only
by appeal to the linguistic practices of the relevant community: discrimination
of a psychological state as a state of a particular kind is a distributed property
of an individual and their linguistic context. A given individual may be accred¬
ited with mental states having a certain content, including attributions by and of
themselves, even where these 'narrow' mental states are, by communal standards,
incorrect. The socio-linguistic context plays a constitutive role in individuating
mental states, challenging the viability of individualistic cognitive models.
This formulation is ambiguous in an important respect. While it is clear that
the narrow cognitive states of some arbitrary individual in a community may not
determine the meaning of a word, it might still be argued that there is always
some expert who commands a definitive understanding of the concept in question.
On this view, the distribution of content is a simple consequence of what Putnam
(1975) termed the distribution of linguistic labour.
2.6.3 The Division of Linguistic Labour
In essence, Putnam's (1975) proposal was that although most individuals have
no knowledge of the theories which might determine what count as instances of
a term like "gold" or "tiger" there is a distribution of knowledge within a com-
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munity on which they can rely to provide the 'official' meaning. For example,
although I may not know what the ultimate constitution of gold is 1 can nonethe¬
less use the word in a particular instance, deferring to experts for the definitive
judgement on the integrity of a sample and, thereby, the appropriateness of the
term. The temptation to read the (subsequent) arguments for broad content solely
as elaborating aspects of the distribution of linguistic expertise in a community
is compounded by the fact that both Putnam's and Burge's arguments suggest
appeals to expert opinion for adjudication on the meaning of the contested word.
In Burge's argument reference is made to the existence of expert medical opinion,
in Putnam's, physical scientists. According to this interpretation, Putnam's twin
earth argument is a special case of Burge's, concentrating on the particularly clear-
case of natural kind terms and the importance of scientific opinion in determining
their reference and, thereby, meaning (cf. Pettit & McDowell, 1986).
This reading of the arguments for broad content has obvious attractions for
cognitive semanticists. Meanings are still analysed in terms of cognitive states, al¬
beit those of particular subsets of the community, possibly supplemented by some
account of the source of each sub-community's expertise. This is certainly the
interpretation entertained by Johnson-Laircl (1983, pp.191-195) and is explicitly
adopted by Gardenfors (1993). Gardenfors' model is particularly important here
as its principal concerns are similar to those of this thesis. Gardenfors carefully
builds up a series of formal structures which capture various possibilities for the
distribution of "linguistic power" within a society. In outline, L is the set of atoms
of a language (sentences or predicates), M is a set of meanings (propositions or
concepts) for the language and U is the set of speakers/users. For each individual
i G U, there is an individual semantics, m,-, mapping from L into M. There is also
a distinguished mapping ras, the social semantics, from L into M.9 A semantic
9Gardenfors' reliance on set theory and model theory has the consequence that the set of
meanings, M, is fixed for a particular language. For example, in the case where M is a Boolean
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situation S is a set of individual mappings, one for each i £ U. By defining condi¬
tions on these structures, namely, compsitionality, contingency-preservation and
designators for social meaning, Gardenfors derives an interesting representation of
alternative possible social power structures that determine ms. For example, the
set D C U of individuals is decisive for L in S if it holds that ms(a) = rrii(a),
whenever mt(a) = rrij(a) for all i, j £ D. Mathematically, I) forms a filter which,
depending on various other parameters, such as whether U is finite, can model
various degrees of democratic and oligarchical control on ms. Importantly, while
no specific individual necessarily determines the entire mapping ms: for all a £ L
there is some mi such that ms(a) = m;(a). Less esoterically, for any given ex¬
pression and its associated social meaning, some individual will determine that
meaning.
This analysis does not, however, succeed in meeting the problems raised by
Putnam's twin earth argument. As noted in section 2.6, there may not be any
individuals in a community whose cognitive states accurately determine the actual
extension of a given natural kind term. Science may be insufficiently advanced to
make the necessary discrimination between H20 and XYZ. Nonetheless, given
that there is some, in principle discoverable, difference between the essential na¬
ture of water on earth and that on twin earth then "water" refers to, and thereby
means, different things in each case. Johnson-Laird and Gardenfors (ibid.) are
both aware of this difficulty and try to meet it by challenging the validity of es-
sentialism. Johnson-Laird raises the (somewhat bizzare) possibility that it may
transpire that nothing actually does have an essential nature: perhaps we are
all subject to a profound cartesian delusion. Assuming this idea could be coher-
algebra it is taken to be the powerset of the finite set of fixed objects O = Oi, o2, 03.... Agents
vary in the assignment of particular meanings to particular expressions but not on the set
of meanings. Clearly, this runs contrary to the arguments of section 2.4 as it constitutes a.11
assumption of a unique, fixed, ontology of concepts. However, for current purposes, the main
interest is in the assumptions relating to the distribution of content.
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ently formulated, it would follow that essentialism about meanings was wrong,
presumably leaving room only for cognitive accounts of meaning. Gardenfors at¬
tacks essentialism on the grounds that many putative natural kind terms such
as "phlogiston" and "caloric" have proved to be without any essential nature.
Pressing a weaker claim than Johnson-Laird, Gardenfors argues that we have no
reliable method of distinguishing between 'genuine' natural kind terms, historical
aberrations and non-natural kind terms. Without independent justification for
the existence of categories which actually do have an essential nature in common,
Putnam, according to Gardenfors, is assuming the very thing he wishes to show.
However, while there may well be legitimate concerns about the viability of
essentialist metaphysics, the point on which the difficulties concerning content
turn is that, rightly or wrongly, ordinary practice presupposes essentialism about
the meaning of at least some words, those that Putnam calls natural kind terms.
In the absence of some argument which accounts, in non-essentialist terms, for the
intuiton that the meaning of "water" is different on earth and on twin earth the
difficulty stands. Furthermore, it is not clear that the problems are restricted to
cases that trade on essentialist intuitions. Burge's thought experiment suggests an
additional problem. Intuitively, some terms, which are neither natural kind terms
nor the province of some group of experts, may still be used with the intention that
their actual content is fixed by the community in which they have their currency.
One candidate, raised in section 2.1.1, is "friend". Certainly, there are neither
experts to whom we, as a community, defer for definitions of what a friend is,
nor some defining essential nature we suppose that all friends share. Individuals
may, paralleling Burge's scenario, harbour various misconceptions about what
constitutes a friend and, as noted above, it is entirely possible that no two people
will have exactly the same concept of a friend. Nonetheless, we still use "friend"
normatively, intending it to mean what it normally means in the community, i.e.,
we would, under appropriate circumstances, accept correction. Examples such
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as these are problematic for cognitivist accounts. It would seem more promising
to propose that the meaning of "friend" is somehow constituted by the relevant
practices and utterances of the linguistic community as a whole.
2.7 Discussion
This chapter began with an attempt to establish that icliolectical variation should
be understood, at least in part, as a semantic phenomenon and that as such it poses
important problems for any attempt to provide a semantic model for dialogue. In
Chapter 1 a number of alternative semantic models were discussed that, it was
claimed, assume that mutual-intelligibility depends on the existence of some shared
semantic code. Given the arguments in the first half of this chapter, it seems that
this assumption must be abandoned in favour of accounts which do not imply that
individuals are semantically transparent to each other. Specifically, an adequate
semantic model of dialogue must be able to accommodate a degree of ontological
pluralism between interlocutors. A promising framework for dealing with this
concern is offered by cognitive semantics where a great deal of attention has been
paid to factors that may differentially influence each individual's interpretation of
particular expressions. Furthermore, these models are noticeably non-commital
about exactly how similar different individuals' conceptual structures should be
in order for communication to be possible (see section 1.3.1), holding out the
prospect that, with some modification, these accounts could be brought to bear
on situations in which interlocutors with divergent ontological commitments are
engaged in dialogue.
The arguments considered in the second half of this chapter, however, raise
important difficulties for the cognitive approach. Theories which attempt to nat¬
uralise meaning by reduction to cognitive states, whether those of an individual
or groups of individuals, appear to violate important intuitions about the nor-
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mative, distributed, nature of meaning. Burge, in particular, argues that this
fact, combined with the normal practice in both 'folk' and cognitive psychology
of individuating mental states with respect to the content of attitude attributions
places the intentionality of mental states beyond the reach of any individualistic
explanation.10 The non-individualistic nature of mental states is, 011 this account,
a corollary of the distributed socio-physical influences on semantic content. For
the purposes of this chapter, the important point is that the semantics of natural
language expressions cannot be naturalised by reduction to mental states, individ-
ualistically understood. Attempts to do so may actually fail to provide a theory
of meaning at all (cf. Putnam, 1988). Discussion of the consequences this has for
the intentionality of cognitive states is deferred until chapter 6.
The contribution of idiolectical variation to the arguments for distributed con¬
tent is salient. A critical point of departure for Putnam's and Burge's views is the
existence of conceptual differences between individuals. In Burge's case the role
of idiolectical variation is quite clear. In Putnam's case it is less obvious since in
the twin earths scenario we are invited to consider a situation in which individuals
with identical narrow concepts of "water" may nonetheless mean different things
by their utterances about it. However, it is only in order to demonstrate the inad¬
equacy of this account in meeting certain intuitions about meaning that he sets up
the hypothetical identity in the twin's cognitive states.11 In fact, Putnam's views,
particularly those concerning stereotypes, depend on the assumption that idiolec¬
tical variation is the norm (see section 2.1.1). Putnam (1988) emphasises that it
is precisely because we normally discount differences in belief, 01* even definition,
10This threat is sufficiently serious for some authors to adopt- an eliminativistic stance toward
the intentional, regarding it as a consequence of inadequate 'folk' theories that should form no
part of a scientifically respectable study of cognition (e.g., Churchland, 1981).
11Burge (1979) interprets Putnam's emphasis 011 individualistic mental states to be a point of
departure from his own account. However, Putnam (1988) emphasises that this was for purely
exegetical reasons and should not be read as an endorsement of individualistic conceptions of
the mental.
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when assessing whether a term means the same thing on different occasions of
use that the cognitive states of speakers are, to a certain extent, irrelevant to the
fixation of semantic content. Normal interpretation proceeds via the application
of a principle of charity which attempts, all things being equal, to hold meanings
constant in the face of synchronic and diachronic variation.
This chapter has been devoted to the theoretical importance of idiolectical
variation to semantic theory. However, it also presents an important practical
problem which individuals must somehow routinely solve in the course of inter¬
action. The next chapter turns to consideration of the extent to which empirical
theories of dialogue can account for the achievement of semantic coordination
between interlocutors.
Chapter 3
Empirical Models of Dialogue
In Chapter 1, it was noted that while there are a number of semantic theories which
aim to characterise discourse, few, if any, can be held to address themselves directly
to dialogue per se. The tendency to assimilate dialogue to monologue, concentrat¬
ing on the problems associated with the sequential, rather than inter-individual,
coherence of discourse is paralleled in psycholinguistics (cf. Clark, 1985). With
some notable exceptions, discussed below, there is a paucity of studies directly con¬
cerned with issues related to the inter-individual coordination of dialogue. The
majority of research on the psychology of language has concentrated on processes
of production and interpretation in individuals effectively isolated from ordinary
conversational context. Examples of work in this tradition include studies on
lexical semantics (e.g., Collins & Quillian, 1969; Morton, 1970; Rumelhart & Mc¬
Clelland, 1986), higher-order theories of scripts and schemas (e.g., Bower, Black,
& Turner, 1979; Minsky, 1975; Schank & Abelson, 1977) and discourse coherence
(e.g., Anderson, Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Amongst
the empirical research that does address issues of inter-individual coordination, a
significant proportion has been concerned with the influence of factors such as gen¬
der, dominance and other personality traits on behaviours such as interruptions,
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frequency of eye contact and persuasiveness (e.g., Linkey & Firestone, 1990; Roger
& Nesshoever, 1987; Kleinke, 1986). While these issues clearly do bear on the ef¬
fective conduct of face-to-face communication, they do not appear to bear directly
on the essentially semantic issues under consideration here. The intuition is that
idiolectical variation would create independent problems for mutual-intelligibility
even where non-verbal signals are factored out (e.g., in telephone conversations)
and personalities, assuming it were possible, are matched.
This aim of this chapter is to survey a range of empirical studies which ex¬
plicitly raise the problem of inter-individual coherence in dialogue and promise
some insight into the mechanisms and processes that contribute to the coordi¬
nation of meaning in dialogue. For exegetical convenience, the studies that fall
under this rubric can be divided into two broad approaches: those that utilise
existing philosophical and linguistic analyses in formulating empirical questions,
roughly, 'theory-driven' approaches, and those that concentrate on the empirical
phenomena in their classification and theorising of dialogue, roughly, 'data-driven'
approaches.1
3.1 Theory-Based Approaches
An ostensibly promising area for consideration is Speech Act theory and its vari¬
ants (eg., Searle, 1969, 1976). It offers an analysis of the ways in which utterances
can constitute actions, actions whose performance sometimes depends on appro¬
priate relations between speaker and addressee. For example, a successful bet
requires, amongst other things, that both parties mutually accept their undertak¬
ing. Despite its elegance, Austin's analysis is not always regarded as generating
unequivocally empirical predictions. In fact, Levinson (1983) goes so far as to
suggest that most analyses that elaborate Austin's insights have proved to be un¬
naturally, this is a distinction in emphasis rather than in principle.
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falsifiable and therefore vacuous. Levinson's basic complaint is that, in general,
subsequent authors have attempted to develop 'well-formedness' conditions on se¬
quences of speech acts or conversational moves. A precondition for achieving this
is the specification of some determinate procedure for identifying what act a par¬
ticular utterance performs or is a response to. However, there is a high degree of
indirection in mapping from utterance form to speech act type. Utterances only
rarely contain an explicit performative such as "I request you ..." or "I order you
..." and a particular utterance may count as an attempt to perform any of sev¬
eral possible direct illocutionary acts. For example, "I will return" may function
equally well as a promise, a warning or a prediction (cf. Saclock, 1988). Indirect
speech acts compound these difficulties by requiring the specification of the in¬
ferences that bridge between an utterance of "It's cold in here" and the implied
request that the addressee closes the window. Additionally, responses may address
the perlocutionary rather than illocutionary force of an utterance. As a result, the
illocutionary type of an utterance in a given sequence and, thereby, its 'gram-
maticality', can only be judged by reference to the linguistic and extra-linguistic
context. Further difficulties are created by the normative, Gricean, nature of ut¬
terance interpretation. An apparently 'ungrammatical' or 'ill-formed' sequence
of utterances is likely to be deemed an intentional exploitation of conversational
conventions in order to achieve effects such as irony and other tropes (e.g., see
Clark, 1985). As a result, there appears to be no principled way of discriminating
'grammatical' from 'non-grammatical' sequences in order to assess the viability of
the empirical claims.
Taking a different approach, Clark (1979) reports a series of experiments aimed
at elucidating some of the cues individuals use in judging which to respond to of
the direct and indirect illocutions associated with an utterance. For example,
Clark identifies several factors that influence whether an addressee will respond to
the direct illocutionary act of a request such as "Can you tell me the time?" by
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asserting "Yes" they can and that "It's six" or whether they respond only to the
indirect request with "It's six" alone. One cue to which people show sensitivity is
the relative 'conventionality' with which the question is asked. The two questions
below make what is, strictly speaking, the same basic request but differ in their
conventionality. Intuitively, question 2 is a less common formulation than question
1.
1. "Can you please tell me what the interest rate is on your regular savings
account?"
2. "Are you able to tell me what the interest is on your regular savings ac¬
count?"
Clark predicts that the less conventional the presentation of the question, the
more likely the direct request will be understood as seriously intended and, as a
result, elicit an answer. Indeed, out of a total sample of 150 bank clerks, 92%
of those asked question 1 responded to the indirect request alone whereas only
64% of those asked question 2 did. There is also evidence that addressees make
inferences concerning a speaker's likely goals in assessing whether an illocutionary
act is intended pro forma or more seriously. For example, 50 restaurants were
phoned and asked "Do you accept credit cards?" or "Do you accept American
Express cards?". In answer to the latter question 100% of those who did accept
American Express cards replied "Yes", but offered no further information. By
contrast, of those who answered yes to the former question 46% also offered a
list of cards that they accepted. The restaurateur makes the natural inference
that the caller is making their inquiry because they actually intend to pay, at the
restaurant, with a specific credit card.
Although Clark's results reveal interesting patterns in the way people deter¬
mine what is being asked of them in a conversation, it is less clear whether they
speak directly to the specific claims of speech act theory. They do not address (and
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are not designed to address) the difficulties raised by Levinson, since the classifi¬
cation of utterances as direct and indirect requests and their respective responses
is made on intuitive rather than formal grounds by individuals fully apprised of
the context in which they occur. A more secure interpretation would be to treat
the data as shedding light on general patterns of conversational inference rather
than providing specific support for speech act theory itself.
An empirical proposal which relates to the informational coherence of a dia¬
logue is the given-new distinction (Clark & Haviland, 1977; Halliday, 1967; Prince,
1969). This distinction was first discussed in detail by Halliday (1967) as a means
of characterising the information structure of an utterance as signalled by its pitch
contour. Briefly, 'new' information is taken to be marked by the principal pitch
focus in an utterance, which determines its rightmost element. By contrast, 'given'
information is intonationally unmarked and corresponds to information that the
speaker presents to their interlocutor(s) as already shared. This definition leaves
the leftmost edge of the 'new' information unit undefined, making the precise
division between 'given' and 'new' in an utterance difficult to determine. The
scare quotes around given and new emphasise the fact that, as Halliday defined
them, they refer to information presented as given or new, thereby encompassing
cases where information is presented as new (or given) for essentially rhetorical
purposes.2 Another approach to informational asymmetries between conversa¬
tional partners, which relates to the semantics of quantifiers, is found in Moxey
and Sanford (1993) who demonstrate that quantifiers play an important 'rhetori¬
cal' role in manipulating focus in a discourse. Amongst their findings is evidence
that individuals deploy quantifiers in a manner which is sensitive to their beliefs
about their interlocutor's expectations.
2As Humphreys (1993) points out, this and several other aspects of the distinctions empha¬
sised by Halliday, for example between given-new, theme-rheme and topic-comment have tended
to be conflated by later discussions.
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Each of the models discussed so far offers proposals concerning the way in
which interlocutors present and deploy utterances in a manner that influences the
inter-individual coherence of interaction. They also suggest ways in which these
factors may influence or alter interpretation and, in this sense, impact on the
meaning of what is said. However, the processing of elements of an utterance as
given or new and the influence of quantifier choice in manipulating focus, both
presuppose that some roughly 'literal' degree of interpretation has been achieved
before they can produce their various effects. Similarly, determination of what
speech act is being performed by an utterance speaks more to pragmatic than
to semantic concerns and, as a result, does not directly impact on the issue of
idiolectical variation. Again, the intuition is that even where these 'rhetorical'
aspects of language-understanding are factored out, there will still be a residual,
semantic, problem posed by interpretational asymmetries.
The research discussed so far is inspired, to a greater or lesser degree, by some
of the theoretical approaches developed within linguistics and philosophy. There
are some notable advantages to investigating the fit between pre-existing frame¬
works or taxonomies and empirical phenomena, not least because it often provides
a relatively explicit specification of various dependencies within a model and, more
diffusely, provides a basis for inter-clisciplinary interaction. However, the theory-
inspired nature of this research, especially in the case of Austinian approaches,
has also been criticised as a weakness. Levinson (1983) argues that the attempt
to provide a 'syntax' of successive turns in conversation is "fundamentally inap¬
propriate to the subject matter" (p.289). For Levinson, the mapping of linguistic
categories and methods of analysis onto conversational data is undermotivated,
encouraging research which overlooks important aspects of conversational organ¬
isation. Schegloff (1992) adopts a more radical stance, insisting that Speech Act
theory and, indeed, any theory in the cognitive/analytic tradition provides at best
a, superficial, and at worst a completely inadequate, analysis of conversational
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data.3 (see also Heritage, 1984). In the absence of specific explanations that offer
more complete or more robust accounts of the experimental findings, it is diffi¬
cult. to justify dismissing the research reviewed above on these grounds, not least
because, bearing in mind the arguments of section 2.3, Schegloff's position seems
vulnerable to the criticism that no empirical observations are free from theoretical
commitments. Nonetheless it is apparent that in psycholinguistics as a whole, too
little attention has been paid to analysing the conduct of dialogue.
3.2 Data-Driven Approaches
Probably the most resolutely empirical approach to the study of dialogue is con¬
versation analysis (henceforth, CA) which has its roots in the ethnomethodological
tradition in sociology. Many of the distinctive commitments of CA derive directly
from ethnomethodology, the tradition in which it arose, and it is consequently
important to place CA within this context.
3.2.1 Ethnomethodology
The term ethnomethodology, coined by Garfinkel in the 1950's, was devised with
the intention of providing a cognate to terms such as ethnobiology and eth-
nomedicine. It designates the study of the 'folk' methods by which individuals
reason about, and make sense of, everyday problems (Heritage, 1984).
Garfinkel's position can be most clearly articulated as a reaction to Parsons'
"voluntaristic theory of action" (see Heritage, 1984; Taylor, 1992). Parsons' work
3e.g., Schegloff (1992) " [...] speech act theory is [...] an analytic resource that in effect
casts action as atomistic, individualistic, atemporal, asequential, and asocial" (pp.1338-1339).
Schegloff, by contrast (ibid) advocates analysis of the "...procedural infrastructure of interac¬
tion" (p. 1338) concluding that "... one should ask what grounds there are for continuing to take
seriously theories whose analytic center of gravity is located elsewhere" (p. 1339).
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aims to develop a theory of social order, founded on scientific methods, that ac¬
counts for the resilience of socio-cultural institutions in the face of apparently
divergent individual interests. A key element of Parsons' theory is its appeal to
internalised 'social norms' as the causal determinants of individual action. An
individual, through learning and experience with particular cultural institutions,
internalises certain rules that govern their subsequent behaviour. Taylor (1992)
illustrates this with the example norm: "wear a tie on formal occasions" which,
in order to regulate the behaviour of males in a given society, would need to be
internalised, independently, by each individual. There is a sense in which this ex¬
ample can be misleading. Parsons' concept of social norms was strongly influenced
by the work of Durkheim and Freud (Heritage, 1984). Consequently, the type of
norms which Parsons held to be determinants of behaviour are not conceived of
as something of which an individual would ordinarily have cognisance. Like the
Freudian notion of a complex, they are considered to be deeply buried psycholog¬
ically, with the actor whose behaviour they determine having little or no insight
into their operation. In the Parsonian framework, norms are externally defined
theoretical entities elucidated by the methods and procedures of social science and
are only accidentally apprehended (if at all) by the individuals subject to them.
Garfinkel objected to the conception of norms as hidden, causal determinants of
behaviour. Drawing on the phenomenology of Schutz (1973), and detailed empiri¬
cal studies of his own (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967), Garfinkel argued that, far from being
opaque to the individuals influenced by them, social norms are directly utilised
in accounting for and making sense of actions and activities. For Garfinkel, the
social phenomena of interest to sociologists are precisely those which the par¬
ticipants themselves frame and interpret in intentional, meaningful, terms. Par-
sons's 'cultural dope' view of individual agency effectively relegates these aspects
of individuals' reasoning about the social to a residual category of epiphenomena.
Garfinkel, by contrast, insisted that it is precisely the processes of everyday ac-
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counting for, and reasoning about, the social which stand in need of investigation.
For example, Garfinkel (1967) highlighted how inadequate the Parsonian approach
is for analysing the processes by which a jury agrees on a verdict. The majority
of jurors' deliberations involve determining, in their own terms, what is fact or
fancy, what actually happened and what merely appeared to happen, what is cred¬
ible and what is contrived and so on. As Heritage (1984) points out, an account
that aims to elucidate the norms which determine the jurors' deliberations while
discounting the juror's own interpretations of the situation as irrelevant fails to
address a significant, if not critical, aspect of the situation.
In emphasising the role of individuals' interpretation of their circumstances,
ethnomethodologists have drawn attention to the way in which norms themselves
can be used as resources for generating some particular understanding of a sit¬
uation. Returning to Taylor's example, rather than viewing the norm, "wear a
tie on formal occasions" as a descriptive or regulative rule, ethnomethodologists
emphasise the way in which individuals may use such a norm in order to constitute
some situation as a formal occasion. As Heritage puts it:
"... the basic relationship between normative rules and socially or¬
ganised events appears to be a strongly cognitive one in which 'rules'
(concertedly applied) are constitutive of'what the events are', or 'what
is really going on here"' (1984, p.83).4
Thus the injunction to "wear a tie on formal occasions" might well be deployed
as an indirect way of informing someone that he was at a formal occasion, even
though he didn't consider it such, or perhaps that the tie he had on was not, under
the circumstances, a tie but rather an indecorous eyesore (see also Wieder, 1974).
4It is worth noting that the cognitive turn in Heritage's and other interpretations of eth-
nomethodology is not uncontroversial (see e.g., Button & Sharrock, 1994).
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In summary, ethnomethodology is the study of practical sociological reasoning
emphasising the ordinary, situated, particulars of everyday talk and conduct. It
aims to avoid 'premature' theorising by concentrating on the detailed empirical
analysis of how individuals orient to, and make sense of, social activity. Against
this background CA has developed as a strongly empirical approach to analysing
the 'lay' practices and procedures through which the intelligibility of interaction
is maintained.
3.2.2 Conversation Analysis
The basic objective of CA is to identify, and formally describe, the structural or
procedural organisation of interaction and, thereby, the competences on which
individuals rely when they engage in conversation (Drew, 1990; Heritage, 1984;
Sacks, 1984). Reflecting the influence of ethnomethodology, the principal valida¬
tion for any proposed analysis is evidence that conversational participants actually
do orient to the proposed structure in making sense of their interaction. As a result
'conventional' categories of analysis, such as illocutionary acts and mixed versus
single sex dialogue, are discarded unless conversational participants themselves can
be shown to be sensitive to such distinctions. The extremely large literature that
now exists within CA renders it impossible to provide a representative survey of
findings in the space available.5 The selection that follows is therefore determined
principally by its relevance to the concerns here.
The goal of avoiding premature theorising has meant that the principle data
for CA are detailed transcripts of naturally occurring conversation, usually tele¬
phone calls. The emphasis on 'natural' conversation extends to a rejection of
experimental manipulations such as structured interviews and the production of
invented examples in order to investigate intuitive judgements of acceptability. It
5Wooffitt (1990) mentions a recent bibliography of over twenty pages covering several hundred
entries.
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also focuses attention on 'mundane' conversations, avoiding academic discourse
and other idiosyncratic contexts. An important methodological commitment of
CA is that no detail of conversation, including pauses, coughs and other apparent
'disfluencies' can be dismissed a priori. As a result, the transcriptions that form
the basic data for CA are extremely detailed. For reasons of clarity much of this
detail is omitted from the examples that follow.
The basic unit of analysis in CA is the turn, identified on the basis of linguistic
surface structure, prosodic and intonational cues (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson,
1974). A speaker is assigned a turn construction unit (TCU) at the end of which
there is a transition relevance point (TRP). In order to account for the smooth
distribution of turns in conversation a set of rules are proposed which charac¬
terise transition between speakers (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1978, modified by
Levinson, 1983). If C is the current speaker and N is the next speaker at a TRP:
1. (a) If C selects N in current turn, then C must stop speaking, and N
must speak next, transition occurring at the first TRP after N-selection.
(b) If C does not select N, then any (other) party may self-select, first
speaker gaining rights to the next turn.
(c) If C has not selected N, and no other party self-selects under option
(b), then C may (but need not) continue (i.e., claim rights to a further
turn-constructional unit).
2. When rule 1(c) has been applied by C, then at the next TRP Rules 1
(a)-(c) apply, and recursively at the next TRP until change of speaker is
effected.
These rules successfully accommodate the observation that only 5% of speech
in conversation overlaps. They predict that only one person should speak at a
time and where overlap does occur it should be restricted principally to competing
Empirical Models of Dialogue 66
starts as in 1 below or misprojected TRPs as in 2 below. Where competing starts
occur, one speaker will drop out rapidly and the one left in the clear will recycle
that part of the turn obscured by the overlap.6
1. J: Twelve pounds i think wasn't it=
D: =//Can you believe it?
L: Twelve pounds on the weight watchers scale
2. A: Uh you been down here before // havenche
B: Yeah
The rules also offer a way of discriminating deliberate from accidental inter¬
ruptions, as in example 3, where the overlapping speech does not occur at a TRP.
3. C: We:ll I wrote what I thought was a a.-a rea:s'n//ble explanation
F: I: think it was a very rude /e/tter
They can also discriminate between silences which are treated as gaps and si¬
lences which are understood as significant or attributable because another speaker
has been selected under rule 1(a), for example:
'^Notation: "=" indicates no discernible gap between utterances, "//" indicates the point at
which the next utterance overlaps the current utterance. and indicate lengthening of the
preceding vowel sound. Italics indicate a word, or part of a word, uttered with extra emphasis.
Numbers in brackets, such as (1.0), give the time elapsed in seconds.
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4. A: Is there something bothering you or not?
(1.0)




The rules provide a skeleton framework around which the local, turn by turn,
organisation of conversation emerges. Importantly, this organisation is anchored
to the 'surface structure' of a turn, not functional or conceptual units. As a
consequence the rules are held to operate irrespective of content or length of a
turn and are independent of the number of possible interlocutors. In keeping
with the precepts of ethnomethodology, the examples suggest that individuals are
indeed sensitive to the organisation they characterise.
A series of more sophisticated proposals builds on the basic framework pro¬
posed for turn-taking. Sacks et al. (1974) address the relationship between pairs
of utterances such as question-answer and offer-acceptance which are drawn to¬
gether under the notion of adjacency pairs. These are pairs of utterances that
are a) produced by different speakers, b) ordered as a first part and a second part
and c) typed, so that a particular first part requires a particular type, or range
of types, of second. Complementary first and second pair parts need not occur
as immediately adjacent turns. For example, on recognising a first pair part the
next speaker may respond with another first pair part, delaying completion of the
'prior' pair until later in the conversation. This behaviour gives rise to nested
sequences of adjacency pairs such as those in example 5.
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5. A: Can I borrow the car?
B: How long do you need it?






An adjacency pair which is nested in this manner is referred to as an insertion
sequence (Schegloff, 1972). There is no hard limit to the number of levels of nesting
which may occur with the consequence that an adjacency pair may be separated by
a large number of intervening utterances (Levinson, 1983, offers some examples).
Consonant with Garfinkel's conception of norms, the relationship between first
and second pair parts is understood in normative rather than regulative terms.
The production of a first pair part makes the production of the second pair part
conditionally relevant rather than 'grammatically' necessary. As a result, whatever
follows a first pair part is interpreted as relevant to it, even though it might not
strictly count as completion. Even the absence of a second, for example, silence
in response to a question, may be interpreted as significant, perhaps leading to a
restatement of the original question.' Adjacency pairs therefore do not constitute
statistical generalisations or conditions on 'well-formed' discourse.
On its own, this formulation is quite weak, most first pair parts take a broad
range of second pair parts. For example, a question may receive, amongst other
things, a protestation of ignorance, a 're-route': "Better ask John", a refusal to
answer or a challenge to its presuppositions. As a means of strengthening the gen¬
eralisation, the notion of a preference organisation is invoked (Sacks & Schegloff,
1979). This allows an ordering of possible second pair parts according to whether
they are preferred or dispreferred: e.g., the preferred second to a request is an
acceptance, the Dispreferred a refusal. Disprefered seconds display a number of
'In fact, conditional relevance can also project back from the second pair part, to the first
pair part as, for example, where someone utters, "Oh you're welcome", after holding the door
open for a stranger who has not thanked them.
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systematic differences from preferred seconds. Their production is usually rela¬
tively delayed, prefaced by some marker, such as, "well", and is often accompanied
by an account. Importantly, this is a structural rather than a. psychological notion
of preference:
"Preference here does not refer to any personal psychological or
motivational dispositions of individual speakers. It refers instead to
the finding in CA research that these alternative actions are routinely
performed in systematically distinctive ways" (Drew, 1990, p.14)
This brief selection of hirelings from CA serves to illustrate some important
properties of the approach. Its goal is to generate substantive generalisations
about the procedural organisation of ordinary conversation. The resulting struc¬
tures, such as adjacency pairs, are defined independently of the content of the
utterances to which they apply, relying, instead, on a taxonomy derived from the
patterns of organisation to which they correspond. This has two consequences for
the concerns here. Firstly, it is not in the spirit of CA, and may well be inco¬
herent, to treat these proposals as claims about cognitive processes that underpin
the interpretation of utterances, although, like the other frameworks discussed
above, they obviously are relevant to interpretation in some sense. As the quotes
from Schegloff and Drew suggest, there is no attempt, and apparently no desire, to
provide an account that directly impacts on claims about cognitive structures. Sec¬
ondly, CA offers generalisations that idealise over individual differences, including
idiolectical variation, and, on face-value, this focus renders it neutral with respect
to the principal concern of this thesis. The issue of how mutual-intelligibility is
addressed in ethnomethodology will be returned to in Chapter 6.
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3.2.3 The Collaborative Model
Clark and coworkers (Clark, 1993; Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark,
1992; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1990; Schober & Clark, 1989) have elaborated an em¬
pirical model of dialogue which draws on the basic framework developed in conver¬
sation analysis but is aimed at explicitly psychological and experimental concerns.
The collaborative model adopts a central metaphor of multi-party discourse or
conversation, as a concerted, collective activity. Rather than treat dialogue as
the simple 'sum' of two autonomous activities, speaking and listening, they focus
on the collaborative nature of conducting a discourse. This leads to a distinction
between two basic types of action, joint or collective actions, performed by an
ensemble of people, and individual actions, (e.g., Clark, 1993; Clark & Schaefer,
1989; Schober & Clark, 1989). The distinction is usually illustrated by reference
to paradigmatic cases of collaborative activities such as dancing, playing a duet
or a game of football (c.f. Searle, 1990). In general, we intuitively recognise a
class of collaborative or joint acts which are performed by an ensemble of people:
it takes two to Tango. However, Clark and coworkers also advance a stronger
thesis, namely, that collaborative acts cannot be analysed by reduction to chains
of individual, autonomous, acts. Instead, joint actions must be further subdivided
into autonomous actions which are performed independently of other people and
participatory actions which are perfomed in collaboration with others.
The claim is that dialogue is not simply a sequence of utterances where each
can be understood as an autonomous act. Instead, it is a series of participatory
acts that are constituted by reference to the joint activity of which they are part.
Placing appropriate restrictions on context, the physical description of someone's
finger depressing a particular key on a keyboard is identical whether the key is
pressed as part of a duet or a solo. Clark's claim, however, is that under (at
least) some descriptions important to the analysis of dialogue these two actions
are not equivalent: they are different acts, involving different intentions (Clark,
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pers. comm.). For example, "I intend to play C" versus "I intend to play C as part
ofmy C plus your E". Clark and Schaefer (1989) propose that while many aspects
of an utterance, for example, words and phonemes, can be successfully analysed
as autonomous acts their function in a discourse demands analysis as participa¬
tory acts. On this model, analysis of any behaviour can proceed at a number of
levels (Clark, 1993). Adapting a framework developed by Alvin Goldman, Clark
proposes that participatory acts should be understood at four levels:
1. Vocalising and Attention.
2. Presentation and Identification.
3. Meaning and Understanding.
4. Proposal and Consideration.
Each level of action is cotemporal and may be performed by the same utterance
token; however, for an utterance to count as an act at any given level presupposes
that it is also an act at the lower, in terms of the numbering, level. A cjuestion
may simultaneously perform all four of these acts. It acts as an appeal for the
interlocutor's attention, it is an utterance, it has a particular meaning and it makes
a request of the interlocutor. If the vocalisation does not gain the attention of
the addressee (level 1) then it obviously fails to qualify as the presentation of an
utterance (level 2), is not understood and makes no request of the interlocutor
(levels 3 and 4). Alternatively, a vocalisation may be identified as an utterance
(level 2) but the meaning may not be understood, perhaps it is delivered in an
unfamilair language (level 3) and, again, thereby fails to qualify as a request (level
4).
The viability of the distinction between participatory and autonomous acts is
not generally defended on conceptual grounds. Instead, the principal support for
the model comes from a series of experimental studies on task-oriented dialogue
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which aim to challenge a particular view of the means by which individuals ac¬
cumulate common ground. This view can be summarised as three assumptions
(Clark & Schaefer, 1989):
1. Common ground: The participants in a discourse presuppose a certain com¬
mon ground.
2. Accumulation: In the course of a discourse, the participants try to add to
their common ground.
3. Unilateral Action: The principal means by which the participants add to
their common ground is by the speaker uttering the right sentence at the
right time.
It is the third assumption, which treats utterances as autonomous acts, that is
contested. Tacitly, it implies that an utterance, once made, is automatically added
to the common ground. A listener essentially decodes an utterance and interprets
it against the current common ground. By contrast, Clark and Schaefer claim that
interlocutors can only add to the common ground through a collaborative process
they term contributing. Structurally, a contribution consists of a presentation
phase and an acceptance phase:
• Presentation Phase: A presents utterance u for B to consider. He does so on
the assumption that, if B gives evidence e or stronger, he can believe that B
understands what A means by u.
• Acceptance Phase: B accepts utterance u by giving evidence e' that he be¬
lieves he understands what A means by u. He does so on the assumption
that, once A registers evidence e', he will also believe that B understands.
A contribution is completed once A and B mutually believe that B under¬
stands what A meant by his presentation. Completion can only be determined
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retrospectively once B has demonstrated acceptance and it does not draw further
comment from A. Any directed signal, at any level, is treated as a presentation for
acceptance by the interlocutor. Consequently, B's acceptance is simultaneously
a presentation to A which, in turn, requires acceptance before it is added to the
common ground. As described so far, the cycle of presentations and acceptances
could go on indefinitely. However, the types of evidence for acceptance of a pre¬
sentation are ordered according to their strength. From weakest to strongest these
are:
1. Continued attention: B shows he is continuing to attend and therefore re¬
mains satisfied with A's presentation.
2. Initiation of next relevant contribution: B starts on the next contribution
that would be relevant at a level as high as the current one.
3. Acknowledgement: B nods or says "uh hu," "yeah" or the like.
4. Demonstration: B demonstrates all or part of what he has understood A to
mean.
5. Display: B displays verbatim all or part of A's presentation.
This ordering combines with a strength of evidence principle which governs the
degree of evidence appropriate in accepting various presentations:
"The participants expect that, if evidence eo is needed for accepting
presentation uo, and e\ for accepting the presentation of eo, then t\
will be weaker than eo." (Clark and Schaefer, 1989, p.268 )
This principle ensures that the alternation of presentations and acceptances
'bottoms out' since the evidence required to establish mutual belief of an accep¬
tance is always weaker than that required for the presentation it is designed to
address.
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This basic structure can build up into quite elaborate sequences of embedded
presentations and acceptances. A given contribution may span several turns, for
example when an initial presentation needs to be repaired (cf. insertion sequences).
Conversely, a single turn may correspond to several contributions, with backchan-
nel responses acting as signals of acceptance within a turn. Like adjacency pairs,
a, presentation is viewed as projecting for its acceptance with continued attention
following an utterance, all things being equal, acting as a signal of acceptance
rather than a noncommital pause. The notion of contribution thus imposes the
constraint that there must be positive evidence that all parties have reached the
mutual belief, at some level, that a presentation has been accepted before it is
accumulated to the common ground between them at that level.
The supporting evidence for this model derives from a series of experiments
(e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1990; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Schober & Clark,
1989) examining its predictions for the conduct of task-oriented dialogues. The
typical format, based on a paradigm introduced by Krauss and Glucksberg, in¬
volves a director, who has a set of twelve tangram figures arranged in a target
sequence in a. numbered grid, and a matcher, who has the same grid and set of fig¬
ures but arranged in a random order. The task is for the director to communicate
to the matcher the desired order of the figures. Both individuals are separated by a
screen and must therefore achieve this through the production and interpretation
of referring expressions that efficiently discriminate between the different figures.
Over the course of a number of trials, each with the same director, matcher and
figures but different target sequences, a regular pattern emerges. For example,
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1990) report a regular decrease in both the number of
words used in identification of each figure the number of turns taken. Over the
course of six trials the average number of words per figure falls from 41 to 8 and
the average number of turns from 3.7 to 1. Thus, a description which is initially
complex, e.g., "looks like a person who's ice skating, except they're sticking two
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arms out in front" becomes progressively contracted to "the ice skater". This de¬
cline is reflected by shifts in the type of noun phrases used to pick out each figure.
For example, episodic noun phrases which consist of several separate clauses, e.g.,
"the goofy guy that's falling over, with his leg kicked up", and provisional noun
phrases which are subject to unprompted elaboration, e.g., "the next one is also
the one that doesn't look like anything. It's kind of like a tree?", both fall across
trials. By contrast, elementary noun phrases consisting of a single, unrepaired,
clause increase across trials. To account for this pattern (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs,
1990) cite a principle of least collaborative effort:
" speakers and addressees try to minimise collaborative effort, the
work both speakers and addressees do from the initiation of the refer¬
ential process to its completion." (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1990, p.486.
Original emphasis)
This is contrasted with a principle of least autonomous effort, derived from
the three assumptions mentioned above, which predicts that individuals should
produce referring expressions that are sufficient to uniquely identify the referent
in context. Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs argue that only the principle of least collab¬
orative effort predicts the observed decline in complexity of referring expressions.
On the autonomous account, once an appropriate expression has been found by
an individual it should not receive further modification. The principle of least
collaborative effort predicts that referring expressions will continue to contract to
beyond the point where they are adequate in context. To some extent this expla¬
nation trades on an ambiguity in the notion of context. If the autonomous models
are modified to include, for example, details of the dialogue history with a partic¬
ular addressee as part of the relevant context, then the predictions converge since
the least autonomous effort with a particular speaker is not equivalent to least
autonomous effort per se. Of course, to a degree, this broadening of the notion
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of context is just what the collaborative model aims to make explicit; however,
it doesn't necessarily require appeal to the process whereby participants actively
work toward the achievement of mutual-belief.
Stronger evidence for this aspect of the collaborative model is provided in a
study by Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992). Using the same basic paradigm, they
examine the effects of level of participation on effectiveness at the tangram task.
The important contrast is between two types of 'acknowledged overhearer', "om¬
niscient bystanders" and "side participants" who both watch, and listen to, a pair
performing the basic tangram task, again over six trials. Both types of overhearer
are fully apprised of everything the director does, they know which figure is being
referred to and they listen to all of the exchange between director and matcher,
who are themselves aware of the presence of overhearers in both cases. In both
conditions the overhearers are silent, making no direct contribution to the course
of the task. The key difference between the two conditions is that the omniscient
bystander observes events via a video and audio link whereas the side participant
sits at the director's table, about lm from the director's chair. In crude informa¬
tional terms both types of overhearer are equivalent. However the side participant
is also a ratified party to the conversation i.e., the director sees them as an ac¬
knowledged participant in the dialogue with the matcher. After the inital phase
of six trials the bystander from the first phase becomes the matcher for a second
phase of trials. Interestingly, the dyads composed of former omniscient bystanders
and director are reliably less efficient at the task, on a number of measures, than
pairs composed of former side participants and director. Directors are faster with
a former side participant, 44 seconds per trial as opposed to 66 seconds per trial,
and produce 33% fewer words. It seems that participation as a ratified overhearer
is sufficient collaboration to improve performance, their silent participation in the
first phase providing a degree of acceptance to the relevant presentations that the
director treats as evidence of a degree of established mutual-belief.
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Overall, the collaborative model draws several levels of participatory action,
driven by cycles of presentation and acceptance, within its scope. The specific
experiments discussed above are essentially neutral on the question of how idiolec-
tical variation contributes to the observed coordination between speakers. Nothing
in the data needs to be interpreted as collaboration on the meaning, in the sense
of semantics, of the referring expressions used. However, the third level of partic¬
ipatory action, that of meaning and understanding, is understood as subject to
the same mechanisms and, under the appropriate conditions, could be implicated
in the same way. As a result, the process of collaboration to secure mutual-belief
offers a possible mechanism for dealing with idiolectical differences and the threat
they pose to mutual-intelligibility.
3.2.4 Input-Output Coordination
A second empirical model that offers a mechanism for dealing with idiolectical
variation and is explicitly concerned with the issue of coordination of meaning, is
input-output coordination (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Doherty, 1994).
The development of this model has been driven by analysis of dialogues generated
by the maze task (described further in section 4.2). In this task, two players are
each seated at a VDU in separate rooms connected by a 2-way audio link. On
their screens both players see the same maze configuration, consisting of boxes with
links between them. Identical in all other respects, there are several additional
features marked only on a particular player's maze. These are: a marker indicating
their the player's own current position, a goal point which the players must move
toward, and a set of switch points and gates each positioned differently on the
respective display. The task is completed when both players reach, through a
succession of alternating moves, their goal points. The collaborative nature of the
task derives from the fact that when player A moves into a switch point marked
on player B's maze all the open gates on player B's maze close and all the closed
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gates open. Thus, if confronted by a closed gate player B must try to communicate
to player A the location of a switch point, marked on B's maze but not A's, to
which A can move thus opening the gate. Consequently, the resulting dialogues
contain a number of exchanges of descriptions of positions as the players try to
coordinate their understanding of both their current locations and various target
locations to which they must move.
Analysis of the transcripts from these tasks reveals that descriptions tend to
fall into one of four broad types: Figural which utilise some salient feature or
aspect of the configuration, Path which pick out a route to be traversed between
boxes, Line which order the maze into a set of rows or columns giving locations as
n boxes along the row or column, and Matrix which appeal to a set of cartesian
coordinates to identify a position (a more detailed discussion of each category
is found in section 4.2). Garrod and Anderson provide detailed evidence that
the different description types are not just arbitrary labels for various positions
but rather depend on different mental models or conceptualisations of the maze
used in the interpretation of descriptions (cf. section 2.1.2). For example, even
amongst Line description types, choice of a particular expression describing the
middle row seems to constrain the choice of description for top or bottom rows.
Thus, where some ordinal numbering scheme has been introduced the bottom row
is referred to as "row one", not "bottom" or "first". Similarly, the occurrence of
prenominals such as "top" or "bottom" patterns with middle row descriptions of
the form "third bottom row". The way choice of one description constrains the
form of other descriptions indicates that a coherent overall interpretative scheme
is being employed, one that varies between individuals. In contrast to Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs (1990), Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992), this directly raises the issue
of coordination of interpretation between members of a dyad.
Garrod and Anderson (1987) demonstrate that the distribution of different de¬
scription types displays some reliable patterns across dyads. In particular, mem-
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hers of the same dyad are much more likely to select the same description type than
would be expected by chance, calculated on the basis of the overall distribution
of description types in the corpus, indicating a tendency for pairs to coordinate
their use of description scheme and the underlying conceptualisation of the maze it
implies. Importantly, the observed coordination of description types within pairs
is not achieved through a process of explicit negotiation as to which description
type to use. Firstly, it is rare, occurring in only 27% of dialogues. Where it does
occur it is almost always subsequent to the completion of several descriptions and
then only where there have been substantial problems in coordinating on some
scheme. Secondly, where pairs do try to arrive at a negotiated solution the re¬
sulting scheme only predicts the form of 59% of the subsequent description types
(similar patterns are reported in Garrod & Doherty, 1994).
Garrod and Anderson emphasise that the level of coordination guaranteed by
membership of a linguistic community, such as English speakers, is insufficient to
explain the degree of coordination individuals achieve at the task. Commonly,
they begin with a range of interpretations of words like "row", for example as
horizontal, vertical and even diagonal lines but during the course of the task pairs
tend to settle on a single interpretation. In order to account for this pattern of
coordination without appeal to explicit negotiation Garrod and Anderson propose
an interactional principle:
"output/input coordination, ... may be simply stated as one of for¬
mulating your output (i.e., utterances) according to the same princi¬
ples of interpretation (i.e., model and semantic rules) as those needed
to interpret the most recent relevant input (i.e., utterance from the
interlocutor)." (Garrod and Anderson, 1987, p.27)
Adherence to this principle ensures that pairs will tend to be locally consistent,
as the data show, and achieve this without recourse to 'higher-order' beliefs about
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how their addressee is interpreting descriptions, or explicit negotiation. Allowing
for convergence on more specific interpretations of words such as "row" and "bot¬
tom" than are available prior to the task, discrepancies between two individuals'
schemes are most likely to become apparent during the process of applying the
interpretation arrived at for the previous input to the generation of a new output.
Any discrepancy can provide the impetus for an individual to restate the original
description according to their assessment of the currently accepted interpretation,
entrenching it further as the common scheme.
Applied rigidly, input-output coordination does not allow for schemes to de¬
velop beyond a certain point: once coordination has been achieved modifications
cannot be introduced without violating the principle. Garrocl and Anderson sug¬
gest that one means by which individuals may overcome this is through a division
of control. One speaker effectively takes control of the scheme used (the 'leader'),
correcting their partner's descriptions ('follower'), and occasionally introducing
new systems of, e.g., counting. This is supported by examples from the corpus
which show pairs in which one speaker always conforms to input-output coordina¬
tion while the other switches schemes and occasionally rephrases the descriptions
offered by their partner.
A second experiment, reported by Garrocl and Doherty (1994), has prompted
further modification of this idea. In this study, degree of coordination is found to
depend on membership of some 'virtual community'. Some details of the design
of this experiment are given in section 4.2; however the basic contrast is between
three groups who engage in nine maze task games. In the isolated pairs condition
clyacl composition is constant, always consisting of the same two individuals for all
nine games. In the community condition players meet a different individual in each
game but always drawn from the same pool of ten. Thus, on later trials, dyads
develop a progressively larger common history of individuals they have both met
already or, through indirect links, individuals one of them has already played who
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have previously met individuals their partner has already played and so forth.
The third, non-community, condition also involves dyads composed of different
individuals on each trail, but in this case they are not drawn from a common
pool. Although all three conditions show coordination of the kind predicted by
the input-output coordination model there are also reliable differences between
the groups. Although they initially show a lower degree of coordination than the
isolated pairs, the community group rapidly converge on a Matrix scheme and by
the third trial show almost perfect entrainment of description types. The non-
community group, like the community group, initially show lower coordination
than the isolated pairs but the degree of entrainment does not increase across
trials, if anything, falling.
To accommodate these findings, Garrod and Doherty consider the various
mechanisms that may operate to determine how conventions can emerge in the
different groups. Considering the community group and isolated pairs first, the
isolated pairs are modelled as conforming to the input-output coordination princi¬
ple. Their choice of description type is influenced both by the maze configuration
and the precedent set by their partner in their previous description. This mecha¬
nism provides a degree of local stability in choice of description types but cannot
become a global convention, in the sense of Lewis (1969), as this depends on pre¬
dicting the behaviour of several different individuals with respect to the task, i.e.,
it must become common knowledge amongst a group of players that they will
usually choose a scheme of a particular type. In isolated pairs the local choice of
scheme cannot be fixed in this way: any violation of the current scheme sets a new
precedent. In the community group, however, individuals are exposed to a range
of different individuals and therefore can begin to fix a more global convention. In
this case a violation of the current scheme by one partner does not automatically
undermine the generalisation that, across a range of partners, that scheme is the
one usually chosen. In support of this Garrod and Doherty observe that in all
Empirical Models of Dialogue 82
conditions, as players near their goals, the more likely they are to depart from the
currently accepted scheme and produce a goal-related Path description, reflecting
their sensitivity to the salience of the goal. Comparison of the frequency with
which isolated pairs versus community group pairs are influenced by this cue re¬
veals that isolated pairs are approximately twice as likely to choose a goal-related
description. This supports the suggestion that isolated pairs are developing a
different, local, form of coordination that is more readily disturbed by salience.
In addition to this basic contrast, they draw an analogy with exemplar-basecl
models of concept learning to account for the stronger convergence observed in
the late games for the community group. Roughly, the greater the range of ex¬
emplars an individual is exposed to in a concept learning task, the more stable
the associated concept, in this case interpretive scheme, will be. Because of the
greater number of people involved, individuals in the community group are ex¬
posed to a greater range of descriptions (2.8) than the isolated pairs (1.6) prior to
convergence, suggesting that, on this account, individuals in the community group
should derive more stable representations of the particular interpretation scheme.
Turning to the disparity in coordination between the community and non-
community groups, in both conditions players are exposed to a wider range of
exemplars and might therefore be expected to display similar convergence. To
account for the diffei*ence between these groups Garrod and Doherty look at what
happens where description types are in conflict. They suggest that conflicts are
resolved through the interaction of two mechanisms. Firstly, the initial degree of
coordination is achieved through input-output coordination but where this fails a
dyad will adopt the scheme most commonly used by both players in the preceding
games and this pattern is supported by the data from the community group. The
difference arises because, in the community group, where a degree of 'common
interaction history' emerges, adherence to input-output coordination amongst the
different pairs predicts that, where a conflict arises, there is more likely to be an es-
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tablished common scheme for the pair. By contrast, players in the non-community
group do not have the same history of common individuals with whom they have
interacted and are therefore less likely to achieve a high degree of coordination.
Thus, input-output coordination can underwrite the stronger convergence on a
common scheme in the community group than in the non-commuity group.
3.3 Discussion
Amongst the range of empirical models discussed in this chapter only the collab¬
orative model and the input-output coordination model provide accounts which
can address the issue of mutual-intelligibility in the face of idiolectical variation.
In view of the widespread acknowledgement that idiolectical differences are the
norm, this is surprising. The majority of work that has addressed questions of
inter-individual coordination has concentrated on factors relating to social and
pragmatic concerns which, though important, leave unacldressed the question of
how semantic coordination is achieved. Conversation analysis does consider the
need for an account of mutual-intelligibility but approaches it in a way difficult to
reconcile with formal and experimental concerns. The concentration on the "pro¬
cedural infrastructure of interaction" obscures the question of what individuals
must know in order to engage in successful conversational transactions.
The collaborative model and the input-output coordination model both offer
mechanisms in virtue of which individuals can overcome the interpretive asymme¬
tries that may obtain between them. Furthermore, both are pitched at levels which
directly address the semantic concerns such differences entail. However, there are
also differences between the two accounts. The collaborative model takes coordi¬
nation to be achieved through an explicit cycle of presentations and acceptances
by the parties to a particular dialogue. The input-output coordination princi¬
ple, by contrast, offers a group-based account that does not appeal to explicitly
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Chapter 3 concentrated on idiolectical variation as a practical problem for the
maintenance of mutual-intelligibility and surveyed exisiting empirical models for
possible solutions. It was claimed that only two models, input-output coordina¬
tion and the collaborative model, address this issue, providing mechanisms which
facilitate semantic coordination between interlocutors. This chapter examines the
empirical problem in more detail, concentrating on an experimental investigation
of semantic coordination. The general rationale behind these studies is that the
action of mechanisms which promote coordination can be most effectively revealed
under circumstances in which a degree of interference between them is created.
That is, if the processes which enhance coordination can be brought into conflict,
then the factors which govern their operation should become more empirically
tractable.
In pursuit of this, two conditions need to be fulfilled. Firstly, it is necessary
to identify conditions under which the problems caused by idiolectical variation
should Ire particularly apparent, promoting greater efforts at coordination. The
85
Experimental Studies of Coordination 86
conversational domains most likely to provoke this will be those least familiar to
the participants, i.e., domains for which there are few semantic precedents, beyond
those constituted by membership of a given linguistic community, for dealing with
the topic in question (see Lewis, 1969). As a rule of thumb, we might expect the
threat idiolectical variation poses to mutual-intelligibility to be inversely propor¬
tional to the familiarity of the domain of discourse.
Guided by this heuristic, these experiments display a preference for abstract
materials and relatively contrived tasks, a preference which raises specific ques¬
tions of generalisability in addition to those normally provoked by experimental
studies. The strategies that individuals employ in dealing with experimental tasks
involving tangram figures or maze-like grids could turn out to have only an indi¬
rect bearing on everyday conversational transactions. There is no straightforward
way to address this worry; however, a minimum hope is that these studies at
least provide a plausible starting point for investigation. Conversely, the under¬
developed state of theory in this area suggests that it would be premature to rule
out experimental studies of the kind pursued here since there is, ipso facto, no
uncontentious way of motivating judgements of ecological validity.
The second condition that must be met is the creation of circumstances under
which interference in the processes of coordination is predicted. If different groups
of interlocutors achieve a degree of coordination for some domain then there is 110
a priori reason to expect that each group will do this in the same way. This fol¬
lows from the suggestion that semantic conventions constitute arbitrary solutions
to recurrent problems of coordination (Lewis, 1969). If this holds then interfer¬
ence should arise where individuals from different groups are faced with the same
need to coordinate, for the same domain, but the previously achieved basis for
that coordination has been removed. Any disturbance in performance that arises
in these circumstances indexes the importance of semantic coordination and the
manner in which it is disturbed provides clues to the mechanisms which operate
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to achieve it.
Beyond the general rationale, the design of these experiments is also guided
by the more specific aim of resolving the tension, raised in chapter 3, between
the input-output coordination model (section 3.2.4) and the collaborative model
(section 3.2.3). A central claim of the collaborative model is that utterances are
subject to a process of presentation and acceptance before they are accumulated
to the common ground between participants in a dialogue. This cycle is seen as
crucial in underwriting the mutual beliefs held to be necessary for communication
(Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992)
and is singled out as critical to establishing the use of particular referring expres¬
sions. As Garrod and Doherty (1994) note, prima facie, the collaborative model
cannot account for the finding that convergence on particular reference schemes is
observed within experimental 'communities' because this occurs before there has
been a chance for each individual in the community to establish, separately, the
mutual belief with each other individual that scheme X represents the conventional
way to refer to particular positions in a maze.
Although, on the collaborative model, a scheme of reference could only become
conventionalised through the active establishment of mutual belief between the ap¬
propriate parties, other explanations of Garrod and Doherty's results are possible.
Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992) note that, in addition to collaborative processes
of adjustment, the referring expressions used in the tangram task also evolve as a
function of each individual's experience with the task. Thus an experienced par¬
ticipant faced with a naive partner will offer more readily identified descriptions
on the first trial with the new partner than was achieved on the first trial with
their previous partner. Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992) attribute this difference to
changes in expertise with the task, suggesting that more experienced participants
are, in some sense, more skilled at generating effective referring expressions. A
similar explanation could be adduced to account for Garrod and Doherty's re-
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suits: the observed convergence on a particular scheme results from increasing
expertise with the task, not from community based mechanisms of coordination.
If individuals in the community are each becoming more expert at communicat¬
ing information about spatial locations, the emergent scheme might represent an
optimal solution to the task, arrived at independently by each participant.
It is worth noting that this explanation faces some difficulties in dealing with
specific aspects of Garrod and Doherty's findings. In contrast to the community
group, isolated pairs who repeatedly perform the maze task do not all converge on
the same scheme. Accounting for this contrast requires appeal to the development
of expertise in performing the task with a succession of different partners rather
than development of expertise with the materials per se.1 An expertise explanation
is also complicated by the comparison of the community group and a control, 'non-
community' group constructed so that individuals do accumulate experience with
different dialogue partners but share only one previous partner in common with
them. As discussed in section 3.2.4, the non-community group doesn't converge
on a single scheme in the same way as the community group. However, there
are reasons why this does not necessarily undermine the expertise explanation.
Firstly, the degree of experience of different partners is not equivalent across the
community and control groups: in fact only 'key' individuals participate in all
five trials, their partners experiencing only one game prior to meeting them. By
contrast, the structure of the community group dictates that each individual has,
on average, been involved in the same number of games. Secondly, although
the control group doesn't converge on the same scheme as the community group
neither is it as heterogenous as the isolated pairs. The partial confound of degree of
experience combined with the disparity between the isolated pairs and the control
'Some support for this explanation derives from the significantly higher degree of coordination
that isolated pairs show in early trials. This disparity could be interpreted as indicating that
individuals treat repeated trials with the same partner as a different task from repeated trials
with different partners.
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group leaves a line of defence open for an expertise based explanation.
These considerations combine to suggest a stronger test of a collaborative
model explanation of Garrod and Doherty's data. In outline, the strategy adopted
in the studies reported below is to encourage, over the course of several trials at
a. collaborative task, the emergence of a number of different 'semantic communi¬
ties' or sub-groups. This is followed by a final trial in which the task is performed
again but in this case half the pairs consist of individuals drawn from the same sub¬
groups, a homogenous condition, and half the pairs consist of individuals drawn
from different sub-groups, a mixed condition. Assuming that variables relating
to experience are appropriately controlled, the collaborative model predicts there
should be 110 significant difference between the performance of the homogenous
and mixed conditions.
All three experiments reported below are designed with the principal aim of
providing a robust test of the prediction that there should Ire no difference be¬
tween mixed and homogenous groups. However, they are also intended to satisfy
two other interests. Firstly, the paucity of experimental studies dealing explicitly
with issues of semantic coordination has the consequence that, with the excep¬
tion of studies by Garrod and coworkers (e.g., Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod
& Doherty, 1994), there is little established methodology to draw on in address¬
ing these questions. In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the selection of
suitable materials, little is known about what measures are appropriate for the
detection of possible effects and there are few precedents for the selection of ap¬
propriate tasks. Consequently, an avocational element of this investigation is the
attempt to identify and develop suitable methodologies and tasks. Secondly, the
experiments are intended to provide a corpus of dialogues suitable for informing
the semantic modelling of chapter 5.
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4.1 Experiment 1
Echoing work on the collaborative model, the first experiment was based on a tan-
gram sorting task. However, the exact design developed by Krauss and Glucksberg
(Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) was not directly adopted on the grounds that the
asymmetry between roles of director and matcher in producing descriptions might
dilute the degree of negotiation between interlocutors.2 Instead, a revised task
was used involving two phases. In the first phase pairs of subjects negotiate var¬
ious criteria by which they can exhaustively divide a group of tangram figures
into two equal sets. The negotiation phase is then followed by a test, carried out
independently by each member of a pair, of the accuracy and speed of their recall
for the agreed classification. The rationale behind this is that because tangram
figures are relatively abstract shapes the process of partitioning them into two
categories should invoke a high degree of negotiation in order to reach agreement
on both the expressions appropriate for referring to individual figures and the
possible categories into which they might fall. Assuming this is the case, sub¬
jects performing the task with a succession of partners drawn from a particular
sub-group are predicted to develop a degree of intra-group semantic coordination
of the kind observed by Garrocl and Doherty (ibid). Given a degree of emergent
coordination, the performance of individuals who perform a final trial in dyads
composed of individuals from different sub-groups can be compared with those
who remain in the same sub-group.
2The possibility of using the map task (Anderson, Brown, Shillcock, & Yule, 1984) was
rejected on the same grounds as a similar asymmetry obtains between the route-giver and route-
follower.
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4.1.1 Method
The experiment consisted of three trials, each divided into two phases. In the first
phase subjects negotiated, in pairs, the classification of a set of twelve tangram
figures. Each pair's negotiations were recorded and subsequently transcribed to
allow for detailed content analysis. The second phase consisted of a speeded
decision task, performed alone, in which the figures from the first phase were
presented, one at a time in random order, to each subject and they were asked to
indicate, via a keypress, to which of their agreed categories the figure belonged.
The measure of response time was selected on the grounds that it should provide a
sensitive measure of the confidence subjects had in the classification of each figure.
Materials
The materials consisted of 96 tangram figures selected from Elffers (1973) rep¬
resenting a range of degrees of abstraction; from those that clearly resemble a
figure or animal to more abstract geometrical forms. These were divided up into
eight sets of twelve figures, taking care to ensure that no set contained more than
two figures readily recognisable as being of a particular type such as animals (see
figure 4.1).
The materials were presented using the psychology testing software Superlab,
version 1.4, running on Apple-Macintosh SE30's under system seven. Script files
were written to control the timing and order of presentation of materials. In
the first phase instructions were displayed until the space bar was pressed (co¬
ordinated by instruction from the experimenter) followed by presentation of the
complete set of 12 figures for two minutes. The second phase also began with
instructions presented until the space bar was pressed (again, on instruction) fol¬
lowed, consecutively, by each of the twelve figures. In each case, a fixation point
was displayed for 350ms followed by presentation of the target figure, terminated
by an appropriate keypress. The order of presentation was automatically ran-
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Figure 4.1: Example Set of Tangram Figures
clomised and the response times logged to a results file. Response times were
recorded via the Apple Desktop Bus keyboard using the Toolbox Time Manager
with an accuracy of ±lms.
Design
Subjects were randomly assigned into sub-groups of four, each constituting one
'community'. In the first two trials subjects performed the task with different
individuals drawn from the same sub-group. On the third trial, two members
of a sub-group formed a new pair and the remaining two were combined with
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Trial: 1 2 3 Condition
Pair: 1+2 1+3 1+4 Homogenous
3+4 2+4 3+6 Mixed
5+6 5+7 5+8 Homogenous
7+8 6+8 2+7 Mixed
Table 4.1: Dyad Composition Across Trials for 8 Subjects
subjects from a different sub-group. The resulting combinations generated for two
sub-groups of four subjects are illustrated in table 4.1.
In order to control for effects of materials the eight groups of twelve tangram
figures were counterbalanced across trials and conditions in a latin square assign¬
ment. Each subject, on each trial, encountered a new set of materials and a
new dialogue partner. This resulted in a factorial design with a between-subjects
independent variable of dyad composition (mixed versus homogenous) and depen¬
dent variables of response time and degree of agreement between dyad partners'
classification of figures in phase 2.
Subjects
Thirty two subjects took part, recruited from staff, graduate and undergraduate
students from various disciplines at the University of Edinburgh. They consisted
of 8 females and 24 males ranging in age from 18 to 39 with an average age of 24
years. They were paid £3 each for taking part in the experiment.
Procedure
The experiment was carried out in four sessions with eight subjects per session
making up two sub-groups of four. It was made clear to all subjects that their
dialogues would be recorded and transcribed (but anonymously coded) and that
they were free to withdraw from the study if this presented them with any problem.
On each trial, subjects were divided into four dyads, seated opposite each other at
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a desk with an SE30 in front of each subject, the screen of each computer visible to
only one member of the pair. On all three trials they were instructed that the task
would proceed in two phases, the first phase to be carried out in collaboration with
their partner, the second to be carried out individually. In the first phase they
would both be presented with a set of twelve tangram figures, arranged differently
on each screen so that they couldn't be identified by position. The figures would
be displayed for two minutes during which they are asked to decide, jointly, on
some classification that sorted the figures into two groups of six. This was to be
achieved by discussion rather than pointing or using gestures. They were informed
that this would be followed by a test of the speed and accuracy with which they
could categorise each figure according to their agreed classification. After the first
phase they were asked to write down the names of the categories they had agreed,
labelling them A and B. At the start of the second phase subjects were instructed
that they would be presented, in random order, with each of the twelve figures
they had .previously classified and asked to indicate, as quickly and as accurately
as possible, which of the two categories the figure had been assigned to (the d and
Iv keys on the keyboard were relabelled A and B for this purpose). Care was taken
to ensure that no indication was given to the subjects, either in the materials or
the instructions, that they were divided into two sub-groups or communities and
during debriefing no subject reported detecting this element of the design.
4.1.2 Results
Two tests were performed to provide general information about the improvement
in performance as experience with the task increased. Firstly, the average response
time for each subject on each trial was calculated and entered in an analysis of vari¬
ance with a single within-subjects factor of experience with 3 levels corresponding
to trials 1,2 and 3. There was a significant main effect of experience, F(2,62)=8-34,
p=0.001, with mean response time falling from 1086ms in the first trial to 801ms
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and 720ms in the second and third trials respectively.
In order to index the changes in effectiveness of the agreed classification as
experience with the task increased, each pair was scored for the proportion of the
target items, out of twelve, that they assigned to the same classification. This
was entered into an analysis of variance with a single between-subjects factor of
experience with three levels corresponding to each trial. There was no main effect
of experience: F(2,45)=1.359, p=0.267. However, the means did suggest an increase
in the expected direction as experience increased: trial 1: 0.81, 2: 0.88 and 3: 0.91
and a linear trend analysis confirmed this, t(45)= 1.747, p (one-tailed) =0.050.
The comparison of mixed and homogenous groups was made in two ways.
Firstly, the average response times for each subject in trial three were entered into
an analysis of variance with a single, between-subjects factor of group composition
(homogenous vs. mixed). The mean response time for the homogenous pairs was
717ms compared with 723ms for the mixed pairs and these were not significantly
different: i7'(ij3o)=0.005, p=0.944.
A second, more sensitive, comparison was made by calculating the difference
between each subject's average response time in trials 2 and 3, providing an index
of how each individual's response time was altered in trial 3. This was entered into
an analysis of variance with a single within-subjects factor of group composition
(homogenous vs. mixed). The anova revealed a significant main effect of group
composition, F(1j3o)=4.23, p=0.048, with a mean decrease in response time for
individuals in homogenous pairs of 3ms compared with a mean decrease of 159ms
for individuals in mixed pairs.
Transcripts
Forty-eight two minute dialogues were collected in phase one and subsequently
transcribed. Analysis of the transcripts revealed a very consistent strategy across
trials and conditions. In contrast to the methods adopted by Clark and Wilkes-
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Gibbs (1986) this task did not successfully elicit negotiation of referring expressions
for individual figures. Instead, by far the most common strategy (94% of dyads)
involved identifying some general property that six figures held in common, for
example, "pointy tops" or "triangular base", and using this to discriminate be¬
tween the two sets, labelling one as possessing the property and the remainder
as "others". This was achieved by direct discussion of candidate discriminating
properties and consequently required very little discussion of individual figures ex¬
cept where the number of figures possessing a particular discriminating property
was not exactly six. In these cases, rather than revise their choice of property, the
common pattern was to identify a single figure to either include or exclude from
the set possessing the key property. For example, "triangle top and straight down
not including the triangle out the way".
A clear majority of the properties dyads used to divide up the tangram figures
were based on the two-dimensional geometric form of the figures. Furthermore, a
number of properties recurred across trials allowing a classification into types. The
most commonly cited property was possession of a pointed top or vertex, realised
variously as, "triangular top", "single pointing arrow top", "pyramid top", "thin
ones with roofs" and "pointy tops". This description type formed the basis of
•30% of the categories. The second most commonly cited discriminating property
involved appeal to the relative height of the figures, with descriptions such as;
"tower-like", "long tall", "long vertical length on both sides","tall thin" and most
frequently just "tall". This property was used to partition the figures in 19% of
cases. The third most common type was possession of a triangular base which
occured as "flat bottom with incline sides" and "triangular base". This property
was used to determine 15% of the categories. Two other properties were utilised
in more than one description: these were "flat base", 6%, and "flat top", 6%.
The x-emaining categories were all determined on the basis of properties that
were not used more than once. These idiosyncratic methods of discriminating
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Criterion Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3
Unique 6 2 3
Relative Height 5 2 2
Pointed Tops 2 7 6
Triangular Base 1 4 2
Flat Base 2 0 1
Flat Top 0 1 2
Table 4.2: Frequency of Criteria Across Trials
amongst the figures accounted for the remaining 23% of the categories. Although
necessarily heterogeneous, this group of properties did display some common fea¬
tures. They tended to be closely tied to the particular set of figures in question
and to fall into one of two classes. The majority were more specific or elaborated
versions of the general geometric properties described above: "four concavities
point at top", "small square blocks attached", "right-angled isoceles triangle at
least one", "no more than two points", "pointy top and flat or downward bot¬
tom" and "forty five degree wedge missing". The remainder appealed to a richer
interpretation of half the figures as representations of objects, "familiar", "living
things", "objects", contrasted with a set of abstract, uninterpreted figures.
Table 4.2 illustrates the distribution of the various criteria for partitioning
figures across trials. Inspection of the raw frequencies suggests a shift in the
pattern of criteria adopted across trials. Unfortunately, there are insufficient data
to determine the reliability of this pattern.3
Collapsing all the criteria that repeated across trials into one category of gen-
eralisable or 'abstract' criteria, it was possible to make a focussed comparison of
unique versus 'abstract' on trials 1 and 3 using the Fisher exact probability test.
This was not significant, p=0.159.
3Calculation of omnibus Chi-square is inappropriate since no cell has expected frequencies
which rise above 5. Fisher's exact probability test could not be applied as it is computed only
for 2-by-2 comparisons (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).
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Criterion Homogenous Mixed
Unique 1 2
Relative Height 0 2
Pointed Tops 4 2
Triangular Base 1 1
Flat Base 1 0
Flat Top 1 1
Table 4.3: Frequency of Criteria in Homogenous and Mixed Dyads
Table 4.3 reports the relative distributions of each criterion type in the ho¬
mogenous and mixed dyads in trial three. There is a weak indication that the
homogenous dyads were more uniform in their choice of criteria than the mixed
dyads. However, as above, there are too few data, points for meaningful compar¬
isons to be made.
4.1.3 Discussion
In respect of methods and choice of dependent variables, this experiment was a
qualified success. The results indicate that as experience with the task increased,
subjects' performance also improved, becoming both faster and more accurate in
the assignment of figures to their agreed categories. The data suggest that the task
was comprehensible to subjects and that the chosen measure of response time was,
at least to some degree, an effective index of subjects' expertise and confidence in
their classification of the figures. Against this background, the comparisons be¬
tween the homogenous and mixed dyads in trial 3 appear warranted and might be
sensibly brought to bear on the experimental hypothesis. The between-subjects
comparison of response times for the two groups shows no difference in task per¬
formance as the collaborative model would predict. However, the more sensitive,
within-subjects comparison of changes in each individuals response times shows
a suprising decrement in perfomance for individuals in the homogenous dyads
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compared to the mixed dyads in the third trial. On the face of it, this result is
predicted neither by the collaborative model nor the rationale for the experiment.
Nonetheless, it does appear to undermine the attempt to account for emergent
semantic coordination as a product of individual task experience.
Although encouraging, there are several reasons why this conclusion, and the
evidence that supports it, are not decisive. The clearest weakness is that although
the results suggest a difference between the mixed and homogenous groups, they
provide 110 convergent evidence that this is actually due to the emergence of local
semantic 'dialects' within the different sub-groups. As noted, the task did not elicit
negotiation of referring expressions for each figure which could then be compared
across trials and conditions. Instead, subjects concentrated on isolating some
discriminating property that could be used to isolate a subset of figures. This
led to few or, in most cases, no exchanges of descriptions concerning individual
figures. Furthermore, the clear majority of these properties were based 011 simple,
two-dimensional, geometric considerations, only the unique, idiosyncratic, criteria
showed any of the richer interpretations evident in Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986).
As a result, the available data were not amenable to the type of analysis used
in previous work, for example, contraction/expansion of referring expressions and
distribution of description types, and there were too few data points, in the analysis
that was possible, to permit meaningful statistical comparisons.
The concerns raised by the lack of evidence for emergent conventions are com¬
pounded by the fact that the design of this experiment admitted only two trials
prior to the experimental manipulation. Practical constraints restricted the study
to sub-groups of four, which can only support three trials before individuals must
meet twice, allowing only a short period for convergence to occur. While Gar-
rod and Doherty (1994) report evidence of convergence within three trials of the
maze task, this is the minimum reasonable number of trials, and it is particularly
questionable whether it is valid to generalise this expectation to a different task.
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This consideration weakens confidence that the effects observed in this experiment
are due to community-based emergence of semantic conventions. Without some
independent measure of convergence it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions.
Furthermore, the significant difference that was found to obtain between response
times in trials 2 and 3 is subject to a possible confound. Although the materials
were counterbalanced across all three trials the shifts experienced by individuals
between trials 2 and 3 were not (i.e., A —> B may not be equivalent to B —»• A).
This opens up the possibility that there may have been a systematic difference in
the difficulty of the shifts experienced by individuals in the mixed and homogenous
groups.
Although susceptible to criticism, the experiment does indicate that the col¬
laborative model might not provide an adequate account of the emergence of con¬
ventionalised reference schemes within sub-groups. The absence of a convincing
demonstration that local, intra-group, convergence occurred in this study means
that no strong conclusion can be drawn. Nonetheless, the distribution of criteria
types across the mixed and homogenous groups is suggestive and, combined with
the within-subjects comparison in response times, provides sufficient motivation
for pursuing the investigation further.
4.2 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to address the design faults in experiment 1 while preserving
the same basic rationale. As before, the aim was to produce conditions under which
sub-groups would converge on particular local conventions and then determine
whether, and in what ways, crossing-over between subgroups affects performance.
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4.2.1 Methods
The shortcomings identified with the tangram task used in the first experiment
prompted adoption of the maze task (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Do-
herty, 1994), described in section 3.2.4, as the basic experimental task. This task
has the advantage that the number of descriptions each subject produces can be
manipulated and these expressions can be classified according to an established
set of categories, overcoming some of the problems that arose with the more open-
ended tangram task. As well as creating more chances for the exchange and modi¬
fication of descriptions, the maze task offers established metrics for comparing the
incidence of, and convergence on, description types across individuals, dyads and
groups.
Materials
The original, electronic, version of the maze task takes approximately 20 minutes
to run and requires two Apple Macintosh computers (SE-30 or better) per dyad.
The aim of using large sub-groups in this study generated impractical demands
on hardware and in order to overcome this problem a paper version of the maze
task was employed. Screen dumps were made of thirty of the displays used in the
original task and edited, using the graphics application Superpaint, to produce 168
basic maze configurations based on a 6-by-4 grid. These were divided into twelve
sets of 14 and each set of 14 was made up into a pair of booklets, one with target
locations, indicated by a circle, marked only on the odd numbered pages and one
with locations marked only on the even numbered pages. Thus, for each pair of
booklets, any given page number had identical maze configurations; however, on
alternate pages only one booklet had a location marked, the other identical in all
respects apart from a circle indicating the target location. An example pair of
pages is illustrated in figure 4.2.
Using these booklets a modified version of the maze task was adopted in which
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Figure 4.2: Example Pair of Maze Configurations
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members of each dyad, alternately, describe the location marked on their maze and
their dialogue partner indicates, using a pen, where they think it is. This preserved
the requirement for the production and comprehension of spatial descriptions while
obviating some of the practical difficulties associated with the original.
Design
The design of this experiment employed the same basic strategy as experiment 1
but was modified, employing larger sub-groups of subjects and a larger number
of trials before the experimental manipulation, in order to promote a high degree
of intra-group coordination. It was also intended to provide tighter control of
two aspects of dyad composition not addressed in earlier studies. The practical
problems with running the electronic version of the maze task had the consequence
that in the original studies (Garrod &; Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Doherty, 1994)
subjects could not all carry out the task within a short period and were required
to return on several different occasions. This often resulted in trials involving
dyads composed of individuals with differing degrees of experience with the task
and who had been subject to different intervals between trials. Although these
differences were unlikely to have introduced systematic bias in the earlier work,
they had the potential to act as nuisance variables in the current study. This was
overcome by ensuring that both number of trials experienced and interval between
trials were equivalent for all subjects at each stage of the experiment.
As for experiment one, materials were assigned in a latin square design in
order to counterbalance possible biasing effects. This is particularly pertinent for
the maze task as Anderson and Garrod (1987) report that certain types of maze
configuration tend to elicit disporportionate numbers of descriptions of a given
type. Some configurations are particularly likely to invoke "figural" descriptions
while others appear to suggest "line" or "matrix" description types.
Satisfying these constraints resulted in a basic design consisting of multiples
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of twenty-four subjects, divided into three sub-groups of eight, who participate in
six trials each consisting of a two minute task-oriented dialogue. For the first five
trials each dyad is composed of subjects drawn from within a single sub-group
of eight. In the sixth trial half of the dyads are composed of subjects drawn,
as before, from within one subgroup of eight while the remaining six dyads are
composed of subjects drawn from different sub-groups. Labelling the three sub¬
groups of eight, A, B and C, the mixed dyads consisted of two pairs for each
of the combinations; AB, BC and AC, counterbalancing the combinations. On
the sixth trial half the subjects perform the task with individuals drawn from
the same sub-group and half perform the task with individuals drawn from a
different subgroup. The combinations generated for a set of twenty-four subjects
are illustrated in table 4.4. As for experiment one, each subject, on each trial, is
exposed to a different set of materials and a different dialogue partner.
Trial: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Condition
Pair: 1+2 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7 Homogenous
3+4 2+4 2+7 2+6 2+5 2+8 Homogenous
5+6 5+7 3+6 3+7 3+8 3+13 Mixed
7+8 6+8 5+8 4+8 4+7 4+22 Mixed
9+10 9+11 9+12 9+13 9+14 14+15 Homogenous
11+12 10+12 10+15 10+14 10+13 10+11 Homogenous
13+14 13+15 11+ 14 11 + 15 11 + 16 9+21 Mixed
15+16 14+16 13+16 12+16 12+15 6+12 Mixed
17+18 17+19 17+20 17+21 17+22 17+23 Homogenous
19+20 18+20 18+23 18+22 18+21 18+24 Homogenous
21+22 21+23 19+22 19+23 19+24 5+19 Mixed
23+24 22+24 21+24 20+24 20+23 16+20 Mixed
Table 4.4: Dyad Composition Across Trials for 24 Subjects
The resulting design was a simple factorial with dyad composition (mixed vs.
homogenous) as a between-subjects independent variable and trial number as a
within-subjects independent variable. The switch to an off-line version of the
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maze task required the abandonment of a response time as a dependent variable.
Instead, to provide basic measures of effectiveness/efficiency at the task, the scores
each pair achieved for the total number of items attempted and for the proportion
of items that involved erroneous identification of the target location were chosen
as dependent variables.4
Subjects
The experiment was run in two parts with a total of 48 subjects participating.
They were recruited from students studying A-level psychology at two colleges of
further education in Edinburgh. They consisted of 9 males and 39 females ranging
in age from 16 to 54 years with an average age of 33.
Procedure
The same procedure was followed in both parts of the experiment. Subjects were
allocated randomly to sub-groups and each was assigned a number that was used
throughout the experiment when pairing individuals into dyads. On each trial
dyads were seated opposite each other at a desk with a partition between them in
order to obscure their view of each other's booklets whilst permitting eye contact.
At the start of each session it was explained that subjects would be asked to work
in pairs, each member of the pair having a booklet of mazes on which one of them
would have a target location, marked by a circle, and their partner would have the
same maze but without the circle. The task being to communicate the location of
the circle, without pointing or showing, to their partner who should then mark it
on their copy. They were informed that they would perform this task six times,
4The decision to score by pair rather than by individual was dictated by the fact that, if
scored by individual, these measures would violate the assumption of independence for analysis
of variance. If one subject managed n items within the time allowed their partner could not,
in virtue of the task structure, manage more than n ± 1. This had the unhappy side-effect of
requiring 48 subjects in order to generate twelve data points in each condition.
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each time with a different partner. It was explained that on each occasion they
would have two minutes to perform the task, start and finish to be signalled by
the experimenter, and they were asked to complete as many pages of the booklet
as possible within this period while preserving, as far as possible, accuracy. It was
made clear that all the dialogues would be recorded, although anonymously coded,
and that they were free to withdraw if this presented them with any problem. As
before, no indication was given, either in the instructions or in the materials, that
they were divided into subgroups and no one reported detecting this aspect of the
design.
4.2.2 Results
Only one dyad managed to complete all 14 items within the time allotted, achiev¬
ing this on trial 6. Overall, the average number of items completed within two
minutes was low but increased across trials: 2.4, 5.0, 5.5, 6.8, 7.1, 8.1. This trend
is illustrated in figure 4.3 with trials 1 & 2, 3 & 4 and 5 & 6 averaged to provide
three levels of task experience: low, medium and high. The reliability of this pat¬
tern of increase was confirmed by an analysis of variance perfomed on the number
of items completed by each pair with trial number as a between-subjects factor:
omnibus /7'(4,i3s)=17.71, p=0.000, linear trend; t(138)=9.03, p (one-tailed)=0.000.
Each pair was also scored for the proportion of items that resulted in incorrect
identifications of the target location. This suggested a reverse pattern, illustrated
in figure 4.4 (with trials again collapsed to give three levels of experience, low,
medium and high), with the average proportion of errors tending to fall across
the first five trials: 0.32, 0.24, 0.29, 0.17, 0.20. An analysis of variance with trial
number as a between-subjects factor confirmed the pattern of decrease: omnibus
F(4,i38)=1.057, p=0.386, linear trend; t(138)= 1.930, p (one-tailed)=0.027.
The effects of the experimental manipulation of group composition on the
dependent measures of items attempted and proportion of errors was tested using





Figure 4.3: Number of Items Attempted with Experience
two analyses of variance with group composition (homogenous vs. mixed) as
a single, between-subjects, factor. No reliable difference was found either for
number of items attempted; F(li22)=0.04, p= 0.843, or for the proportion of errors;
F(i,22)=0.006, p=0.936.
Transcriptions
A total of 144 two minute dialogues were transcribed and coded for the occurrence
of the description types, Figural, Path, Line and Matrix. Repetitions of all or part
of an original description were not counted as completed descriptions, nor were
procedural clarifications or clarifications, including reformulations, of part of a
description. This classification was guided by the criteria offered in Garrod and
Anderson (1987), drawing on the same conceptual and lexical discriminations.
The criteria, with examples drawn from the current corpus, are illustrated below:















Figure 4.4: Proportion of Errors with Experience
Figural: draws on some element of the configuration or location of particular
features to identify the target. For example:
"on the bottom row there's one missing it's diagonally to the: diagonally
up to the left"
Path: identifies a route to be traversed through the maze to the target location.
Sensitive to the layout of boxes and connections and frequently involves an
interdependence in the enumeration of the vectors so that a location whose
cartesian coordinates are 2,2 might be described as "two up, one along".
Often contain adverbs such as "across " or "along".
Line: classifies the maze into a set of elements corresponding to rows, columns
or diagonals. The target line is described first, followed by the target box
as a position along it. Frequently an ordering is imposed on the set of lines
giving rise to descriptions that refer to lines as e.g., "second" or "last".
"right from the right go to your left one and it's umm down one"
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"right second column from the left and it's the second one down"
Matrix: effectively imposes a cartesian coordinate system on the maze with loca¬
tions identified via the specification of two vectors either as rows and columns
or in terms of two numbers, one for each axis.
"two, four"
Each description was coded, as appropriate, for its chosen or implied origin
(e.g.. top left, bottom right etc., where it lay at one of the corners of the basic
6-by-4 grid, otherwise its coordinates from bottom left where a corner was not
used or, usually in the case of figural descriptions, whether it enlisted either a
feature marked on the maze, a group of boxes that formed some shape or a pat¬
tern of spaces formed by missing boxes), the use of cardinal or ordinal numbers
in enumerating boxes and the order in which the axes were introduced (i.e., X-
axis first or Y-axis first). This information provided convergent evidence for the
classification of ambiguous descriptions where it was not immediately clear from
the description and its context what category applied. Overall, the transcripts
generated a corpus of 975 descriptions, each classified into one of the description
types.
During the process of coding the descriptions a difficulty with the application
of Garrod and Anderson's criteria became apparent. The switch to a paper version
of the maze task necessarily altered the exact nature of the task. In particular,
subjects appeared to be less constrained by the exact configuration of the maze.
In the electronic version, the presence or absence of passages between boxes repre¬
sents an important restriction on the way the maze is conceptualised since subjects
must move their figure between boxes and they consequently pay relatively close
attention to the layout of connections between them. The paper version of the task
does not require any movement between boxes, thus reducing the importance sub¬
jects attach to the pattern of connections. In terms of coding, the net effect of this
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difference was to undermine the confidence with which some Path-type descrip¬
tions could be classified. Amongst the descriptions that could be unambiguously
classified as Path, for example, because of an interdependence in the enumeration
of the axes, subjects frequently offered descriptions that followed routes between
unconnected boxes. This reduced confidence in categorisation of other descrip¬
tions that did not unequivocally meet the additional criteria for classification as
Path-type.
In contrast to previous studies with the maze task, few matrix description types
were identified in the corpus. Only 1.2% (11 out 975) fell into this category in the
current study, compared with 23.4% reported in Garrod and Anderson (1987) and,
averaging across conditions, approximately 40% in Garrod and Doherty (1994).
Rather than discard these descriptions from the analysis, they were combined with
the Line-type category to form a general category of 'Abstract' description types
in the sense that, relative to Path and Figural descriptions, their interpretation
relies less on the configuration of any particular instance of the maze.
Averaging across all six trials, the relative proportions of descriptions of each
type were; Figural: 25%, Path: 53% and Abstract 22%. Although the proportion
of Path-type descriptions remained relatively constant across trials; 51%, 55%,
55%, 52%, 55% and 52% respectively, the relative distribution of Figural and Ab¬
stract description types shifted, with a fall in the proportion of Figural description
types across trials shadowed by a rise in the proportion of Abstract description
types. Calculation of Pearson's product-moment correlation suggested a strong
negative relationship between the two description types with r = -0.90. The shift
in distribution is illustrated in figure 4.5 with trials 1&2, 3&4 and 5&6 combined
to give low, medium and high levels of experience as before.
The reliability of this pattern was assessed firstly by calculating an omnibus
\2 for the raw frequencies of Figural and Abstract description types across all
six trials. This proved significant with x?5>=13.28, p=0.020. Secondly, a focussed
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Figure 4.5: Relative Distribution of Description Types According to Experience
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comparison was made of the relative frequencies of each description type on trial
1 versus trial 6. This also proved reliable with x^=10.66, p=0.001.
The experimental manipulation of group composition was analysed by calcu¬
lating x2 f°r tire frequencies of Figural and Abstract description types in the ho¬
mogenous and mixed dyads in trial 6. This was significant: xf1)==l 1 -00, p=0.000,
with homogenous dyads using Abstract description types for 40% of target lo¬
cations and Figural description types for 14%, compared with mixed dyads who
produced Abstract description types for 19% and Figural description types for
24%. Additionally, comparison of the frequencies of Abstract and Figural decrip-
tion types used by mixed dyads in trial 6 with those used by all dyads in trial 1
revealed no significant difference: x^)=0.944, p=0.331.
Turning to local patterns of coordination, entrainment scores, following the
method described in Garrod and Doherty (1994), were also calculated for each
member of a dyad in each trial. This is an index, varying between one and zero
where Imperfect entrainment, of the tendency for individuals to generate descrip¬
tions of the same type as those their partners have just generated. It is calculated
as the number of description types produced by an individual that match the pre¬
ceding description type produced by their partner, divided by the total number of
exchanges of description types in that trial. Entrainment scores for trial 1 were not
calculated as the average number of transitions was very low (2.4). Logically, the
scores obtained for each member of a dyad are independent: one individual could
always choose a different decription type from their partner, while their partner
always matched description type. However, the entrainment scores for members
of a pair displayed a strong, positive, relationship, Pearson's product-moment cor¬
relation, r=0.51, indicating that the tendency to match description types by each
member of a dyad was related to the degree to which their interlocutors were also
matching description types.
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The average degree of entrainment displayed remained fairly consistent over
trials 2-6: 2:0.49, 3:0.39, 4:0.46, 5:0.44, 6:0.51, with values close to the chance
level of 0.40 (calculated as the sum of the squared proportions of each description
type on trial one). The scores for each pair5 were entered into an analysis of
variance with trial number as a between-subjects factor. This was not reliable:
omnibus F(4i116)=0.610, p=0.656. The prediction that entrainment should increase
across trials was not supported by a linear trend analysis (unweighted means):
t(ii6)=0-479, p (one-tailed)=0.316.
A comparison was also made of the experimental manipulation of group com¬
position. The average entrainment scores on trial 6 were: Mixed: 0.46 and Ho¬
mogenous: 0.63. The scores for each pair were entered into an analysis of variance
with group composition, mixed versus homogenous, as a single, between-subjects,
factor. This was not significant: F(ii22)=2.34, p=0.139.
4.2.3 Discussion
Drawing on the results of both experiments 1 and 2 it seems warranted to conclude
that both proportion of errors and number of items attempted constitute poor
measures of semantic coordination between members of a dyad. Although they
clearly do vary as a function of experience at the task they are not sensitive to
the manipulation of group composition. In the case of errors this may be due,
in part, to the lack of feedback subjects receive concerning the accuracy with
which they have identified the target location. The only direct cue they have
that something is wrong arises where they are unable to interpret all or part of a
description given by their partner. This contrasts, for example, with the electronic
version of the maze task in which an error is more likely to be detected since it will
usually have consequences for subsequent actions. The lack of a similar check on
5It was necessary to analyse by pair as the positive correlation between the scores for members
of the same dyad undermines the assumption of independence for analysis of variance.
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accuracy in the paper version of the task makes the interpretation of errors more
equivocal with some undetected errors arising from fundamental asymmetries in
interpretation of descriptions and others stemming from 'accidental' sources such
as left-right confusions or miscounting. All of this undermines the sensitivity of
errors as a dependent measure. This problem feeds into the interpretation of the
total number of items attempted. Since subjects were less likely to detect trouble
in their interpretation of a description we might expect fewer delays due to cycles
of repair, making the total number of items attempted less sensitive to the degree
of coordination in interpretation by members of a dyad.
Interpretation of the failure to find any effects of local entrainment, either
across trials or between the mixed and homogenous groups, is more vexed. The
expected increase in degree of entrainment over trials was not observed, nor was
any difference in entrainment found between the mixed and homogenous dyads
in trial 6. One possible reason for this derives from differences between the elec¬
tronic and paper versions of the maze task, which could be implicated in a number
of ways. The average degree of entrainment observed here was lower than that
reported in previous studies -an average of approximately 0.9 in Garrod and Do-
herty (1994) compared with 0.5 here. This may be partially due to the fact that
Garrod and Doherty found strong convergence, in their community group, on the
matrix scheme, a scheme practically absent from this corpus. This is the most
abstract description type and its presence may well be a cause, as much as a con¬
sequence, of a high degree of entrainment. Also, Garrod's and Doherty's subjects
had a greater opportunity for convergence, participating in nine trials, as opposed
to six, each of which involved a greater number of transitions between speakers.
The tighter constraints that the electronic task places on accuracy also provide a
possible explanation since this might well be expected to influence the extent to
which individuals coordinate.
Despite these reservations, the overall distribution of description types does
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provide strong evidence of increasing convergence on the use of particular descrip¬
tion types across trials. The change in relative proportions of each type indicates
a move from relatively specific, context dependent forms, such as Figural and
Path descriptions, to more abstract types, such as Line and (occasionally) Ma¬
trix, that provide a. scheme which generalises well to new instances of the maze.
Figural descriptions are highly context dependent, drawing on specific details of
configuration or features that are unlikely to be repeated from one item to another.
Conversely, Line type descriptions effectively preserve invariant information about
the grid common to the different maze configurations, providing a scheme accord¬
ing to which the description of a range of target locations can be generated (cf.
Garrod & Anderson, 1987). While this pattern fits well with the predictions of
an explanation based on increasing experience with the task, it does not account
for the difference between the mixed and homogenous dyads in trial six. The
contrast between these groups suggests that the observed convergence depends
to a critical degree on membership, even though unacknowledged, of a particular
sub-community. The contrast in the distribution of description types between the
mixed and homogenous dyads shows that the degree of convergence achieved over
the course of five trials can be readily disrupted by transfer outside a subgroup, the
observed distribution of description types produced by mixed dyads not differing
significantly from those of dyads attempting the task for the first time.
Interestingly, this presents something of a contradiction since, given the consis¬
tently low, almost chance, level of entrainment across trials, this pattern cannot,
without elaboration, be attributed to input-output coordination. Full discussion
of this issue is deferred until section 4.3.3. Similarly, although some aspects of
the data are amenable to analysis in terms of the collaborative model of dialogue,
it cannot account for the contrast between the mixed and homogenous groups.
The question then arises as to how both the shift in the overall distribution of
description types and its sensitivity to group composition can be accounted for.
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A further study was conducted in order to try to resolve some of these issues.
4.3 Experiment 3
In order to investigate further the mechanisms that drive the shift in patterns of
description type, and to provide a check on their reliability, a third experiment
was run, again utilising the paper version of the map task.
4.3.1 Methods
The methods adopted for this study were basically the same as those for experi¬
ment 2 with some modifications. Some of the difficulties in the interpretation of
the previous study stemmed from the relatively low number of items attempted by
each individual and the low incidence of Matrix description types in the corpus.
In order to try to compensate for this, the materials were substantially altered
and the number of items in each trial, as well as the time allowed for completion,
were increased.
Materials
The transcripts from experiment 2 suggested several sources of difficulty for sub¬
jects. The use of screen dumps from the original task had resulted in the inclusion
of a number of features, such as switch points, gates and the window border, that
are strictly irrelevant to the completion of the task on paper. These were fre¬
quently utilised in Figural descriptions and their presence appeared to promote
the use of this description type, possibly at the expense of the more abstract
schemes. This observation prompted the removal of these features from the maze
configurations. It was also noted that because both the maze and its background
were white, a number of subjects, particularly on early trials, fell prey to figure-
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ground ambiguities leading to problems in identifying which elements of the maze
were to be interpreted as boxes. To overcome this, the background was shaded
grey, making the pattern of boxes more apparent. As well as removing some of el¬
ements that favoured Figural descriptions, the size of the basic grid was increased
to 5-by-6, increasing the range of possible targets, and enhancing the effectiveness
of Line/Matrix description types relative to Path and/or Figural which should,
on average, become more complex for larger grids. An example of the resulting
configurations are given in figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Example Configuration
Following the same strategy as in experiment 2, 120 basic configurations were
generated and then made up into two sets, one with a location marked (this time
by an X) and one without. These were divided up into twelve sets of 20 items,
each forming a pair of booklets with target locations on alternate pages paired
with the appropriate unmarked configuration on the corresponding page in the
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other booklet. This increased the number of descriptions each subject aimed to
generate up to a possible maximum of ten.
Design
The design of this study was unchanged from experiment 2, employing the same,
counterbalanced, ordering of materials and composition of experimental groups.
As before, this resulted in a simple factorial design with the experimental manipu¬
lation as a between-subjects independent variable of dyad composition (mixed vs.
homogenous) and a within-subjects variable of number of trials completed. The
descision to abandon number of items attempted and proportion of errors per pair
as dependent measures allowed a reduction in the sample size to 24.
Subjects
Twenty-four subjects were recruited from amongst the staff and students of various
disciplines at the University of Edinburgh. They consisted of thirteen males and
eleven females with ages between 20 and 47 (average age: 25 years). Each was
paid £3 for participating.
Procedure
Two substantive changes were made to procedure. Firstly, the length of time
allowed for completion of each trial was increased to 3 minutes to promote com¬
pletion of a larger number of items. Secondly, the instructions were altered with
each item now referred to as a grid rather than a maze. This was principally
motivated by the very weak resemblance each item now bore to the original mazes
but was also intended to provide an extra prompt toward the use of more abstract
description types.
Experimental Studies of Coordination 119
4.3.2 Results
The changes to procedure and materials had the desired effect of producing a
consistently higher average number of items attempted by each pair across trials:
1:13.4, 2:16.0, 3:16.4, 4:17.2, 5:18.6 and 6: 19.3, with 28 out of 72 clyads completing
all twenty items within the time allowed. The number of items attempted by each
dvad were entered into an analysis of variance with trial number as a single,
between-subjects factor. This confirmed that the pattern of increase across trials
was reliable: omnibus F(5i66)=5.234, p=0.000, linear trend; t(66)=3.503, p (one-
tailed)=0.000.
Transcriptions
71 three minute dialogues were transcribed (one dyad excluded due to a failure
to record) and analysed, following the same criteria as before, for the presence
of the four main description types: Figural, Path, Line and Matrix. As well as
recording information about each description's origin, order in which the axes were
introduced and type of enumeration employed (cardinal versus ordinal), each de¬
scription was also coded as 'challenged' where it was subject to clarification or
repair and 'accepted' where a pair either moved straight on to the next item on
completion of a description, a description prompted only a simple acknowledge¬
ment such as "okay" or "right" or where it was subject to a verbatim repeat that
did not prompt any further exchange other than an additional acknowledgement.
The dialogues generated a corpus of 1,207 descriptions with all four descrip¬
tion types represented: Figural:9%, Path:36%, Line:26% and Matrix:29%. The
observed proportion of Matrix description types is comparable to those reported
in Garrocl and Anderson (1987), Garrod and Doherty (1994), confirming the effec¬
tiveness in the changes to the materials and procedure in promoting this scheme.
As before, the relative proportions of each description type displayed a shift across
trials, illustrated in figure 4.7. Trials 1&2, 3&4 and 5&;6 are pooled to give low,
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Figure 4.7: Relative distribution of Description Types According to Experience
medium and high levels of experience with the task.
The overall pattern is very similar to the previous study with Figural de¬
scription types falling across trials, matched by a rise in the more abstract Line
and Matrix description types. Pearson's product-moment correlation calculated
between the proportions of Figural and Matrix-type descriptions in each trial in¬
dicates a strong negative relationship, r= -0,74, and there is a reliable difference
in the pattern of raw frequencies of Figural and Matrix-type descriptions across
trials: X(5)~35.068, p=0.000.
Taking the Figural and Matrix description types separately, the proportion
produced by each dyad, ignoring the mixed dyads in trial 6, was entered in an
analysis of variance with trial as a between-subjects factor. For Figural-type de¬
scriptions omnibus F(5,59)=1.59, p=0.17, and linear trend analysis (unweighted
means) confirmed the presence of a regular decrease across trials: t(65)=2.10.
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Type: Figural Path Line Matrix
Mixed: 16% 40% 39% 5%
Trial 1: 18% 48% 15% 19%
Table 4.5: Description types in Trial 1 and Mixed (Trial 6)
p(one-tailed)=0.019. The parallel analysis for Matrix description types gave om¬
nibus F(5)5g)=0.543, p=0.74, with weaker support for the pattern of increase across
trials; linear trend analysis, t(sg)= 1.540, p(one-tailed)=0.064.
Turning to the experimental manipulation, the frequencies of all description
types, in the homogenous and mixed groups, were reliably different: X(3)= 129.62,
p=0.000, the relative distribution is illustrated in figure 4.8. Although comparison
of the frequencies of all description types in the mixed dyads on trial 6 and all
dyads on trial 1 were reliably different: X(3)=26.28, p=0.000, both groups display
a similar preference for Path and Figural description types while differing in the
relative proprtions of Line and Matrix-type descriptions (see table 4.5). When
the frequencies of Line and Matrix-type descriptions are pooled to form a single
category of 'Abstract' descriptions, as for experiment 2, no reliable difference is
found: y^2j=3.34, p=0.187.
The proportion of descriptions subject to repair or clarification, ignoring the
mixed dyads in trial 6, displayed a steady pattern of decrease across trials illus¬
trated in figure 4.9. Ignoring descriptions that were incorrect but not subject to
clarification or repair (for the reasons discussed in experiment 2), this data was
analysed in an analysis of variance, with trial number as a between-subjects factor.
This confirmed that the trend was reliable with omnibus Fpsg^l.020, p=0.41,
linear trend analysis; t(5gj=2.05, p (one-tailed)=0.022.
The frequency with which descriptions were subject to repair or clarification
versus accepted proved to be reliably different for the mixed and homogenous
dyads: Xm)=6.543, p=0.010, with homogenous dyads repairing or clarifying 16%
of descriptions and mixed dyads repairing or clarifying 37%. Also, frequency of
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of
Dyads




Figure 4.9: Proportion of Descriptions Repaired or Clarified with Experience
repair/clarification in the mixed dyads (trial 6) was not reliably different from that
observed in all dyads on trial 1: X(i)— 1 -135, p=0.287.
The entrainment scores, calculated for each subject, showed some interesting
contrasts with experiment 2. The chance level of entrainment was lower; 0.32 com¬
pared with 0.40 previously (this is expected given the greater range of description
types observed in the corpus). Conversely, the average degree of entrainment was
higher than in experiment 2: 0.57 compared with 0.46 previously (although still
lower than the average of 0.9 found by Garrod and Doherty (1994)). Across trials,
the degree of entrainment was, again, relatively constant: 1:0.58, 2:0.58, 3: 0.54,
4:0.58, 5:0.56 and 6:0.54, but, unlike experiment 2, consistently above chance.
Examination of the entrainment scores between members of each clyacl revealed
a similar, but substantially higher, positive correlation than before: Pearson's
product-moment: r=0.90, but there was, again, no reliable increase in entrain¬
ment across trials. An analysis of variance on the average entrainment score for
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each pair gave an omnibus F(5)66)=0.054, p=0.99, linear trend: t(66j =0.311, p
(one-tailed)=0.378.
4.3.3 Discussion
Smaller sample size and changes to materials and procedure notwithstanding, these
results do replicate the observations of experiment 2, providing extra support for
the analysis. Dyads show the same shift from Figural toward more abstract de¬
scription types across trials, a shift which is, again, dependent on membership
of a sub-group. Even though experience with the task is equivalent for all in¬
dividuals in the sixth trial, dyads composed of individuals drawn from different
sub-groups show a reliable difference from dyacls composed of individuals from the
same sub-group. This difference occurs despite the fact that subjects receive no
cues concerning the partitioning into different sub-groups and no one, in either
experiment, reported detecting this manipulation. Where the homogenous dyacls
conform to the trend of producing fewer Figural description types and more Ma¬
trix on trial 6, the patterns observed in the mixed dyads are, in several respects,
no different from those observed amongst individuals attempting the task for the
first time. Although they still manage to attempt a high number of items and
make fewer errors, the description types employed, and the frequency of repair or
clarification of descriptions, are notably similar to those attempting the task for
the first time.
The trend, across trials, to make fewer errors and deal with more items in the
time allowed can be unproblematically attributed to greater expertise at the task,
where it is understood as communicating target locations to a range of different
individuals. Although the shift in patterns of description type produced, and fre¬
quency of repair/clarification, across trials also seem to admit an expertise-based
explanation, the contrast between the mixed and homogenous dyads, which de¬
pends on membership of sub-groups, does not. This contrast also raises difficulties
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for any explanation that appeals to the pairwise establishment of mutual beliefs
since every individual, on every trial, meets a new partner and, according to this
type of model, should have the same requirement for re-establishing the pertinent
mutual beliefs on each occasion regardless of whether they are members of mixed
or homogenous dyads.
A more promising candidate is Garrod and Anderson's (1987) principle of
input-output coordination which does offer an account of group-based effects and
does not depend on every individual establishing mutual beliefs with each other in¬
dividual about the appropriate way to refer to a target location (see section 3.2.4).
However, as noted earlier there also seem to be problems for this explanation.
The gross degree of coordination observed in experiments 2 and 3, as measured
by entrainment scores, was effectively constant across trials and, although higher
than chance in experiment 2, appears to be independent of the shifts in descrip¬
tion types found here. To an extent, this is unsurprising since entrainment scores
calculate the degree of matching regardless of the type of description produced.
Thus, perfect entrainment on Figural descriptions is, on this index, equivalent to
perfect entrainment on Matrix descriptions. However, an important element of the
argument here has been that we can invoke a partial ordering of description types
according to the degree of coordination they imply: matching of Figural descrip¬
tions represents the weakest degree of coordination and Matrix the strongest. The
reasoning is that the generalisations possible from one Figural description to an¬
other are very weak whereas Matrix descriptions can potentially invoke the same
order of axes, the same origin and the same counting scheme. This is supported
by the fact that where Matrix description types tend to be highly elliptical, utter¬
ances often amounting to just two numbers, e.g., "three four", Figural description
types are almost always extended, produced in installments over a number of turns
and involve several stages of checking for comprehension. Effectively, Figural de¬
scriptions are the lowest common denominator, calling only on the pre-established
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linguistic coordination that each individual brings to the task in the first place
whereas Matrix descriptions call on local, more specific, conventions established
during the course of the task (cf. Garrod & Anderson, 1987).
As a result, entrainment scores provide only an approximate index of coordi¬
nation which is not sensitive to the reliable pattern, observed in the mixed dyads,
of switching toward more primitive description types, since both individuals tend
to make the same switch. It seems that, as indexed by entrainment, input-output
coordination cannot easily account for this switch. However, this is only one el¬
ement of the mechanism considered by Garrod and Doherty. They also propose
that where conflicts arise, in their case where a pair have coordinated on differ¬
ent description schemes in their previous game, they are resolved by a shift to
the description type most commonly used by both players in all previous games.
This is supported by their data from their community group which conform to
this pattern in 8 out of 9 cases of possible conflict, the apparent exception being
an artifact of the coding scheme.6 However, this assumption does not hold true
for the mixed dyads, where conflicts are most likely to occur, in experiments 2
and 3. Of the 18 mixed dyads 7 went against this pattern and 11 conformed.
Furthermore, ignoring those dyads that had used the same description type in the
previous game, the figures are 7 against and 8 conforming.' It appears that mixed
dyads were most likely to shift not to the most commonly used previous scheme,
but to the most basic scheme, with the two frequently coinciding.
An additional problem arises concerning the patterns of repair/clarification
6For this pair, although Matrix was the most common previous scheme type, they had adopted
versions with different, conflicting, labelling systems for the axes.
"The chance level of independently switching to the same scheme is difficult to calculate
precisely here but, intuitively, will be high since there were only 3 common description types in
experiment 2 and 4 in experiment 3. Therefore if both players shift there is only one possible
alternative in experiment 2 and two possible alternatives in experiment 3. If only one shifts
there are 2 and 3 possible alternatives respectively. Of course, much depends on the specificity
of the coding into types.
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observed in experiment 3. There are two aspects to this: firstly, the reliable fall in
repair across trials was not matched by a corresponding increase in entrainment.
Secondly, while the mixed dyads engaged in reliably more repair/clarification than
the homogenous dyads (roughly twice as frequently) their degree of entrainment
was almost identical: 0.53 and 0.54 respectively. The occurence of repair appears
to be independent of input-output coordination. Similarly, the additional propos¬
als for group-based mechanisms do not account for this pattern, once pairs have
shifted schemes in response to conflict there is no reason, on the input-output
coordination model, to expect that repair should increase.
The problems with extending the group-based mechanisms proposed in the
input-output coordination model to the results reported here suggests that the
processes giving rise to coordination are approximated by this model rather than
explained by it. That is, whatever the mechanisms are which are responsible for
coordination, they result in input-output coordination rather than being caused
by it. If this holds, the outstanding problem is to identify a mechanism by which
individuals achieve the degree of coordination implied by the shift in description
types.
4.4 Coordination Through Repair
Drawing on the discussion of previous chapters and the experiments reported
above, the suggestion advanced here is that the mechanism of semantic coordina¬
tion is located in the process of clarification and repair. There are several steps
to developing this claim. The central assumption, one developed throughout this
thesis, is that idiolectical variation is pervasive. In the context of the maze task
this becomes the claim that the interpretations of a particular description by any
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given pair of individuals will differ to some arbitrary degree.8 Drawing on the
discussion of Garrod and Anderson, it is reasonable to suppose that individuals
generate descriptions of a target position according to their current conceptual¬
isation of the maze/grid and, similarly, interpret descriptions according to the
same conceptualisation. Given that these conceptualisations will vary, how do
individuals manage to coordinate their actions using them?
One, apparently natural suggestion is that individuals overcome this problem
by discussing their interpretations and arriving at an explicit, negotiated solution.
However, this strategy would not be expected to succeed since it faces a marked
bootstrapping problem. If we take idiolectical differences to obtain in both the
'meta-language' (in this case some dialect of English) and the 'object language'
(in this case the expressions relating to locations in the maze, such as "rows",
"columns" etc.) there is no guarantee that asking "what do you mean by rows?"
will not itself receive a response that is open to misinterpretation. The empirical
findings fit with this: Garrod and Anderson (1987), Garrod and Doherty (1994)
both observe that explicit negotion does not seem to be effective in improving
coordination. Negotiation is relatively rare and where it does occur the imme¬
diately succeeding description frequently deviates from whatever agreement had
been reached. To avoid the threat of regress in the strategy of explicit negotiation,
the proposed solution here is that, all things being equal, individuals apply a prin¬
ciple of charitable interpretation. They proceed with the attempt to coordinate
behaviour, assuming that their descriptions are being interpreted as they intend,
until some evidence of trouble arises. Where trouble does occur, they engage in
local, minimal, repair which, with respect to the constraints provided by the cur¬
rent context of the task, appears to resolve the problem and then move on. While
this does not provide any guarantee that there will not be subsequent problems, it
8Of course, their membership of a (sub)community of English speakers means they are unlikely
to be completely orthogonal.
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does offer a mechanism by which local coordination can improve, with each cycle
of problem and repair moving the dyad towards better coordination. The limit on
the degree of convergence achieved, is set by the constraints the task places on the
coordination of behaviour and allows that their interpretations may still diverge
to a substantial, but lower, degree.
So far, this basic proposal treats the steady fall in repair/clarification across
trials observed here as a consequence of individuals' increasingly meeting the limits
of accuracy required by the task. It also provides a plausible explanation of the
differences between these studies and the previous experiments on the maze task.
The stronger convergence on the Matrix scheme in Garrod's and Doherty's (1994)
community group can be viewed as consequence of the tighter constraints the
dynamic task places on the accuracy of interpretation; disparities in interpretation
are more likely to be detected, in subsequent moves, increasing the likelihood
of repair and, according to the current proposal, therefore greater coordination.
Conversely, the weaker constraints on accuracy of interpretation in the current
study allow for a greater degree of residual ambiguity, a greater range of description
types persisting in later trials and a lower degree of coordination. All things
being equal, entrainment will be higher where the premium placed by the task on
convergence in interpretations is higher.
The more substantive problem is to account for the differences between the
mixed and homogenous dyads in the current study and the differences between
the community, control and isolated pairs in Garrocl and Doherty (1994). Assum¬
ing a background of idiolectical variation in a population, the relative balance of
asymmetries in interpretation will differ from pair to pair. For example, one pair
may differ more widely on the interpretation of "row" relative to a another pair
who differ more widely on the interpretation of "column". To the extent that
the constraints imposed by the task highlight their differences, each pair will find
different aspects problematic and engage in different kinds of repair, generating
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uneven patterns of convergence. Importantly, where the pairs form a coherent sub¬
group that perform successive trials with individuals drawn from the same pool,
this explanation predicts a regression towards some 'average' degree of asymmetry
between members of the group. As the history of interactions with common indi¬
viduals increases so the range of asymmetries between each pair will reduce. The
detection and repair of task-relevant differences in interpretation over trials will
drive the group toward convergence on some group-based optimum with respect
to the task.
A second consequence of this explanation is that the type of convergence that
emerges in a sub-group will be different for different groups; all things being equal,
the initial balance of asymmetries in any subset of individuals will be different,
giving rise to different patterns of convergence in each group. The semantic re¬
sources built up within a group are thus expected to be specific to that group.
Consequently, transfer outside a subgroup will, on average, confront individuals
with a situation in which the pi'oblem of coordinating on the interpretation of
descriptions is similar to that they faced on the first trial, giving rise to a marked
disturbance in coordination. This explains both the increased repair observed in
the mixed dyads and the shift toward description types that rely on membership
of the broader linguistic community from which the sample was drawn as opposed
to the linguistic sub-community of the group from which the individuals trans¬
ferred. This also provides a reason why individuals faced with a conflict within
a, community group shift to the scheme most commonly used by both individuals
in previous games (Garrod & Doherty, 1994) whereas individuals faced with a
conflict deriving from transfer between sub-groups tend to shift to the most basic
scheme. In the former case the community group will already have achieved some
degree of convergence and, when faced with a conflict, can still utilise this, shift¬
ing to a scheme that takes advantage of it. By contrast, the mixed dyads have
no common resource beyond membership of the wider linguistic community from
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which they are drawn at the start of the experiment. As a result they retreat
to description types which draw on the common ground that does exist between
them, the dialect of English shared prior to the task.
Turning to Garrod and Doherty's data, the isolated pairs are predicted to
show a lower degree of coordination, and a wider range of description types, as a
consequence of the fact that they are only faced with accommodating one set of
asymmetries. Performance of the task precipitates repair of problems specific to
the differences in their interpretations but leaves untouched those disparities that
do not become apparent. With different partners, different problems are likely
to arise, provoking convergence in different areas. As a result isolated pairs will
show limited convergence and maintain a wider range of description types. This
reasoning also explains why the non-community group, in virtue of their exposure
to a succession of different partners, are predicted to develop a higher degree of
coordination. However, since there is almost no common history of performing
the task with other individuals, and the consequent process of accommodating
the problems that arose in coordinating with them, the degree of coordination is
not predicted to reach that of a full community group.
Overall, this explanation fits well with the data and resolves some of the ten¬
sions between these and previous findings. To the extent that it is successful in
dealing with the empirical findings it gives additional support to the central as¬
sumption on which it depends, namely, that idiolectical variation is pervasive and
creates problems for the maintenance of mutual-intelligibility. Importantly, this
explanation only extends to the semantic coordination demanded by a co-operative
task. Other factors that also affect performance, such as experience with task pro¬
cedure, role differentiation and possible effectiveness of ratified versus unratified
observers do not fall within its scope and the predictions of existing models with
respect to them are unaltered.
Chapter 5
A Channel Theoretic Model
The preceding chapters have developed the claim that formal models of natural
language semantics, by idealising to a single ontology or set of semantic primitives,
imply a code theory of mutual-intelligibility; an implication explicitly realised in
contemporary models of communication. Idiolectical variation, it has been argued,
undermines this idealisation and any model which aims to account for the mutual-
intelligibility of dialogue must accommodate disparities in interpretation between
different parties to it. In particular, it has been proposed that an adequate formal
semantic model that addresses communication between different agents must ac¬
commodate a degree of ontological pluralism between them. Prima facie, attempts
to naturalise meaning by appeal to cognitive states seem promising candidates for
acheiveing this since they can allow the cognitive states associated with interpre¬
tation to vary between different individuals. However, it has also been argued
that this approach is, itself, undermined by the arguments that meaning cannot
be directly reduced to cognitive states without violating important intuitions re¬
lating to its normative character. The distributed, or broad, nature of semantic
content appears to defy analysis in terms of groups, or subgroups, of individuals'
mental states (narrowly understood); a consequence which substantially weakens
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any claim models which take this approach have on providing a genuine semantic
theory.
This chapter aims to make progress in developing a semantic analysis of idi-
olectical variation while respecting the intuition that the content of any utterance
is determined by reference to the socio-physical context in which it occurs; achiev¬
ing this in a way that preserves the ambition of naturalising semantics. To do so
it must reconcile the tension between idiolectical variation on the one hand and
distributed content on the other.
The importance of developing a semantic framework resides in the adjunct it
can provide to principle-based accounts of communication. While empirical models
such as the collaborative model and the input-output coordination model offer
principles which operate to improve semantic coordination between the parties
to a discourse, they are not equipped to provide a detailed anatomy of when
and why coordination fails. The emphasis, of both accounts, on characterising
successful coordination has the consequence that, where the principles they offer
are violated, little can be said about the nature of the violation or its likely effects
on the subsequent conduct of dialogue (although see Garrod & Doherty, 1994).
A parallel concern arises with theoretical accounts which, covertly and overtly,
appeal to principles of charity in interpretation to explain the way idiolectical
variation is often discounted in ordinary discourse (e.g., Putnam, 1981; Schutz,
1973). Again, these are principles which apply in the ideal case and would be
considerably strengthened if they could be supplemented by some indication of
under what conditions interpretation should be charitable and when it should not.
A similar weakness is apparent in the repair-based model of coordination proposed
in Chapter 4. While, arguably, it offers greater coverage of the empirical data it
gives no more than a general specification of the conditions that might provoke
repair, nor any indication of likely patterns of response.
Progress with any of these issues ultimately requires a model of idiolectical
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variation at a level of analysis that addresses the specific conflicts that may arise
between idiolects and characterises their consequences for the maintenance of
mutual-intelligibility. With this goal in mind, the following analysis draws on
the dialogues generated by the maze task experiments of the previous chapter,
and aims to give a semantic characterisation of some of the phenomena observed.
A promising framework in which to attempt this, and one that does not require
assumptions that run contrary to those made by this thesis, is channel theory.
5.1 Channel Theory
Channel theory is a development of situation theory that aims to provide a for¬
mal, structural, characterisation of natural regularities which reconciles two key
properties; their reliability and their fallibility (Barwise & Seligman, 1994, 1993;
Seligman & Barwise, 1993). Taking up a theme explored in the original formu¬
lation of situation theory (Barwise & Perry, 1983), channel theory is concerned
with the nature of the 'reliable connections' that make our knowledge of the world
(sometimes) dependable. Reliability is important in accounting for successful rep¬
resentation, knowledge, truth and inference. Fallibility is important in explaining
misrepresentation, error, falsity and defeasible inference. From the outset, this
focus makes channel theory a promising framework for dealing with issues relat¬
ing to the finite, error prone, information processing normally cited in cognitive
models of human performance. Additionally, there is an explicit concern with the
problems of naturalising intentional states, a concern shared by the discussion of
Chapter 2. Overall, the goal of channel theory is to develop a naturalised the¬
ory of information flow, in the sense of Dretske (1981), that provides a structural
account of the reliability and fallibility of regularities and is general enough to
accommodate both formal logics and situated, defeasible, reasoning.
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5.1.1 The Analysis of Regularities
An enduring problem for the attempt to naturalise regularities has been the diffi¬
culty of finding a plausible way to specify background conditions that underwrite
their reliability. Because regularities are normative, stated ceteris paribus, they
need to be exception bearing, however, the specification of conditions under which
a regularity does in fact hold, for example by determining necessary and sufficient
conditions for its application, has proved highly problematic. Barwise and Selig-
man (1994) argue that the most popular solution to this problem, which involves
analysing regularities as conditionals, actually undermines the project of natural¬
ising the relationships captured. The basic reason for this is that the semantics
of conditionals are usually analysed in terms of relations between sets of possible
worlds. This is quite successful in accounting for the entailments between con¬
ditional statements but leaves open the question of how the actual world might
determine truth conditions like those generated by possible worlds. There appear
to be two alternatives. The first, endorsed by Lewis (1972a), is to suggest that
possible worlds are, in fact, real; a response strongly counter to naturalistic intu¬
itions. The alternative, pursued by Stalnaker (1987), is to treat possible worlds
as epistemic objects, instantiated by the beliefs of the individual reasoning about
particular conditionals. The problem for this account is that the cognitive capaci¬
ties invoked in this way must in turn be given a naturalistic reduction, raising the
problems discussed in Chapter 2. A direct reduction of the meaning of conditionals
to cognitive states will violate the intuitions associated with broad content.
5.2 Basic Apparatus
Instead of attempting to refine the conditions under which a regularity holds,
formulating progressively finer necessary and sufficient conditions that determine
when it applies, the strategy followed in channel theory is twofold. Firstly, it
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emphasises the distinction between tokens, or parts of the world, and the connec¬
tions between them that support a particular regularity, and types, and relations
between them, that express the regularity. Secondly, taking up a proposal in
Seligman (1990), it relativises the notion of regularity to classification domains,
providing local 'theories' of particular domains and avoiding commitment to a
total or definitive theory that exhaustively captures all possible regularities.
5.2.1 Classifications
Intuitively, a classification is a way of grouping a set of things into some category.
Thus the type "Fiction" might, amongst other things, group together all books
and short stories about imaginary people and events. By contrast, the type "Au¬
tobiography" might group together books and short stories about real lives and
events. Of course, some autobiographies are calculated works of fiction and some
works of fiction are highly autobiographical. This is an important point, the same
things can be classified in many different, even conflicting, ways. People can be
simultaneously classified as terrorists and freedom fighters. The same clay can be
simultaneously classified by a date, as the first day of the sales, as a birthday and
as a national holiday. Although classifications can be derived on the basis of a
range of criteria, not all are felicitous. People cannot, equivocation and nonce use-
age aside, naturally be classified as national holidays or literary works. Channel
theory does not assume that there is any universal or 'correct' classification, rather
it draws on the intuition that there are a range of possible classifications for any
object, some of which are more natural than others. There is no attempt to de¬
fine what makes one classification more natural than another, rather a pluralistic,
intuitive view is taken on what classifications can apply to what things.
Formally, a classification A is modelled as a triple, A = (T, 5', |=), where T is
set of types {T), T2, T3 ... Tn}, S is a set of tokens {si,S2, S3,... sn}, referred to
as sites, and |= is a relation on S x T where sx |= Ti is read as Si is classified as
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being of type T\. Following Seligman (1990), this structure can be conveniently
represented in a two level diagram as in figure 5.1, where the set of types associated
with a classification are rendered as elliptical bubbles and the set of tokens are
rendered as a plane. The dotted line between a type and a token indicates that
the relation |= holds between them.
Taking the example of the maze task, a classification might include the de¬
scription types; "two three" (Matrix), "third row, second box" (Line), "two up,
two along" (Path) or "above the space" (Figural) and the corresponding set of
tokens might consist of the various screen displays classified by the description
types. The same token screen configuration can be classified by several descrip¬
tion types. For example, one position could correspond to all the types above and
each description type can classify a range of token screen configurations.
In order to characterise informational relations between classifications, Barwise
and Seligman introduce the notion of infomorphism which provides a mapping
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between classifications.1 Given two classifications A = (Ta, Sa, |=a) and B —
(Tb, Sb,\=b) an infomorphism / : A B is a pair of functions, /v : Sb -» Sa
on the tokens and /A : Ta —t 7b on the types such that fw{sb) |=.4 T4 iff sb |=b
r(TA).
Barwise (1995) illustrates this idea with the example of a translation of a
classical, logical language Li in L2 in which each sentence A in L1 is associated
with a sentence /A(A) in L2 and each truth assignment, or structure .s, for L2 is
associated with a truth assignment or structure /v(s) for L\. The reason that
the relation /v goes in the 'reverse' direction is that, where the translation is an
infomorphism, the structures for L2 must be rich enough to preserve the entailment
relations defined for L\. More generally, infomorphisms are homomorphisms that
preserve subclassification relations. .
In the maze task, a translation of Path descriptions into Matrix descriptions as¬
sociates each Path description type with a Matrix description type and associates
each location classified by a Matrix description type with a location classified by
a Path description type. This would be an infomorphism just in case each lo¬
cation classified by the Matrix description type M maps to a location classified
by a Path description whose translation is M. This formulation allows for situa¬
tions in which, a location corresponding to several description types in the Path
classification translates to a single description type in the Matrix classification.
For example, assuming an origin of bottom left, a location classified by the Path
description types "two up, two along" and "three along, one up" can both be
translated as the Matrix description type "two, three". Similarly, a, single location
in the target classification of the translation may correspond to several locations
in the source classification of the translation. For example, a translation of Path
descriptions into Figural descriptions might map locations classified by the Path
1The definitions used here are those presented by Barwise (1995) and differ somewhat from
earlier treatments.
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description types; "one in" "two in, one up" and "two in, two up", to a single
location classified by the figural description "Left leg".
Treating translations between description types in terms of direct infomor-
phisms between the appropriate classifications is too restrictive. In practice, there
are many informational relationships between classifications that are better mod¬
elled in a way that imposes weaker constraints. For example, it is not plausible
to assume that all the subclassification relations of Path description types are
preserved by translations into, say, Figural description types. To provide a more
general notion of information flow, Barwise and Seligman elaborate the notion of
infomorphism to give a characterisation of information channels.
An information channel, C, is an indexed family of infomorphisms {ft : At
C}ies with a common target, illustrated in figure 5.2.
C is a classification which forms the core of the channel C and its tokens are re¬
ferred to as connections. An information channel, C, between the classification, P,
{pt |= Pi,p2 |= P21P3 |= P3 • ■ -Pn |= Pn} of displays classified by Path description
types and the classification M, {mi |= Mi,m2 \= M^rri?, |= M3, ...mn |= Mn}
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of displays classified by the Matrix description types consists of the two infomor-
phisms; {/i : P T- C} and {/2 : M C}. Although the classifications connected
by a channel are infomorphic with respect to the core, they are not necessarily
infomorphic with respect to each other. In the simplest terms, this is because an
infomorphic mapping needn't be symmetric (cf. isomorphism, where this is the
case).
Information flow along a channel, C, between classifications P and M derives
from two aspects of the channel. Firstly, the presence in the channel classification
of connections, or signalling relations, st £ C, written pj mk defined so that
fi(si) — pj and Si) = . Secondly, the presence of indicating relations,
Ti £ C, between Pj and Mk, written as Pj Mk defined so that = Pj
and J'2 (Tt) = Mk- With respect to the maze task these two relations can be
interpreted as the presence of connections between tokens of screen displays, in
this case the physical and temporal connections between tokens of a single screen,
or on different displays, and the presence of indicating relations understood here
as translations between particular Path and Maze description types.
A channel, C, is sound or reliable where if pj \—p Pj, pj Si mk and Pj =>t, Mk
then ?77,k |—m mk-
Thus, if the assumption that Path and Matrix classifications are translatable
captures a reliable regularity this can be interpreted as the claim that; if a) a.
particular location is classified by a description "two up, two along" b) the con¬
nections between hardware and software project the same display onto another
screen and c) descriptions of the type "two up, two along" translate as Matrix
descriptions of the type "two, three", then the display on the second screen is
correctly classified by the description "two, three".
This apparatus may appear somewhat complex but this complexity provides
for characterisations of a number of ways in which errors may arise. The example
Matrix-Path inter-translation, C, consists of the infomorphisms, with a common
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target, between all Path and Matrix type descriptions. However, there could be
a situation in which two screens are not, in fact, connected in the appropriate
way. Faults in the hardware or software that link two displays might distort
them relative to each other so that, although there clearly are still connections
between the screens, they do not support all the regularities captured by C. Under
these circumstances, a situation may arise in which the fact that one screen is
appropriately classified by "two up, two along" and this type of Path description
translates as a Matrix description type "two, three" does not guarantee that the
other screen can be appropriately classified as "two, three". Here, the fact that
pj \=p Pj, the existence of a connection pj a. nik, and the indicating relation
Pj =*■t, Mk does not ensure that m,k \=m Mk- Barwise and Seligman term this
kind of error an exception, st is an exception to the indicating relation T,- in the
channel C, more compactly s,- \/= p. Although the faulty connection between the
two screens may be an exception to the indicating relation Pj =>r, Mk it may
still support other indicating relations in the channel. For example, if the faulty
connection has resulted in the deletion of the second box up in the first column
then if mi |—m "two, three" and T\ is the indicating relation; "two, three"
"two up, two along" and T2 is the indicating relation; "two, three" "three
along, one up" then the connection m\ p\ is an exception to the indicating
relation T\ but not to T2.
Another source of error considered by Barwise and Seligman concerns cases in
which there is no connection pj Si mk in the channel formed from two classifi¬
cations. In this situation it may be true that p3 |= Pj and that Pj =>n Mk but
the lack of an appropriate connection means that no information can flow from
one classification to the other. As a result of a procedural error, the players may
be looking at screens connected to different machines, not each other. Thus the
fact that one screen is appropriately classified as "two up, two along" has 110 con¬
sequences for whether the other screen is appropriately classified as "two, three",
A Channel Theoretic Model 142
although, accidentally, it may indeed be appropriate. Barwise and Seligman term
this sort of error a psuedosignal.
This sketch of the basic structures in channel theory illustrates how the appeal
to different channels and different forms of error provides a framework in which
both the reliability and fallibility of regularities can be characterised. Exceptions
to a channel do not entail that no information can flow, rather, they entail that
some inferences, characterised by the indicating relations, will fail while others
succeed. Channel theory provides an elaborate framework for modelling various
possible relations on classifications, and the foregoing provides only a sketch of this
apparatus (see e.g., Barwise & Seligman, 1994). However, this outline provides
a sufficient foundation for the purposes of characterising communication in the
maze task.
5.3 Modelling the Maze Task
The example channel, C, which characterised some of the informational depen¬
dencies suggested by an inter-translation between Path and Matrix descriptions,
was derived from the perspective taken in the discussion on the maze experiments
of Chapter 4. Obviously, this is not a perspective available to the participants
in those studies. They did not know what their partners were looking at any
particular point, nor could they be sure of how their own descriptions were being
interpreted. The channel C represents a theorist's characterisation of information
flow between description types; what is required for a model of the maze task
is a characterisation of the patterns of information flow determined by each in¬
dividual's interpretation of various description types with respect to their own
understanding of the maze. To the extent that this is possible, communication
can then be analysed in terms of the information flow between individuals.
The goal of analysing the information flow in communication requires the elab-
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oration of a number of steps. The following section proceeds toward a character¬
isation of individuals playing the maze task (henceforth agents) in three stages.
Firstly, by appeal to schemes of individuation made up of primitive classifica¬
tions. Secondly, by developing these primitive classifications into a model of con¬
ceptualisations through the elaboration of informational structure on schemes of
individuation. Lastly by combination of conceptualisations in order to derive a
characterisation of idiolects. These structures form the basic model of an agent.
Section 5.3.2 considers the consequences for information flow between agents in
terms of connections between them which can then be elaborated into a notion of
a language.2
5.3.1 Agents
An important condition to be met by this model is that it should allow an arbitrary
degree of ontological variation to obtain between agents. In the framework of
channel theory two restrictions are required to meet this criterion; firstly, the
types and tokens of a classification must be relativised to agents. Secondly, the
tokens, though still understood as tokens of things in the world, are individuated
solely by reference to the types in the relevant agent's classification.
Scheme of Individuation
A scheme of individuation (cf. Barwise & Perry, 1983) characterises the basic
ontology recognised by each agent. For modelling the maze task, two schemes
of individuation are important. The first scheme consists of a set, E, of primi¬
tive location classifications {LI, L2, L3 ... Ln} each of which consists of a token
part of a maze display, and the type, or concept, L.;, which individuates that
2The spirit of this approach, although not, its exact form, owe a great debt to an ongoing
collaboration with Carl Vogel (see e.g., Healey & Vogel, 1994) and should be understood as the
product of joint work.
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point i.e., lt |= Li. Different schemes of individuation are assumed to carve up the
maze with unequal degrees of acuity, picking out different chunks for any instance
of the maze. For example, the concepts involved in a simple Figural scheme of
individuation might pick out large portions of the display, classifying areas as 'jut¬
ting portion' or 'large square',3 discriminating only relatively gross characteristics
of the display. By contrast, the scheme of individuation associated with Matrix
descriptions would individuate locations more finely. The second scheme of indi¬
viduation important to the development of the model below, is that associated
with the classification of utterances. This is also modelled as a set of primitive
classifications, {Dl, 172,173,... Un}, consisting of an utterance token, iq, and its
individuating type U{ i.e., tq |= 17,-. More will be said about this below. However,
again, the scheme of individuation is understood as determining the ontology of
utterances, different schemes carving different boundaries. Some motivation for
this derives from the familiar examples of perceptual confusions between different
languages (see e.g., Clark & Clark, 1977), and the problems of even segmenting
utterances in a language with which we are not conversant. Phonological distinc¬
tions vary from language to language and so do peoples' abilities to discriminate
between them.
Conceptualisation
Given a basic scheme of individuation, we can develop a structure corresponding
to the notion of mental model used in Garrod and Anderson (1987). The idea is to
capture the informational relations between locations implied by mental models of
the maze in virtue of their organisation into, for example, ordered lines of elements
or interlocking paths.
A conceptualisation is a, classification formed by a channel, C, from a scheme
3The phrases 'jutting portion' and 'large square' are intended as labels for the corresponding
non-linguistic concepts.
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of individuation and consists of an indexed family of infomorphisms between lo¬
cations; {fi : Li LT- C}ie-£ that share a common target together with relations
defined on the indicating relations.
The classification that forms a conceptualisation consists of a set of signalling
relations, between points in various instances of the maze lj Ik and a set
of indicating relations between location types Lj =>t, Lk. Modelled this way, a
conceptualisation amounts to a collection of location classifications and the differ¬
ent frames of reference associated with different mental models are captured in a
conceptualisation through the structures encoded by the types in the channel and
relations on them. To illustrate this we can consider a display that consists of a
3 by 3 grid, , as in figure 5.3, classified, according to a scheme of individuation,
as nine possible locations; S : {LI, L2, L'3,... L9} consisting of a token of part of
the display L classified by an individuating type Li.
Figure 5.3: Scheme of Individuation for a Simple Maze Display
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A mental model that imposes a Line based frame of reference for this display
can be characterised as a conceptualisation Line consisting of the indexed ho-
momorphisms /; : Li L. The classification Line will include various types or
indicating relations that characterise the basic structures for a Line based model
with information flow determined by the connections classified by the indicat¬
ing relations in particular instances. The grouping of locations into lines can be
captured in the channel in terms of the component indicating relations in the
conceptualisation Line. For the display in figure 5.3 the top row might be mod¬
elled as the indicating relation Ri formed from the infomorphisms; fx : LI Rl,
f2 : L'2 Rl, fz : L3 Rl. Thus the indicating relation =>r, holds between the
location types; L\, L2 and L3 and classifies the various connections ~>ri, between
l\, l2 and I3. Similarly, the positions in a row can be modelled by other indicating
relations in Line; =4>pi,=4>P2 and =>P3 with, for example, =>px holding between
the types; L\,L-x and L& and classifying connections between /j.,/4 and l&.
Given the basic organisation of locations into rows and positions a vertical
ordering of rows can be captured by a relation, >, on Line such that for all
pairs of rows, Ri is above R1 if (R{,Rj) (E >. Similarly the horizontal ordering
of positions could be captured by another relation, 3>, such that for all pairs of
positions Pl is before Pj if (Pi,Pj) £ A>.
Similar considerations apply to conceptualisations formed on the scheme of in¬
dividuation for utterances. This channel is considerably more complex as it must
characterise an individual's conceptualisation of the relations obtaining between
utterance types and the possible structures for this channel will clearly be com¬
plex, however, they are not directly relevant to the concerns of this analysis. It
is assumed that they capture the relations, as understood by a particular individ¬
ual, obtaining between utterance types, including segments of utterances, grouped
according to similarity of form. For example, via types that capture notions like
'quantifier' or 'noun' or higher order structures corresponding to 'noun-phrase'
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etc. Roughly, the syntax recognised by a given individual.
Clearly, the notion of conceptualisation admits a wide range of possible struc¬
tures, each corresponding to alternative mental models, or frames of reference, on
the locations picked out by the scheme of individuation. The question of which
structure is appropriate, or what is the best way to characterise it, in any given
instance is taken to be essentially an empirical one. However, we can also consider
two formal properties of conceptualisations that can be used in comparing them.
A conceptualisation, C, is consistent if it has no exceptions. This is the sound¬
ness condition; for each connection st £ C and each indicating relation T; £ C if
Lj =>t, Lk then for all lj \= Lj and all // such that lj /; then // |= Lk-
In the context of the conceptualisation Line considered above, this amounts to
the condition that, for example, all the location types or concepts in the scheme
of individuation are mutually consistent. This is because the conceptualisation is
modelled in a way that entails connections such as 4 14, that fall outside the
domain of an indicating relation such as , have sites of a type appropriate to
the indicating relation, i.e. /1 |= L1, and L\ =$-Ri L2, requiring that l4 |= L2 if the
conceptualisation is consistent. Less formally, the individuating types or concepts
that contribute to a consistent conceptualisation, Line, should all correspond to
something like a notion of 'box'.
The stringency of this condition is a function of how systematic the framework
of a particular mental model is. For example, in a simple Figural conceptualisation,
consistency is a weaker condition since, intuitively, they encode fewer relations
between locations. Where a Line conceptualisation encodes relations between all
locations in a display a Figural conceptualisation may only pick out the relations
between one or two locations with respect to some coarse individuating type that
picks out a feature such as the 'left leg' or 'large space'.
A conceptualisation is lucid if whenever lj \= Lj and lj Si 4 and 4 |= Lk
then Lj =>t, Lk.
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A lucid conceptualisation of the maze displays is one in which every connection
between individuated points in the maze is classified by the appropriate indicating
relation between their individuating types. It amounts to the condition that all the
connections, as given by the infomorphisms that characterise the conceptualisa¬
tion, between token locations in a display are classified by some indicating relation
i.e., the possible informational relations with respect to a conceptualisation are ex¬
haustively mapped. This condition is met by the example conceptualisation Line
discussed above since every connection is classified either by an indicating relation
characterising position, =>pt or an indicating relation characterising a row, =>Rt.
In a figural conceptualisation this condition will often not be met since it offers
only a partial characterisation of the interrelations between locations. Although
one, target, location will be determined with respect to some feature, or element
of the configuration, in a display the ad hoc nature of this sort of model suggests
that many other connections are not classified.
There is a tradeoff apparent between consistency and lucidity since the more
connections that are classified under a conceptualisation the tighter the restriction
on compatibility between the indicated types.
The properties of lucidity and consistency can be utilised to generate a par¬
tial order, -<c, on conceptualisations that characterises their relative internal-
coherence. Firstly, they are ordered according to their lucidity, with the most
exhaustive classification of connections corresponding to the most lucid. Where
two conceptualisations are equally lucid they can be ordered according to their
consistency. The most lucid, consistent classification is the most coherent, pro¬
viding the most information about the inter-relations between locations and their
individuating types. There is no restriction on agents to adopt only consistent,
lucid classifications; a condition unlikely to be met on the grounds of performance
limitations alone. However, agents are assumed to prefer more coherent to less
coherent conceptualisations as characterised by -<c-
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This comparison of conceptualisations according to their coherence does not
depend on the relative acuity of the ontology or scheme of individuation they
employ. That is, a relatively gross Figural conceptualisation can be as coherent,
in this sense, as a Matrix conceptualisation. This is important because it avoids
a commitment to any absolute preference for one ontology over another, a com¬
mitment that would be inconsistent with the arguments of Chapter 2. Such a
preference could only be determined by reference to the uses to which a concep¬
tualisation is put. With respect to some goal, an ontology may prove inadequate
if it fails to make a discrimination appropriate to the task at hand. An absolute
judgement of the adequacy of an ontology presupposes a definitive specification of
the uses to which it will be put.
Idiolect
The final step in the characterisation of agents is to model the informational
contingencies in the interpretation of utterances about the maze.
An idiolect, X, for the maze task is a channel formed by an indexed set of
infomorphisms, {/; : Tt I}iec,u between the conceptualisation of C locations
employed by an agent and the conceptualisation, U, of utterances.
An idiolect is modelled as indicating relations, =W,, between utterance forms
and elements of the conceptualisation that classify connections between to¬
kens of utterance forms and tokens of conceptualisation types. In the context
of the maze task, the signalling relations in an idiolect can be thought of as the
physical/temporal links between instances of displays and instances of utterances
perceived by an agent. An idiolect characterises the interpretation function em¬
bodied by an agent.
An interpretation is a signalling relation, q, and an indicating relation, X in
X, such that X |= X. An idiolect characterises the semantics, for an agent, of
expressions relating to the maze. Each type in the idiolect, such as =>/, provides
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a relation pairing expression types such as "row" with types of structure in the
maze conceptualisation such as Rt. This formulation still admits a number of
possible idiolects even where the conceptualisations of maze and utterance forms
are constant. Thus, the indicating relation between "first row" and lines of boxes
in the display could correspond to an interpretation in one idiolect in which it
picks out the bottom line of boxes and one in which it picks out the top line. By
contrast, if "first row" is interpreted in one idiolect as a horizontal element and in
another as a vertical element this difference could be modelled as due to divergent
conceptualisations.
As for conceptualisations, a wide range of possible structures could be defined
in any particular case. The question of which of these is appropriate is also un¬
derstood to be a matter of fitting whatever empirical data is available. However,
again, properties of consistency and lucidity can be formulated to provide a partial
ordering.
An Idiolect, I, is consistent if it admits no exceptions, i.e. for all X
if cj Ck ancl Cj =$■ Ci and Cj |= Cj then Ck |= C/. For example, using the
Line conceptualisation discussed above translates as the condition that a token
of the utterance form "row" is connected to elements in the example grid each of
which is classified by mutually compatible type. This condition would be violated
where, for example, there was some equivocation in the interpretation of "row" as
corresponding to horizontal or vertical elements.
An idiolect, X, is lucid if for each connection £ X such that Cj c& there
is an indicating relation =>/, £ X, between the types of Cj and Ck such that F |= ft.
This can be understood as the condition that there are no connections between
utterance forms and elements of the maze that cannot be interpreted.
These two properties can be used to generate a partial ordering, -</, on idiolects
according to their coherence. Agents are assumed to prefer more coherent idiolects
but are not restricted to completely consistent or lucid ones. The principle value
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of this approach is that is allows the semantics of an idiolect, for both production
and comprehension, to be characterised in terms of information flow.
5.3.2 Communication
The preceding section developed a model of agents that employed three levels
of analysis; schemes of individuation, conceptualisations and idiolects. This was
clone in a manner that maintained a substantial degree of independence between
each level, allowing that even where schemes of individuation are held constant,
conceptualisations may vary and, similarly, even where conceptualisations are held
constant, idiolects may vary. As a result, different agents can vary in the ontology
they recognise for a domain, the mental model they use to organise it and the
interpretational scheme they apply in relating utterances to their mental model.
Given these possible asymmetries between agents, the next step is to characterise
how communication can occur in the face of these disparities.
Communication
Two agents A and B are communicating iff there is an utterance token uf \= Uf G
A and an utterance token uf \= Uf £ B and there is a connection uf uf.
This is communication in the literal sense recpiiring only a connecting route,
c, between utterances classified by both parties. In the electronic version of the
maze task this connection is the audiolink between players. In the paper version
it is the transmission of sound waves through the air. Agents themselves cannot
determine whether they are connected in the right way, they might be subject
to hallucination or background noise might infect their classification of what they
hear. In the former case there is, by our lights, no communication at all and in the
latter there is communication but it is distorted. The connection between agents
is a precondition imposed for communication to actually occur but this does not
A Channel Theoretic Model 152
imply that agents cannot be mistaken about with whom or exactly what they are
communicat ing.
A connection c is a clear signal between agents A and B iff, for both agents,
there is one it |= /; 6 I such that uj Ck, Ut =^-/t Ck and, in their conceptuali¬
sation of the maze, Ck b Ck.
This characterisation of successful communication requires only that agents
arrive at unique interpretations for an utterance on their current understanding,
not that this is, by our lights, the same interpretation. The definition is consis¬
tent with circumstances under which the interpretation arrived at in each agent's
idiolect is quite different, for example A interprets "rows'1 as corresponding to
horizontal elements whereas B interprets them as vertical elements. In this sense
communication is a special case of misunderstanding, agents' interpretations may
still diverge to an arbitrary degree, but can communicate successfully as long as
this divergence is mutually indiscriminable.
To deal with unsuccessful communication and its likely effects on interpretation
we need to analyse cases where agents are connected in the appropriate way but one
or both does not have a clear signal, i.e., do not associate a unique interpretation
with an utterance. The consequences for information flow in these cases can be
characterised by two alternatives.
An agent A has a multisignal where Uj \= Uj but there is more than one
interpretation |= /, £ I for which uj q, and Uj =>/s Ck-
A multi-signal arises where some utterance token Uj is classified in the utterance
conceptualisation but there is more than one element of the maze conceptualisa¬
tion to which it could correspond. For example the utterance type "Leg" could
plausibly indicate several parts of a display under a Figural conceptualisation.
An agent A has a pseudosignal where Uj \= U1 and Uj =>/t Ck but there is no
Ck b Ck-
A psuedosignal would arise where, for example, an utterance is classified as
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having a type "two up, one along" but, under the current conceptualisation there
is a blank space at the position indicated by that description type.
The foregoing definitions of clearsignal, multisignal and pseuclosignal charac¬
terised the information flow corresponding to interpretation in an idiolect. They
can equally well be used to characterise the information corresponding to pro¬
duction. A clearsignal would capture the default case in which a particular part
of the maze relates to a particular utterance. A multisignal would give multiple
realisations for the same location. A pseudosignal would correspond to an 'ineffa¬
ble' aspect of the configuration, i.e., one which has no realisation as an utterance.
Intuitively, the default case in production would be a clear signal. The other two
possibilities amounting to uncooperative or even pathological behaviour.
So far, this characterisation of communication provides an indication of how
communication, in terms of information flow, can be modelled despite marked id-
iolectical disparities between the parties to a dialogue. It requires only that there
is some physical connection, even a very indirect one, between interlocutors. This
addresses, in at least a minimal way, the desire to develop a model of communica¬
tion that does not depend on a shared code. It also indicates how the semantics
for an idiolect could be constructed. A second aim of this Chapter is to give some
analysis of the consequences of unsuccessful communication for semantic coordi¬
nation. A full account of this process, dealing with cycles of repair, and more
nebulous factors such as whether the agents are cooperative, would require a. dy¬
namic model beyond the scope of the model outlined here. However, some simple
suggestions can be made on the basis of the characterisations of signal types and
their consequences for the different levels of analysis: scheme of individuation,
conceptualisation and idiolect.
The expectation is that, all things being equal, the different kinds of signal
should make certain responses more likely than others. Given a clear signal, an
agent would be expected, possibly after a confirmation, to move on to production
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of the next utterance. Given a multisignal an agent would be expected to seek
clarification e.g., "counting the first box as one?" or "which side?". Consideration
of psuedosignals suggests more interesting possibilities. In situations where an
agent has no interpretation available which provides a link between an utterance
and a part of the display several options are open. Firstly, a refusal to accept
the utterance, e.g., "I don't know what you mean" or "Sorry, no". Secondly,
an adjustment in idiolect that results in a unique interpretation or clear signal.
Thirdly an adjustment of the current conceptualisation of the display in order to
find an appropriate location, in turn, altering the idiolect to arrive at a clear signal.
Lastly an agent may revise their scheme of individuation, causing adjustments in
both the conceptualisation and idiolect in order to arrive at a clear signal.
The repair based model of coordination in Chapter 4 appealed to some general
constraints on the likely responses to difficulties in interpretation. The most gen¬
eral of these was that explicit negotiation is dispreferrecl on the grounds that it is
susceptible to infinite regress. This translates to a suggestion that rejection of an
utterance is the least preferred response to a psuedosignal. Appeal was also made
to the claim that individuals would generally prefer to engage in minimal repair
until the difficulty was resolved. The question of what constitutes minimal repair
was given no further explanation. One approach to this is that it corresponds to
minimal collaborative effort in the sense of Clark et. al. where each individual
tries to limit the joint effort required to overcome whatever difficulty has arisen.
Appeal to the structures proposed above admits an additional, individualistic cri¬
terion relating to the extent of the revisions an agent must engage in in order to
arrive at a unique interpretation for an utterance. If we assume a general prefer¬
ence for adjustments that occasion the least revision for an agent then the model
predicts that adjustments in interpretation will be preferred to adjustments in
conceptualisation which are in turn preferred to adjustments in the scheme of in¬
dividuation. Changing the scheme of individuation has consequences for both the
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conceptualisation and interpretation, changes to the conceptualisation alter the
idiolect but leave the scheme of individuation intact. Changes in interpretation
cause the least disturbance. Although this is speculative, it does illustrate a way
in which the model can be used to analyse semantic coordination.
The model of an agent characterises the semantics of idiolects in terms of in¬
formation flow determined by the existence of connections between instances of
things classified by the agent. This goes some way toward accommodating Put¬
nam's argument that the meaning of a term, at least its reference, is partially
determined by the actual nature of the stuff referred to. The appeal to classifica¬
tion of tokens 'in the world' has the consequence that the individuating types or
concepts, and the indicating relations between them, depend for their reliability
on the 'ultimate' nature of whatever is picked out. There is no suggestion that
these individuating concepts determine the extension of the things they classify,
only that the information flow and, thereby, semantics of the indicating relations
between types depends on the constitution of the connections they classify. This
element of indexicality feeds into the model of semantics for an idiolect. However,
Putnam's argument also requires a characterisation of meanings in a language not
just an idiolect. This characterisation is also necessary to deal with Burge's claims
concerning the role of a linguistic community in fixing the meaning of terms in
the language.
Translation
A translation, 7", is modelled as the channel formed by an indexed set of info-
morphisms between interpretations in a set S of idiolects {/,■ : /,• <— Tjigv. The
types of this classification are indicating relations, =>rt between the types in each
component idiolect. The connections are between the tokens of each idiolect.
This channel brings the discussion back to the characterisation of the theorist's
perspective, outlined in section 5.2.1, which determined various equivalences be-
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tween Matrix, Line, Path and Figural description types. The indicating relations
that determine translations between these types are characterised by the types of
T■ For example, a translation between Line and Matrix descriptions is a set of
indicating relations, formed from the infomorphisms, between interpretations in
Line based idiolects and interpretations in Matrix based idiolects.
Naturally, no theorist actually has veridical access to the structure of the com¬
ponent idiolects they aim to translate. Rather, this is inferred, as it was in the
discussion of the maze task, from e.g., patterns of co-occurrence of particular ex¬
pressions relating to the maze and comprehension as indexed by patterns in the
marking of locations. A translation between idiolects uses the theorist's idiolect to
determine the interpretations employed by each individual and the interrelations
between them. Depending on how the component infomorphisms are defined, a
number of translations are possible between idiolects.
The theorist's translation resolves the ambiguities and conflicts between idi¬
olects by determining relations that provide mappings between all the different
interpretations in the component idiolects, for example by treating "row" as in¬
dicating horizontally oriented elements in one and vertically oriented in another.
This allows that a single interpretation in one idiolect may map to several in
another.
Language
A characterisation of a language in some community involves a restriction of the
possible mappings between interpretations to those that determine unique map¬
pings between interpretations in each idiolect utilised in interaction.
A language, £, is a translation between a set S of idiolects {T\T\Tk . ..} such
that for each type 5',; G i and each T G S, there is only one type /■ G X* and only
one 11 G Tk such that 7j =>s, 7f.
This condition imports the idea of successful communication as a clear signal
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into the notion of a language. Interpretations may still vary between idiolects, but
each indicating relation in the language relates only a single interpretation type
from any idiolect. The types of a language represent the content of each expression
and the tokens, as connections between idiolects naturalise this content in terms of
the information flow supported in specific interactions. Importantly, the variation
admitted between idiolects means that this content is not necessarily reducible to
the associated interpretation type in any particular idiolect and it preserves the
intuition that the meaning of many terms of a language is inherently vague. A
term like "row" can relate interpretations that treat it as a horizontal, diagonal
or vertical set of elements. It also allows that where interpretations converge as
a result of repair so the content of a term as specified by the relevant type in the
language becomes more specific.
The set S of idiolects that contribute to a language determines the linguistic
community. This treats the choice of linguistic community as arbitrary depending
only on the presence of interconnections between them. This allows for a charac¬
terisation of sub-languages that emerge for the different experimental communities
as well as more general languages such as English.
5.4 Discussion
It was suggested in Chapter 2 that one possible reason for the persistence of
implicit or explicit appeals to some form of shared semantic code in explaining
mutual-intelligibility is the intuition that there must be one in order for commu¬
nication to be possible at all. The model described above provides a possible
account of communication that does not appeal to a code. There is no reliance
on individuals' associating the same, or even commensurable, interpretations with
utterances, only that there should be connections between them for communica¬
tion to occur. This was reflected in the definition of successful communication
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as a clear signal which depends on interpretations being mutually-indiscriminable
in the context of their current dialogue. The only condition on success is that
interlocutors can continue to coordinate their behaviour in a way appropriate to
the constraints placed on them by a particular task.
The model attempts to defuse the tension between cognitivist semantics and
broad content by isolating two different domains of semantic analysis: idiolects
and languages. The semantics of idiolects are characterised by reference to the
connections in the world that support information flow amongst the component
classifications in the idiolect. As noted above, this imports a degree of indexi-
cality into the notion of an interpretation that allows the types and indicating
relations in an agent's classifications to embody only partial characterisations of
the things they classify, and the relations between them. However, the appeal to
information flow in virtue of classification of things in the world leaves room for
the actual nature of what is classified to constrain the reliability of the indicating
relations employed in an idiolect. This provides important leverage in meeting the
difficulties raised by Putnam.
In order to characterise the semantics of a language the notion of a translation
was introduced with languages defined as a special case. In the model, a language
is a set of infomorphisms between idiolects that provides unique translations be¬
tween interpretations arrived at in interaction. This is intended to provide a level
of analysis which corresponds to what Putnam and Burge, and, to an extent, se¬
mantical realists, think of as the meaning of expressions in a language. The types
of a language £ were treated as determining the content of various expressions and
classify connections between interlocutors. This provides for a normative charac¬
terisation of content that need not be reducible to the interpretations employed
by any specific individual or set of individuals. The content of a term like "friend"
is modelled as an indicating relation between unique interpretations arrived at
by each individual, interpretations which may differ to an arbitrary degree. The
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only requirement is that the information flow between individuals is captured. As
a result, the semantics of a language in this framework is a generalisation over
interactions, and depends on how individuals coordinate their interpretations in
use.
Situations of the kind considered by Burge can be analysed by treating the
'deviant' use of "arthritis" as an exception to the appropriate indicating relation
between interpretations of arthritis in the patient's speech community. The as¬
sociated signalling relation supports many other interactions between the patient
in expressing other beliefs about arthritis, but is an exception in the case of the
expression of beliefs relating to arthritis in his thigh. For this model, the shift to
the counter-factual community, in which the 'deviant' interpretation is widely held,
alters the derived indicating relation in a way which ensures that, in this case, it
does classify the signalling relation.
With respect to the goal of modelling dialogue this model is incomplete in a
number of ways. Although it does suggest a way of characterising the semantics of
idiolects and languages it does not provide any dynamic mechanisms for modelling
how these structures change during the course of a dialogue. Such mechanisms are
necessary for an adequate account of how convergence in interpretations evolves
over the course of a dialogue and for accounting for the group-based effects ob¬
served in the maze experiments. In addition to its limitations in accounting for
semantic coordination, the model does not address other important aspects of the
successful conduct of communication. For example, 'higher order' concerns such as
planning models, intentions, game structures and speech acts (e.g. Airenti et ah,
1993; Cohen & Levesque, 1990; Grosz & Sidner, 1990; Kowtko, Isard, & Doherty,
1991). Nonetheless, it does provide a semantic framework on which these struc¬
tures could, at least in principle, be built. With respect to this aim, the model
of communication advanced here coulcl be advantageous. As Cohen and Levesque
(1993) have noted, one of the problems in developing adequate models of dialogue
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is the assumption that the literal meaning of utterances is automatically recog¬
nised by the parties to an interaction. This creates problems in accounting for
phenomena, such as backchannel responses, which seem to function primarily as
signals that the 'literal' meaning of an utterance has been understood (cf. Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1990; Clark & Schaefer, 1989). The relaxation of this assumption
in the current model may provide a way of overcoming these difficulties.
This model also has very little to say about more familiar semantic concerns
such as compositionality, anaphora and negation. The issues it is designed to
address do not speak directly to these concerns; however it is worth noting that
the structures provided by channel theory can be adapted to provide a normal
compositional syntax and semantics (e.g., Cooper, 1989, 1991). This could be




In cognitive science, semantic theory has two broadly separate lineages. One tra¬
dition, exemplified by semantical realism, analyses language effectively abstracted
away from users, treating it as an independent domain of investigation. The other
tradition, exemplified by semantical cognitivism, interposes cognitive structures
between language and the world, locating semantic analysis in the investigation of
regularities between cognitive states and interpretation. Although it is generally
acknowledged that the notion of meaning is bound up with the communicative
function of language, both traditions, it has been argued, proceed to the analysis
of semantic structures in a manner that overlooks this function. Both traditions
assume that communication is possible in virtue of "speaking the same language"
or possessing conceptual structures that are "sufficiently similar" but no explana¬
tion is given of what this consists of. This assumption implies a shared code model
ofmutual-intelligibility in which communicational success is apparently underwrit¬
ten by the existence, at some level, of a common semantic model. In theories that
do directly address communication, this assumption is frequently made explicit.
It has not been claimed that this is a necessary feature of these models, rather
that it has persisted as an unexamined, frequently tacit, assumption in theories
161
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directed toward other concerns. Consequently, in models that deal explicitly with
communication, a range of 'pragmatic' factors are countenanced as contributing to
interpretational asymmetries between interlocutors but they take effect only after
some literal or primitive semantic content of an utterance has been recovered (cf.
Rommetveit, 1983).
Taylor (1992) suggests that this situation has arisen as a consequence of an
adaption of informal discourse about communication into an argument which takes
as a premise the observation that successful communication is a commonplace
and reasons from this to the existence of some form of shared linguistic code.
In theoretical semantics this code has found expression in realist, structuralist
and naturalist forms but each variation draws support from the intuition that
language is, after all, mutually-intelligible and that this must depend ultimately
on some shared set of meanings. A central theme of this thesis has been that
another commonplace observation, namely, that we do not all understand exactly
the same thing by an utterance, ultimately undermines an appeal to a shared
code. The main body of this thesis has been concerned with establishing an
empirical case for the importance of icliolectical variation and then arguing from
this to conclusions about the nature of semantic theory. It has been suggested
that idiolectical variation is a semantic problem, that it cannot be discounted as
'noise' and that attempts to blunt the threat it poses by appeal to factors that
might naturalise a cocle are inadequate.
One property that is frequently cited in discussions of meaning is that it is a
normative notion: what an expression means is not a matter for individual deter¬
mination. Pace Humpty-Dumpty,1 meanings are not something that individuals
are free to legislate as they please, rather as McDowell (1984) puts it, there is
a 'contractual obligation' to conform to certain standards by which our use of
lu 'When I use a word' said Humpty dumpty in rather a scornful tone 'it means just what I
choose it to mean -neither more nor less' " (Carroll, 1962, p.75)
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an expression is judged correct or appropriate. For the semantical realist, this is
because there is some determinate fact about what a word actually means, inde¬
pendent of our, possibly mistaken, beliefs on the matter. The application of this
view in understanding communication is problematic since it is difficult to provide
an adequate explanation of how such facts about correct interpretation could ever
come to be internalised or perhaps apprehended by an individual. Semantical re¬
alists preserve a strong explanation of normativity at the expense of an account
of communication.
The alternative view, that meanings are cognitive entities faces the converse
problem, it does appear to explain intersubjectivity but faces problems in dealing
with normativity. Chapter 2 concentrated on the problems idiolectical variation
creates for determining an appropriate semantic ontology. It was noted there that
normativity may result from the presence of an interpretive strategy which involves
discounting these differences for 'most purposes'. However, there is also another
important strand of argument, deriving from Wittgenstein's (1958) remarks on
rule-following which argues, in principle, that cognitive states cannot be the sort
of things which account for normativity. It is useful to consider how this issue
relates to the concerns of this thesis.
Wittgenstein (1958) was concerned, amongst other things, with the problem
that we can never determine whether an individual has settled on the correct
interpretation of an expression, understood as an internalised rule, since their be¬
haviour is always consistent with indefinitely many possible interpretations. An
addressee's utterance of "four" in response to "two plus two" provides no guar¬
antee that the interpretation of "plus" is correct, since it may transpire on more
exhaustive examination that they offer 'deviant' responses where the numbers to
be added rise above, say, one thousand. In fact, for any finite number of exam¬
ples there are indefinitely many possible interpretations of "plus" consistent with
answers that appear to conform to the accepted meaning of the rule for addition.
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This is not just a point about induction; the problem is that nothing we can cite
about internalised rules can successfully narrow down the open horizon of possible
interpretations that could be consistent with them. Whatever mental state or rule
I have, through learning, come to associate with addition I may still reinterpret in
ways that are at odds with the normative meaning of "plus". For Ivripke (1982),
the upshot of this is that no sense can be made of the idea that an individual,
considered in isolation, can be understood as following a rule since there is no way
of giving substance to the claim that a rule or mental state has been (in)correctly
interpreted. Kripke, (but not Wittgenstein, see e.g., Baker & Hacker, 1984; Mc¬
Dowell, 1984), diagnoses this as a problem with the conception of interpretations
as correct or incorrect. His solution is to discard the idea that interpretation
should be analysed in terms of truth conditions in favour of assertion conditions.
What counts as a correct interpretation is thus something determined with re¬
spect to the practices of a particular linguistic community. The utterance "two
plus two is four" is not determinately true or false, rather, it is merely justified
by a community in which most individuals assent to its assertion. Consequently,
even granted a set of rules for interpretation, they cannot do the work we hope
since the rules must be applied in given instances and nothing can guarantee a
correct application. Kripke's anti-realist response to this is to appeal to warranted
assertions whose appropriateness is determined as a matter of "brute fact" in the
community.
The appeal to community assent brings the communicative aspects of language
into focus. It is through use in a community that the normative nature of mean¬
ing is cashed out. The Kripkensteinian arguments against interpretive realism
are similar to aspects of Garfinkel's (1967) critique of the role of shared knowl¬
edge in the Parsonian model of social order. The Parsonian approach discussed
in section 3.2.1 offers two main ways of accounting for intersubjectivity. In the
basic case, individuals share knowledge in virtue of making convergent discoveries
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about the objective world. As long as the knowledge is obtained, in each case,
by something approximating scientific methods convergence is assured. The sec¬
ond case, more pertinent to the current concerns, deals with shared knowledge of
socio-cultural institutions. Here, the appeal to objective discoveries according to
scientific method is of no avail since, for Parsons, there is no appropriate objective
structure to underwrite intersubjective convergence. Instead, Parsons appealed to
the internalisation of existing institutional/cultural practices or norms that limit
potential divergences in individual's perspectives, providing the necessary condi¬
tions for intersubjectivity. Communication, in particular, is achieved through the
internalisation of norms relating to the institutional use of a system of symbols
i.e., meanings established by the prior practices of the community.
Garfinkel (1967) objected to this view of intersubjectivity on the grounds that
the notion of "common" or "shared" at work in the Parsonian model did not, in
fact, provide an adequate guarantee of intersubjectivity. Garfinkel urged that even
if it is granted that a set of norms or symbols for governing interpretation were
somehow internalised this fact itself does not actually solve the problem of how
an individual determines an appropriate application of those rules.
"If no rule can 'itself step forward to claim its own instances' but
always awaits contingent application 'for another first time' , it neces¬
sarily follows that rules per se cannot determine the specifics of actual
conduct no matter how deeply internalised they are (Heritage, 1984;
p!24)
Garfinkel's proposal, following Schutz (1973), was that intersubjectivity should
not be understood as an 'in principle' problem requiring a philosophical or con¬
ceptual solution but rather as a practical problem that individuals deal with on
a clay to day basis. Rather than trying to account for the possibility of shared
knowledge,
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"'Shared' agreement refers to various social methods for accom¬
plishing member's recognition that something was said-according-to-
a-rule and not the demonstrable matching of substantive matters.
The appropriate image of a common understanding is therefore an
operation rather than a common intersection of overlapping sets."
(Garfinkel, 1967; p.30)
The rejection of realist accounts of intersubjectivity and the difficulties with
individualistically understood norms or rules leads both anti-realists and eth-
nomethodologists to a similar conclusion about the normative nature of meaning.
Like Kripke, ethnomethodology and, latterly, conversation analysis rejects the
idea that successful communication consists in some matching of internal states,
turning instead to the public practices of the community as a means of grounding
intersubjectivity and normativity. What marks the ethnomethodological approach
off from Kripke's anti-realism is that it treats intersubjective understanding as a
local, contingent, matter achieved for the first time in each interaction.
There is, however, a difficulty with this sort of appeal to communal practices
in that the kind of normativity it licenses seems to be too weak. Communities,
under the anti-realist conceptualisation look like arbitrary aggregations of individ¬
uals with a propensity to make certain noises under certain circumstances. This,
seems to lose sight of the intuition that language somehow gains traction, not just
on individuals but also the world. McDowell (1984) suggests that the notion of
justified and unjustified assertions, is a "thin surrogate" of what is required by
the intuitive notion of objectivity, ft appears as though the problem has been
moved rather than solved since we are still left with a residual question about
what the standards of correctness are for a community. Without some way of
linking the patterns of communal assent with the world it seems any arbitrary
pattern of assent will suffice for normativity. In the case of conversation analysis
we are offered a theory of the 'procedural infrastructure' of interaction but again,
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no obvious way of interleaving this with the intuition that language relates to the
world in some non-arbitrary way. (Heritage, 1984) regards this as part of a general
"ethnomethodological indifference" toward the objectivity of language and argues
that in ethnomethodological accounts the real world is temporarily 'bracketed' in
order to pursue other questions. In recent approaches to the sociology of science
and discourse analysis in social psychology the notion of an objective world has
dropped out completely, being treated as a purely discursive construction (see e.g.,
Leudar, 1991; Button & Sharrock, 1994).
The in-principle problem of accounting for the objective aspects of the norma-
tivity of meaning is thus intimately bound up with the notion of communication.
It seems we can maintain either the intuitive notion of objectivity or the intuitive
notion of intersubjectivity but not both. Like informal discourse about meaning,
as captured by the conduit metaphor, theoretical discourse seems to be driven by
a basic dilemma. This thesis has attempted to resolve this dilemma by appealing
to both objective and communal features of linguistic practice. The result has
been a claim that there are two domains of analysis appropriate to an account of
meaning; idiolects and languages, and that it is in the interaction between these
two domains that the requisite properties emerge. In some respects this is similar
to the ethnomethodological account, but there are some important discontinuities.
Taken literally, Heritage's suggestion that the interpretation of normative rules is
"achieved for the first time" in each interaction leaves no account of how different
communities can ever converge toward particular interpretations, in turn, imply¬
ing that social order is actually illusory. There seems to be no way of accounting
for the fact that communities converge, in an apparently regular way, on certain
patterns of making sense rather than others. It is not at all clear how the effects
of interference between 'sub-communities' reported in chapter 4 can be accounted
for on this picture. On the ethnomethodological view, intersubjectivity is held to
rely on a symmetry of methods or procedures for making sense (see e.g., Heritage,
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1984; p.179 and p.153) and in this respect appears similar to the appeal made
here to processes of repair. However, there must also be an account of how the
methods and procedures change to explain how individuals actually arrive at the
situation of symmetry. As noted earlier, in CA the specification of procedures
for the maintenance of intersubjectivity proceeds at a level for which cognitive or
individualistic interpretations are explicitly disavowed. The suggestion here has
been that what individuals are repairing is precisely something cognitive, they are
trying to arrive at some situation in which their inferences about the links between
utterances and states of affairs provide for more reliable coordination of behaviour
with their interlocutors.
Although this account appeals directly to the cognitive states of individuals in
characterising the competences that underpin interaction it does not rely on these
alone in accounting for semantic content. Intentional content, as it is normally
understood, has been treated as an emergent property of interaction, in particular,
of the need to coordinate action through language. The fact that we consider
utterances to be about things has been treated as a consequence of the ways in
which we can use utterances, in concert with others, in order to achieve things.
Effectively, aspects of both the realist and anti-realist accounts of normativity
have been combined in an attempt to provide a more satisfactory model of the
way meaning forms a link between expressions and states of affairs. This has been
done in a way that does not treat this link as a code but nonetheless provides for
the possibility of mutual-intelligibility.
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